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ABSTRACT 
The background of the project is based on the notion of ubiquitous computing. 
Ubiquitous computing was introduced as a prospective view about future usage of 
computers. Smaller and cheaper computer chips will enable us to embed 
computing ability into any appliances. Along with the convenience brought by 
ubiquitous computing, its inherent features also exposed its weaknesses. It makes 
things too easy for a malicious user to spy on others. 
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a tool used to protect computer 
resources against malicious activities. Existing IDSs have several weaknesses that 
hinder their direct application to ubiquitous networks. These shortcomings are 
caused by their lack of considerations about the heterogeneity, flexibility and 
resource constraints of ubiquitous networks. Thus the evolution towards 
ubiquitous computing demands a new generation of resource-efficient IDSs to 
provide sufficient protections against malicious activities. 
SUIDS is the first intrusion detection system proposed for ubiquitous 
computing environments. It keeps the special requirements of ubiquitous 
computing in mind throughout its design and implementation. SUIDS adopts a 
layered and distributed system architecture, a novel user-centric design and 
service-oriented detection method, a new resource-sensitive scheme, including 
protocols and strategies, and a novel hybrid metric based algorithm. These novel 
methods and techniques used in SUIDS set a new direction for future research and 
development. As the experiment results demonstrated, SUIDS is able to provide a 
robust and resource-efficient protection for ubiquitous computing networks. It 
ensures the feasibility of intrusion detection in ubiquitous computing 
environments. 
1 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
My thanks go to the School of Computing and Mathematical Sciences, 
Liverpool John Moores University for their funding of this project. I would like to 
thank my supervisors, Dr. Qi Shi and Prof. Madjid Merabti for their help and 
`fishing' me out from many applicants. In particular, I would like to thank Dr. Qi 
Shi for his trust, support, friendship, encouragement, inspiration and patience to 
correct my `perfect' Chinglish. I would like to thank Prof. Madjid Merabti for his 
friendship and belief in me as a researcher. 
My thanks go to the researchers and staff at Liverpool John Moores 
University for their support over the past years. I would like to thank (in no order): 
Steph Hogan, Carol Oliver, David Llewellyn-Jones, Mengjie Yu, Sareer Badshah, 
Tom Bailey, Gurleen Arora, Humayun Bakht, Bob Askwith, John Haggerty, 
Faycal Bouhafs, Henry Chang, Paul Fergus, Kashif Kifayat, Jennifer Tang, Ruth 
Thompson, Catherine Watts, Yuanyuan Shen, and Denis Reilly. In particular, my 
thanks go to David Llewellyn-Jones for his help and advice on Latex and Mengjie 
Yu for his friendship. 
Finally, and by far most importantly, I would like to thank my family for their 
care, support, and trust over the years. Thanks to mum and dad. They created the 
opportunity for their son to study overseas. They kept belief in their son even 
when he was at the darkest moment. Thanks to my girlfriend, Daisy, for her 
patience and comfort despite my fussy temper under pressures. Without her 
understanding and care, this project would have never been completed. 
11 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 1 
1.2 Project aims and objectives 2 
1.3 Novel contribution of this project 3 
1.4 Project achievements 4 
1.5 Thesis organisation 5 
1.6 Summary 9 
CHAPER TWO: THE ROAD TOWARDS UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
2.1 A brief history of computer networks 10 
2.2 Network architectures 12 
2.3 Concept of ubiquitous computing 15 
2.4 Summary 18 
CHAPTER THREE: NETWORK SECURITY AND 
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
3.1 Network security 19 
3.2 Intrusion detection systems 24 
3.2.1 Signature-based and anomaly-based IDS 26 
3.2.2 Host-based and network-based IDS 27 
3.3 Summary 28 
CHAPTER FOUR: LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT IDSS 
FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
4.1 Cost-efficient solutions 29 
4.2 Hierarchically distributed solutions 31 
4.3 Cooperative solutions 33 
4.4 Mobile agent based solutions 35 
4.5 Summary 38 
CHAPTER FIVE: SUIDS AND ITS SIMULATION 
5.1 Design of SUIDS 40 
5.1.1 Application scenario 40 
111 
5.1.2 Nodes classification 42 
5.1.3 System architecture 43 
5.1.4 Service-oriented intrusion detection 44 
5.1.5 Concept of a user-centric model 46 
5.2 Simulation of SUIDS 49 
5.2.1 A simulation scenario 49 
5.2.2 Service nodes classification 52 
5.2.3 User scenario 53 
5.2.4 Intrusion auditing 54 
5.3 Summary 55 
CHAPTER SIX: REAL-TIME INTRUSION DETECTION WITH A 
STRING-BASED APPROACH 
6.1 Detection methods 56 
6.1.1 Structure of event record 56 
6.1.2 Mathematical model 57 
6.1.3 Historical statistics: representation of long-term behaviours 58 
6.1.4 String: representation of short-term behaviours 58 
6.2 Experiments and results 59 
6.3 Summary 62 
CHAPTER SEVEN: IMPROVED CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC TEST 
7.1 Detection methods 63 
7.1.1 Chi-square statistic test 64 
7.1.2 Case study: monitor Mike's usage on a printer 65 
7.2 Experiments and results 68 
7.3 Summary 74 
CHAPTER EIGHT: ACHIEVING ENERGY-EFFICIENCY IN SUIDS 
8.1 Energy-efficiency in SUIDS 75 
8.1.1 Energy consumptions in SUIDS 76 
8.1.2 Save computing energy by using head nodes 76 
8.1.3 Save communication energy by splitting user profiles 77 
8.1.4 Choose proxy nodes based on a hybrid metric 78 
8.2 Experiments and performance analysis 80 
8.2.1 Modified simulation environment 80 
8.2.2 Effect of the hybrid metric 83 
iv 
8.2.3 Head nodes' density and distribution 84 
8.2.4 User nodes' mobility 86 
8.3 Summary 88 
CHAPTER NINE: BALANCING INTRUSION DETECTION 
RESOURCES IN SUIDS 
9.1 Selecting a proxy node based on additional factors 90 
9.1.1 Remaining energy and storage space 91 
9.1.2 Available computing ability 91 
9.1.3 Trust 92 
9.2 The protocol 94 
9.3 Experiments and performance analysis 97 
9.3.1 Effect of the hybrid metric on network lifetime 97 
9.3.2 Enhanced security policy under attacks 99 
9.4 Summary 101 
CHAPTER TEN: SUIDS EVALUATION 
10.1 Requirements on IDSs in ubiquitous computing 102 
10.2 Evaluation of SUIDS 105 
10.2.1 System architecture 105 
10.2.2 Resource efficiency 107 
10.2.3 Detection effectiveness 108 
10.3 Summary 110 
CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
11.1 Conclusions 111 
11.2 Future work 116 
11.3 Summary 117 
REFERENCES 119 
APPENDIX A 135 
APPENDIX B 152 
V 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1 Number of Internet hosts. 11 
Figure 2.2 ISO OSI 7-layer reference model. 13 
Figure 2.3 Nested layer headers. 15 
Figure 3.1 Attack types related to computer networks. 20 
Figure 3.2 Examples of attack types and system targets. 22 
Figure 3.3 Examples of security countermeasures at 
different network layers. 24 
Figure 3.4 A basic model of IDS. 25 
Figure 4.1 A conceptual model for an IDS Agent. 34 
Figure 5.1 Example of Mike's smart home. 41 
Figure 5.2 System hierarchy for Mark's smart home. 44 
Figure 5.3 High-level operation of the user agent. 47 
Figure 5.4 System structure of the user-centric model. 49 
Figure 5.5 Initial state of the simulated environment. 50 
Figure 5.6 A snapshot of the simulated environment during executions. 51 
Figure 7.1 The decay effect with 2, set to 0.3. 66 
Figure 7.2 Values of X2 for normal data. 69 
Figure 7.3 Values of X2 for anomalous data with all the results for 
events 1-2596. 71 
Figure 7.4 Values of X2 for anomalous data with partial results for 
events 1501-1600. 71 
Figure 7.5 Values of X2 for mixed data. 73 
Figure 8.1 Three metrics will work out different proxy nodes. 80 
Figure 8.2 Modified simulation environment with GTSNetS. 82 
Figure 8.3 Impact of the proposed hybrid metric. 84 
Figure 8.4 Use of head nodes from one to five. 85 
Figure 8.5 Four head nodes with different distribution patterns. 86 
Figure 8.6 Effects of users' velocities. 87 
Figure 8.7 Effect of users' thinking times. 88 
V1 
Figure 9.1 Process for the selection of a proxy node. 95 
Figure 9.2 Impact of the proposed hybrid metric. 99 
Figure 9.3 Proxy selection distributions before attacks. 100 
Figure 9.4 Proxy selection distributions under attacks. 101 
vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 4.1 A summary of the introduced IDSs. 39 
Table 6.1 Increment of Q decreases as the string length increases . 60 
Table 6.2 False positive rate (String length = 80, Ne = 854). 61 
Table 6.3 Hit rate (String length = 80, Ne' = 181). 62 
Table 7.1 Observation values for vectors of {Xo, Xi, ..., X9). 66 
Table 7.2 False alarm rates and hit rates (by both records and sessions) 
for a combined data set. 73 
Table 10.1 Comparing SUIDS with other IDSs in respect of 
system architectures. 106 
Table 10.2 Drawbacks of current resource efficient solutions for IDSs. 108 
Table 10.3 Comparison of two detection methods. 109 
viii 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
With the continuous growth and development of computer networks, the 
notion of ubiquitous computing introduced by Mark Weiser has received 
increasing attention. However, this evolution faces a barrier. On the one hand, 
people want to construct a ubiquitous network to make the best use of computers; 
on the other hand, they must secure their network in order to cope with a number 
of security threats from malicious entities. One solution for this is to use an 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS). This chapter is organized as follows. First, the 
topic of the thesis is presented with its aims. Second, the novel contribution of the 
new approach posited in the thesis is presented. Third, an overview of the chapters 
of the thesis is presented. Finally, the chapter is summarized. 
1.1 Background 
With the wide spread of computers, our daily lives are highly computerised 
and closely connected with computer networks. In the near future, one will be 
able to open a door by simply sending an order to the electric door lock from 
his/her PDA, or read news on a computer embedded "e-paper" with the content 
updated through wireless connections [52]. The trend towards a computerised 
smart space is part of the conception of ubiquitous computing [1,155]. In the era 
of ubiquitous computing, devices with computing and communicating abilities 
will surround us all over. Eventually it will achieve the non-intrusive availability 
of computers throughout physical environments. For example, hundreds of little 
appliances (e. g. computer embedded notes, pens and coffee machines) in a smart 
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office will be seamlessly integrated into a work environment, gently enhancing an 
occupant's everyday activities [47]. 
Just like other networks, one of the main prerequisites for a ubiquitous 
network is adequate security [32,90,142]. The network has to be properly 
secured so that it can be relied upon. Intrusion Detection Systems [4,5,31] are 
widely used to protect computer networks. If an intrusion is detected quickly 
enough, the intruder can be identified and ejected from the system before any 
damage is done or any data are compromised. Moreover, an effective intrusion 
detection system can even serve as a deterrent, acting to prevent intrusions. 
Traditional IDSs, which were originally developed for wired networks, are 
not suitable for ubiquitous computing due to the unique characteristics and 
inherent vulnerabilities of the environemnt. This unfitness directly compromises 
the effectiveness and efficiency of existing IDSs. For example, with the concept 
of ubiquitous computing, there must be some small-size devices in order to 
achieve unaware deployment. Inevitably, they will have limited energy supplies 
and storage spaces. An obvious issue is how to implement an IDS in a 
resource-effective way [94]. This is a big challenge since one of the most 
desirable features for an IDS is real-time detection and response, which is 
extremely energy consuming. Another key issue is related to the system 
architecture. Current host-based IDSs do not fit for ubiquitous computing due to 
the nodes' capacity constraints, while network-based IDSs simply cannot capture 
inside users' activities as the network's infrastructure tends to be heterogeneous. 
In chapter four these limitations are discussed in depth. 
1.2 Project aims and objectives 
The above discussion indicates that the evolution towards ubiquitous 
computing demands a new generation of resource-efficient IDSs to provide 
sufficient protections against malicious activities [105]. The aim of the project is 
to design such an IDS, which is able to minimize the use of system resources such 
as energy consumptions and communication overhead. It should have an 
appropriate system architecture and detection strategy to be flexible and scalable. 
The IDS must also be able to detect intrusions effectively, e. g. with a high hit rate 
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and a low false alarm rate. 
The objectives of this project are: 
" To provide a background to ubiquitous computing and demonstrate the 
unfitness of existing IDSs when applying them to ubiquitous computing 
environments. 
" To posit the requirements for an appropriate IDS that is associated with 
resource-sensitive design and distributed modules' deployment. 
" To present the design of a system (i. e. SUIDS, standing for 
Service-oriented and User-centric Intrusion Detection System) that detects 
attacks at the service layer and builds a defence wall against malicious 
users. 
" To propose an original set of mechanisms, strategies and protocols that 
together achieve resource-efficiency in SUIDS. 
To prototype the SUIDS system in order to provide proof-of-concept for 
proposed work and perform an assessment in relation to the proposed 
requirements, where possible. 
1.3 Novel contribution of this project 
The key points of novelty of this project include: 
A layered and distributed system architecture, which is seamlessly 
embedded into ubiquitous computing environments. By categorizing 
system nodes into three major groups, SUIDS is more scalable and 
adaptable in order to fit for various network scenarios. 
"A novel user-centric design and service-oriented detection method. By 
giving mobility to detection modules, SUIDS is able to react to malicious 
activities in real-time. It detects anomalies at the service level rather than 
relying only on the information from network layer. 
"A new resource-sensitive scheme, including protocols and strategies. By 
allowing delegation of intrusion detection tasks to proxy nodes, SUIDS 
provides satisfactory intrusion detection service coverage to those nodes 
that are incapable of running IDS independently. 
A novel hybrid metric based algorithm. In order to balance system 
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resources such as CPU usage, network overhead, storage space, and 
energy consumption, SUIDS uses a hybrid metric to measure these factors 
together for the dynamic determination of cost-effective intrusion 
detection deployment. A node's trustworthiness is also considered in this 
hybrid metric to enhance the system's security policy. 
" Critical assessment methods to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the proposed IDS model. The effectiveness of SUIDS is reflected by its 
high hit rates on anomalies and low false alarm rates. Its efficiency is 
shown on deducted energy consumptions. 
1.4 Project achievements 
SUIDS is among the first intrusion detection systems proposed for ubiquitous 
computing environments. It keeps the special requirements of ubiquitous 
computing in mind throughout its design and implementation. The methods used 
in SUIDS set a new direction for future research and development. Practically, it 
ensures the feasibility and realization of intrusion detection in ubiquitous 
computing. 
The outcomes of our research have generated the following conference and 
journal papers: 
" B. Zhou, Q. Shi, and M. Merabti. Intrusion detection in ubiquitous 
computing environments. Proceedings of EPSRC Sixth Annual Network 
Symposium on the Convergence of Telecommunications, Network and 
Broadcasting (PGNet'05), Liverpool, UK, Jun. 2005, pp. 344-9. 
" B. Zhou, Q. Shi, and M. Merabti. A novel service-oriented and 
user-centric intrusion detection system for ubiquitous networks. 
Proceedings of TASTED International Conference on Communication, 
Network and Information Security (CNIS'05), Phoenix, Arizona, USA, 
Nov. 2005, pp. 76-81. 
9 B. Zhou, Q. Shi, and M. Merabti. A framework for intrusion detection in 
heterogeneous environments. Proceedings of IEEE Consumer 
Communications and Networking Conference (CCNC'06), v2, Las Vegas, 
USA, Jan. 2006, pp. 1244-8. 
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9 B. Zhou, Q. Shi, and M. Merabti. Real-time intrusion detection in 
ubiquitous networks with a string-based approach. Proceedings of IET 
International Conference on Computational Science and its Applications 
(ICCSA 2006), Part4, LNCS 3983, Glasgow, UK, May 2006, pp. 352-9. 
" B. Zhou, Q. Shi, and M. Merabti. A survey of intrusion detection 
solutions towards ubiquitous computing. Proceedings of 1st conference on 
Advances in Computer Security and Forensics, Liverpool, UK, Jul. 2006, 
pp. 31-40. 
" B. Zhou, Q. Shi, and M. Merabti. Intrusion detection in pervasive 
networks based on a chi-square statistic test. Proceedings of 30th IEEE 
Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference 
(COMPSAC06), Chicago, USA, Sept. 2006, pp. 203-8. 
" B. Zhou, Q. Shi, and M. Merabti. Balancing intrusion detection related 
energy in ubiquitous computing networks. Journal of Information 
Assurance and Security, vol. 1, issue 4, Dec. 2006, pp. 275-80. 
" B. Zhou, Q. Shi, and M. Merabti. Resource-efficient intrusion detection in 
pervasive computing. Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on 
Communications (ICC 2007), Glasgow, UK, Jun. 2007, in press. 
" B. Zhou, Q. Shi, and M. Merabti. Balancing intrusion detection resources 
in ubiquitous computing networks. Journal of Computer Communications, 
under review. 
The simulation environment created in this project could be used as a primary 
testbed for other researches related to ubiquitous computing. 
1.5 Thesis organisation 
Chapter two: Chapter two reviews the history of computer networking and 
presents its future direction. Since the first set of computers connected together in 
the late 1960's, millions more computers have joined the network and formed an 
enormous cyber-world - Internet. Based on a layered architecture and well 
designed communication protocols, various computers on different platforms are 
able to communicate with one another under the same standard. In the near future, 
with the continuous growth and development of computer and network 
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technologies, it will enter the next stage of information era - ubiquitous 
computing. Smaller and cheaper computer chips will embed computing ability 
into any appliances, from a greeting card to a smart home. People's daily lives 
will be closely connected with computers and beneficially become ever 
convenient. Finally, along with the benefits, vulnerabilities of ubiquitous 
computing are discussed. Security is one of the major concerns for any computer 
network, including ubiquitous computing. 
Chapter three: This chapter briefly introduces some attacks and 
countermeasures involved in computer security. In computer security, intrusions 
are defined as any malicious activities that could compromise the integrity, 
confidentiality, or availability of networks and information sources. There are 
many types of attacks on computer systems. As a second line of defence, IDSs 
play an important role in computer security, especially in the fight against attacks 
launched inside a network. The principles and classifications of IDSs are 
introduced in this chapter. 
Chapter four: This chapter presents a critical survey on existing IDSs and the 
state of the art in intrusion detection related to ubiquitous computing. Although 
the research in intrusion detection started decades ago, its application to 
ubiquitous computing is new. Limitations and drawbacks of current IDSs are 
discussed. In particular, they cannot fulfil the special requirements of ubiquitous 
computing in respect of resource-efficiency and system architecture. An IDS in 
ubiquitous computing should not require transmitting or processing a large 
amount of audit data or attacking signatures. It should have a distributed or 
cooperative detection scheme instead of a centralized system architecture. In order 
to provide all-sided protection, resource constrained nodes in ubiquitous 
computing networks need special considerations for the design of an IDS. This 
chapter demonstrates the demand for a resource-efficient and robust IDS in such 
networks. 
Chapter five: In this chapter, the system architecture and framework of our 
novel solution SUIDS are introduced. SUIDS is an adaptive and resource-efficient 
intrusion detection system with a novel service-oriented auditing mechanism and 
flexible user-centric design. In SUIDS network nodes are classified into three 
categories: head nodes, user nodes and services nodes. By working together with 
service-oriented (software) agents, SUIDS is able to reliably and effectively detect 
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malicious activities of inside users. It is suitable for heterogeneous environments 
such as ubiquitous computing networks. The simulation work of SUIDS is also 
provided in this chapter. As a research scenario, a smart home is simulated by 
using the Georgia Tech Network Simulator (GTNetS). 
Chapter six: SUIDS is an anomaly-based intrusion detection system. Its 
detection algorithm and experiment results are presented in this chapter. To detect 
anomalies, SUIDS builds a profile for each user. The user's profile consists of the 
user's long-term behaviour, represented by his/her usage of service nodes. To 
achieve real-time detection, a string is utilized in the user profile to represent the 
user's short-term behaviour in due course. Every time a new event record arrives, 
the user profile is updated and the deviations between long-term and short-term 
behaviours are calculated. An appropriate string length and threshold value work 
together to balance the system's false alarm rate and detection effectiveness. With 
a carefully selected string length and threshold value, SUIDS can achieve a high 
hit rate while keeping the false alarm rate low. 
Chapter seven: This chapter refines the detection method of SUIDS in order 
to improve its performance in terms of both detection effectiveness and efficiency. 
Instead of using a string, an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) 
technique is used to smooth out the observation value for the variables being 
tracked. In this way, the observation reflects the `most recent past' characteristics 
of variables in an online fashion. It applies the smoothing constant in a user 
profile to represent the user's short-term behaviour in real-time. The deviations 
between a user's short-term behaviour and long-term profile are measured by 
using a chi-square statistic test. This method can measure not only the probability 
distributions of variables, but also their occurrence patterns. 
Chapter eight: The inherent features of ubiquitous computing request SUIDS 
to give special concerns about the issue of resource-efficiency. This chapter 
presents a comprehensive analysis of energy consumed in SUIDS and proposes a 
profile splitting technique in order to reduce the energy consumptions. The energy 
consumed in SUIDS is categorized into two parts: computing-related and 
communication-related. Head nodes are used to save the computing-related 
energy. User profiles are managed in a distributed pattern to reduce the 
communication-related cost. A hybrid metric is used to measure multiple 
energy-related factors: transmission power, remaining energy, and energy 
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consumption rates. In order to balance energy consumptions among network 
nodes, proxy nodes can be selected based on the hybrid metric to share intrusion 
detection burdens with service nodes. In this way, the SUIDS achieves better 
performance in respect of energy-efficiency, so the network lifetime is 
beneficially extended. 
Chapter nine: This chapter extends the work of chapter eight and takes more 
system resources into account during the selection of proxy nodes. Specifically, 
three deciding resources are considered in this chapter: energy, computing ability 
and trust level. A node's computing availability is measured by correlating with its 
energy usage. A faster energy consumption rate of the node means less computing 
ability available to intrusion detection. And its trust level is estimated based on 
multi-factors including its energy consumption pattern and `safe time'. A new 
conditional hybrid metric is proposed in order to balance these limited resources 
together. The system's security policy is beneficially enhanced due to the 
consideration of nodes' trustworthiness. 
Chapter ten: In this chapter, the requirements on IDSs in ubiquitous 
computing networks are reviewed. The performance of SUIDS is evaluated 
against these requirements. A successful IDS operating on ubiquitous computing 
networks must have the following five features: real-time detection, scalability 
and adaptability, full coverage, resource efficiency, and detection effectiveness. 
Comparing with existing solutions, SUIDS is the first IDS keeping the special 
requirements of ubiquitous computing in mind before its design and 
implementation. Specifically, SUIDS achieves real-time detection by giving 
mobility to its detection modules. The classification of network nodes and usage 
of lightweight agents make it scalable and adaptable. SUIDS considers capacity 
constrained nodes by adopting proxy nodes. Its novel hybrid metric balances 
multiple system resources, and in the meantime, it achieves high detection 
effectiveness while keeping the false alarm rate low. SUIDS provides a robust and 
resource-efficient protection for ubiquitous computing networks. 
Chapter eleven: This chapter presents conclusions and future work. 
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1.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of this thesis. In the near future, 
computing is becoming ubiquitous. Tiny embedded processes with the abilities of 
computing and communication will spread everywhere for the purpose of sensing, 
control and information display. Security protection, as an inevitable and critical 
issue, must be provided properly before the large-scale implementation and 
deployment of ubiquitous computing. Traditional IDSs are not fit for such an 
environment due to the resources constraints and heterogeneous infrastructure of 
ubiquitous computing. Therefore, this thesis provides a new and novel solution to 
the problem: SUIDS. This system adopts a flexible and adaptive system 
architecture to provide resource-efficient security protection against malicious 
activities. In the next chapter, the history of computer networks and the trend 
towards ubiquitous computing are introduced. 
9 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE ROAD TOWARDS UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Many years after the invention, computers were supposed to work alone, 
running their own programs locally. This situation has changed in the late 1960's. 
A set of computers were connected together to allow remote access to computer 
resources. Since then, the world witnessed one of the greatest miracles in human 
history - Internet. In this chapter, we first introduce the history of computer 
networks, and then talk about the network structure underneath. Just like a 
language in human society, TCP/IP enables various computers and network 
hardware and software to communicate with each another under the same standard. 
Soon, with the continuous growth and development of computer and network 
technologies, we will enter the next stage of information era - ubiquitous 
computing. 
2.1 A brief history of computer networks 
In computer science, a network can be defined as a system for connecting 
computers by using transmission technology [23]. In the early time, computers 
were huge and expensive. They were hardly moved due to their large footprint. 
The computers' computing abilities were also limited. Programs took a long time 
to run. At that time, computers were `luxuries' and only deployed in the top 
research labs. 
In late 1960's, ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency) initiated a 
project aiming to connect researchers with computers [129]. The objective of the 
project was to enable researchers to remotely access to expensive computer 
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resources. As a result, ARPAnet - child of the ARPA project - became the first 
prototype of modern networks. Although it used a connection of only 50 kbits/s, 
ARPAnet brought a fundamental change from centralized to distributed 
computing and incorporated features of reliability and robustness, e. g. multiple 
links and distributed routing. 
Computer networking is very complex. Before ARPA, there were many 
different hardware and software technologies from wired to wireless and from 
undersea optical fibber to home used infrared. No one technology is appropriate 
for every scenario. The occurrence of TCP/IP protocol glues together networks of 
many dissimilar technologies with routers [24,146]. TCP/IP were developed in 
late 1970s and ARPAnet switched to TCP/IP in early 80's. The first switchover 
occurred in 1983 and it is regarded as the start of one of the greatest inventions - 
Internet. 
Internet is defined as a set of networks connected by routers that are 
configured to pass traffic among any computers attached to networks in the set 
[23]. The global Internet is growing exponentially since its advent [22]. Initially 
the Internet had only a few hundred computers and a few dozen sites. Today, 
millions of computers and thousands of networks world-wide are connected 
together. No one knows the exact size of the Internet [34]. The recent ISC 
(Internet Systems Consortium) domain survey shows the growth of Internet in the 
past decade. 
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Fig. 2.1: Number of Internet hosts (Source: www. isc. Orq). 
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Internet also brought a new industry. Companies like Cisco [21], IBM [71] 
and Microsoft [104] continuously work out new products on networking hardware, 
computers and relevant software. Today, Internet has become a new phenomenon 
that networks are an important part of everyday activities. Through Internet, we 
can do shopping at home, finish a degree without going to an university, and make 
friends with people from anywhere of the world ... In many ways, it changes the 
way we live. 
2.2 Network architectures 
Hardware alone can't solve all computer communication problems. Software 
for Local Area Network (LAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN) systems 
provides high-level interface to applications. Standards have been adopted to 
allow a heterogeneous group of computers using a multitude of operating system 
software to communicate with one another. The layering model is a well known 
structuring solution to organize the complex networking software design and 
implementation. A layer on one machine communicates directly with the 
corresponding or peer layer on another machine to which it is connected. The 
rules and conventions which allow this communication to take place are enforced 
through layer protocols. They specify the format and meaning of messages 
exchanged between computers across a network. The set of protocols used in the 
communication between systems provides a network architecture. 
The International Standards Organization's (ISO) Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) 7-layer reference model is the most widely-used model [30]. 
It is a guide to the design of a network protocol suite. Layers are named and 
numbered from bottom to top as shown in Fig. 2.2. Each layer fulfils specific 
functions in the communications between the two computers. The application 
layer consists of a number of protocols that are commonly needed, for example, 
File Transfer Protocol (FTP) [117] and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) 
[116]. The presentation layer defines the common formats for the representation 
of data. The session layer manages sessions such as login to a remote computer. 
The transport layer is designed to let computers carry on a conversation and is the 
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heart of the whole protocol hierarchy [149]. Two types of transport service, i. e. 
the connection-oriented Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the 
connectionless User Datagram Protocol (UDP), work at this layer to ensure the 
reliable delivery of data between computers [24,25,146,149]. The network layer 
is in charge of address assignment and data delivery across a physical network by 
using the Internet Protocol (IP). The data link layer formats data in frames and 
delivers frames through a network interface. The physical layer includes basic 
network hardware such as RS-232 or Ethernet [24,25,146,149]. 
Sender computer 
Layer 7 Application 
Receiver computer 
Application 
Identical 
----------- ----------- message 
Layer 61 Presentation Presentation 
Identical 
----------- ----------- message 
Layer 51 Session Session 
Identical 
----------- ----------- message 
Layer 4 Transport Transport 
Identical 
----------- ----------- message 
Layer 31 Network Network 
Identical 
----------- ----------- message 
Layer 21 Data Link Data Link 
Identical 
----------- ----------- message 
Layer 1 Physical (network hardware) 
Fig. 2.2 ISO OSI 7-layer reference model. 
IP is an unreliable, connectionless delivery service, so there are no guarantees 
that an IP datagram will reach its destination [24,91]. In IP, data are transmitted 
in small and independent pieces, i. e. packets or datagrams. Each packet placed on 
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the network will be automatically routed through a number of networks until it 
reaches its destination. Packets travel independently and may follow different 
paths based on the network's status. The source divides outgoing messages into 
packets and the destination reassembles received packets to get the original data. 
Packets may be delivered out of order, especially in systems that include multiple 
networks. It can be detected and corrected through sequencing. The sender 
attaches a sequence number to each outgoing packet and the receiver uses the 
sequence number to put packets in order and detects missing packets. Lost packets 
perhaps are the most widespread problem. Any error such as a bit error or network 
congestion may cause a packet to be discarded or undelivered. Protocols use 
positive acknowledgments with retransmissions to detect and correct lost packets. 
The packet receiver sends a short message acknowledging receipt of packets. The 
sender sets a timer for each outgoing packet and infers lost packets from missing 
acknowledgments. If a timer expires before the acknowledgment is received, the 
sender will retransmit the lost packets. 
The flexible layered architecture allows multiple networks and computers to 
connect in a seamless way, irrespective of the requirements demanded by various 
applications. Software implemented from the layered design has layered 
organization. The software for each layer depends only on the services of the 
software provided by lower layers. The software at layer n at the destination 
receives exactly the same protocol message sent by layer n at the sender (Fig. 2.2). 
It means the protocols can be tested independently and replaced within a protocol 
stack. The software at each layer communicates with the corresponding layer 
through information stored in headers. Each layer adds its header to the front of a 
message from the next higher layer. Headers are nested at the front of the message 
as the message traverses the network (Fig. 2.3). On the sender side, each layer 
accepts an outgoing message from the layer above, adds a header and other 
processing information, and passes the resulting message to the next lower layer. 
On the receiver side, each layer receives an incoming message from the layer 
below, removes the header for that layer, performs any other processing, and 
passes the resulting message to the next higher layer. 
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Original user data 
Layer 7 header 
Layer 6 header 
Layer 5 header 
Layer 4 header 
Laver 3 header 
Layer 2 header 
Fig. 2.3 Nested layer headers. 
2.3 Concept of ubiquitous computing 
The term of ubiquitous computing was brought out by Xerox PARC (Palo 
Alto Research Center) in 1991. It was first mentioned in Mark Weiser's article 
"The Computer for the 21S` century" [155]. The author explained that the most 
powerful and successful technologies are those that naturally blend into our world 
until they are effectively invisible. These technologies become human's second 
nature due to their usefulness and wide availability. People stop thinking of 
themselves as using a technology; instead, they just consider themselves capable 
of doing whatever the technology enables. A good example is the telephone [32]. 
If people say "I spoke to my brother in London this morning", we understand 
implicitly that they used the telephone networks to do so. We would never hear 
someone saying like "This morning I used the telephone networks to speak ... " 
Just like the telephones, computing is becoming ubiquitous as well. Five 
trends indicate the technical feasibility of this change [102,147]. The first trend is 
given by Moore's law [106]. It states that the number of transistors on the same 
chip area doubles every eighteen months. Thus, the price of computer chips are 
getting lower and their sizes are getting smaller. It makes integrating computer 
chips into daily items become possible. The second trend is the emergence of new 
materials. Smart paper [40][45] for example provides a new interaction scheme 
with IT systems: a thin and flexible plastic foil contains the electronic ink that can 
display information as well as be used as an input device with a special pencil. 
Progress in communication technologies dominates the third trend. Except for 
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higher bandwidth, mobile networks like mobile phones or mobile ad-hoc 
networks have been widely deployed in recent years. No matter sitting in a cafe or 
airport lounge with a small PDA, people can easily be kept updated of their 
business. Progress in sensor technology is the fourth trend: like computer chips, 
sensors are getting smaller and cheaper, so that they can be integrated into 
everyday items to observe surrounding environments. A milk bottle for example 
could calculate its expiry date depending on its current temperature: the colder the 
milk bottle, the later the expiry date. The last trend refers to new concepts that 
model the infrastructures for these smart everyday items. People reinforce existing 
devices with computers because they are more effective, well-understood, and 
reliable. Actually we always choose the most comfortable technologies even when 
alternatives exist. That is why lights and doorbells are all operated by electricity 
now. 
An online medicine cabinet is a good illustration to understand the notion of 
ubiquitous computing [47]. Imagine that you are walking into the bathroom in the 
morning. Your medicine cabinet recognises you and tells you that you should take 
your allergy medicine since it is a high pollen day. Because the cabinet knows 
your needs, it will gently warn you if you pick up a wrong drug. If you are almost 
out of pills, the cabinet will automatically order them online and refill it. 
Several components form such an online medicine cabinet: 
"A basic computer system. The cabinet must be able to store information 
such as the user's health condition and the functionalities of medicines. 
"A context-aware mechanism. The cabinet must be able to recognise the 
user and sense the type and availability of the medicines. 
9A communication network. The cabinet should be able to receive the 
information related to the medicine (in this case it is the weather) and 
order the medicine automatically online. 
The components listed above already exist, but they are typically conceived 
and operated independently in the context of their own restricted view of the 
world. Current research is focused on the problem of combining them together 
and creating integrated ubiquitous computing systems. Many devices will be 
networked together to provide portable, effortless access to a global information 
infrastructure. The concept of computing will no longer imply a workstation with 
a single display screen demanding its user's attention; rather, there will be a 
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collection of displays everywhere allowing casual, low-intensity use. Computing 
power, including data storage and retrieval, will be everywhere in the 
environment and the devices needed to access that power will be freely available 
like ball point pens, which you pick up to use as needed and then leave behind 
when you're done with them. 
Additionally, ubiquitous computing will also have a great impact on today's 
business processes. When companies plan to adopt a new technology, they want 
to know business impacts in advance. These impacts are mainly characterized by 
costs and benefits. We already mentioned that the costs for computer chips are 
getting lower and lower. The benefits can be concluded as: the avoidance of 
media breaks between the real world and the digital world, the awareness of 
"smart objects", and the support for mobility. 
The avoidance of media breaks means the potential to improve the efficiency 
and quality of business processes through automation. A high level of process 
automation leads to reduced cost since less human intervention is required and 
more human errors are eliminated. For example, all the goods in a supermarket 
can have an embedded small chip on their tags. It can record necessary 
information such as the price of the product and be sensed by exit doors. 
Customers can check out immediately without queuing at the casher and the stock 
count could never be easier and more accurate. The awareness means that objects 
are able to provide data about their current and past context. Decisions that affect 
an object can be made at the object itself. For example, a milk bottle can decide 
and be asked whether it was stored always at the right temperature. In a traditional 
process it must be ensured that thermometers are always around for external 
monitoring. These thermometers must be checked every time the milk bottle 
changes its location. This process is laborious and error-prone, and does not 
provide an appropriate means to measure the actual quality of the milk bottle. 
However, along with the benefits, ubiquitous computing also brings 
numerous vulnerabilities. It makes things too easy for malicious people to build a 
system to spy on others. A basic concern about any information stored in a 
computer is who can access and modify the contents. Where are the bits? Are they 
secure? And more questions will be asked especially if the information is 
collected from environments and transmitted over networks. Although issues 
surrounding the appropriate use and dissemination of information are as old as the 
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history of human communication, specific concerns stem from the fact that 
ubiquitous computing makes information more generally available. Imagine, 
when a visitor uses your bathroom, you will not expect your medicine cabinet to 
leak your health condition out to him; when the cabinet buys the pills online, you 
will need it to keep your personal/financial information secure. The situation 
could become even more worrying if your medicine cabinet already has been 
compromised. What will happen if the cabinet advises you with wrong doses? 
And what will happen if the cabinet changes the medicines without your 
awareness? 
The above discussion clearly suggests that a strong security mechanism is 
necessary to ubiquitous computing. In this thesis, we particularly pay attention to 
one of the most important security solutions - intrusion detection. 
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we introduced the history of computer networks. Since the 
first network project carried out in later 1960's, computer networks never stop 
growing. Till now, millions of computers have joined together forming the biggest 
cyber-society: Internet. The notion of ubiquitous computing was introduced as a 
prospective view about the future usage of computers. Smaller and cheaper 
computer chips will enable us to embed computing ability into any appliances, 
from a piece of paper to a racing car. People's daily activities will be closely 
connected with computers and beneficially become ever convenient. However, the 
great features of ubiquitous computing inevitably expose its inherent 
vulnerabilities. A ubiquitous network must be properly secured so that it can be 
relied upon. In the next chapter, we will present the work related to network 
security. As a defensive countermeasure, IDSs will be introduced. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
NETWORK SECURITY AND INTRUSION DETECTION 
SYSTEMS 
In computer security intrusions are defined as any malicious activities that 
could compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of networks and 
information sources. For example, an attacker may compromise the availability of 
an information system by flooding a server with an overwhelming number of 
service requests over a short period of time or deliberately wasting the server's 
CPU time simply with a paragraph of malicious code. Another attacker may 
compromise the integrity and confidentiality of an information system by gaining 
the privileges of an authorized user and then modifying or stealing information. In 
this chapter, we briefly introduce possible attack types and countermeasures 
involved in computer security. As an effective tool against inside threats, the 
principles and classifications of intrusion detection systems are specifically 
discussed. 
3.1 Computer security 
Computer security is a subfield of computer science, regarded as the control 
of risks related to computer usage. A traditional approach to coping with this issue 
is to specify and enforce a security polity on a computer system to restrict the 
actions an entity (user or program) can perform. There is no universal standard 
defining what secure action is. A university may have a very different notion of 
security from a military base. Thus security here is a property that is unique to 
each situation and so must be overtly defined by a security policy. 
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A secure system should still permit authorized users to carry out legitimate 
and useful tasks. One might be able to secure a computer beyond misuse using 
extreme measures such as those noted by author Eugene H. Spafford: The only 
ti-uh, . secure system 
is one that is powered off cast in a block of concrete and 
sealed in a lead-lined room with armed guards - and even then I have my doubts 
[35]. However, this would not be regarded as a useful secure system. There is 
aINN a% sa trade-off between the security and utility of computer systems. 
Source Destination 
Normal flow 
&-* 
Interruption &--] 
Interception 
Modification 
Fabrication 
Fig. 3.1 Attack types related to computer networks. 
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With the advent of the Internet, tens of thousands of networks are connected 
together through routers. These routers forward packets from their sources to the 
destinations. It gives legitimate users, as well as malicious users, easier 
accessibility to the computer systems. And since then, computer security is no 
longer only about computer consoles, but also their connections with the outside 
world. Fig. 3.1 illustrates the possible attack types regarding computer networks 
[143]. 
A recent FBI survey (2005) suggests that the vast majority of organizations 
(87%) experienced some type of computer security incident [26]. More than 79% 
said they'd been affected by spyware and almost 84% were affected by a virus 
attack at least once a year, despite the almost universal use of antivirus software. 
The target of an attack could be any part of a computing system. Fig. 3.2 shows 
some examples of targets and attacks related to a computer system. Basically, a 
working security policy should include [59]: 
" Data accessibility - the contents are accessible to legitimate users. 
" Data integrity - the contents are not modified by unauthorized entities. 
" Data confidentiality - the contents are not revealed to unauthorized 
entities. 
" Accountability - responsible for tracking who has accessed the data. 
" Authorization - responsible for who is allowed to access the data. 
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Interception 
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HARD DRIVE 
E-MAIL 
Interruption 
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Fig. 3.2 Examples of attack types and system targets. 
Interception 
(of passwords) 
Countermeasures against security breaches work together at different network 
layers as shown in Fig. 3.3 [143]. Some of them are briefly explained here: 
" CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check): A type of hash function used to 
produce a checksum -a small, fixed number of bits - against a block of 
data, such as a packet of network traffic. The checksum is used to detect 
errors after transmission. A CRC is computed and appended before 
transmission, and verified afterwards by the recipient to confirm that no 
changes occurred on transit. 
" Encryption: A mathematical procedure of rewriting contents so that they 
cannot be read without the corresponding decryption key. The encrypting 
function produces an encrypted message, while the decrypting function 
extracts the original message from the encrypted one. An encryption key 
is a parameter that controls encryption/decryption. A message sender and 
a receiver share a secret key for symmetric encryption/decryption. Key 
management is the crucial part of the encryption. 
Digital signatures: A public-key/asymmetric cryptographic method used 
for message authentication and integrity checking to deter fraudulent 
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Masquerade 
(IP address forgery) 
activities. A sender encrypts a message with its private key and a receiver 
decrypts the encrypted message with the public key linked to the sender's 
private key. As this pair of keys should be uniquely associated with their 
owner and certified by a certification authority, the encrypted message 
can only be generated by the key owner. This guarantees that the message 
must be originated from the key owner. 
" Firewall: A device located at the edge of networks to permit or deny data 
connections. Firewalls can be hardware and/or software based. A 
firewall's basic task is to control traffic between computer networks with 
different zones of trust and it is configured based on the organization's 
security policy. 
" IPSec (IP Security): A framework operates at the network layer by 
extending the IP packet header (using additional protocol fields, not 
options). This gives it the ability to encrypt packets from any higher layer 
protocol, including arbitrary TCP and UDP sessions, so the information 
cannot be captured and understood by outsiders. It is widely used between 
two private networks over the Internet to support virtual private 
networking (VPN). 
" Kerberos: A secure method for authenticating a request for access to a 
service in a computer network. Kerberos issues a user an encrypted 
`ticket' in an authentication process, so the user can use the `ticket' to 
request a particular service from an application server. The user's 
password does not have to pass through the network. 
" PGP (Pretty Good Privacy): A free and widely used encryption program 
that lets user protect files and electronic mails. PGP uses both 
conventional and public key cryptography so it can be used to 
authenticate messages, protect their integrity, and keep them secret. 
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Applications I, E-commerce protocols Applications 
E-mail I S/MIME, PGP I Email 
Higher level SSL, TLS, SSH, Kerberos Higher level 
10 net protocols net protocols 
TCP/IP IPSec, Firewall TCP/IP 
Data link Hardware link encryption Data link 
Physical CRC, Message digest Physical 
Internet 
Fig. 3.3 Examples of security countermeasures at different network layers. 
All the methods mentioned above are used to protect against attacks from the 
outside of an organization. However, the same FBI survey (2005) reported that 
44% organizations had experienced intrusions from within their organizations. 
Further, the average cost of a successful attack by a malicious insider is much 
greater than the cost of an external attack. It emphasizes the needs for another type 
of security tool - Intrusion Detection System. 
3.2 Intrusion detection systems 
An IDS detects and makes alarms when intrusions have taken place or are 
taking place in a network being monitored. It achieves detection by continuously 
monitoring unusual activities happening in the network [4,31]. The basic 
hypothesis of IDS is that there must be some trails connected with intrusions, at 
least traceable for a certain period. Unlike firewalls which are designed to prevent 
the occurrence of intrusions, an IDS only works after intrusions have occurred or 
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even succeeded. That is why an IDS is thought as the second line of defence. The 
main advantage of IDSs over firewalls is that IDSs can detect not only the attacks 
launched outside a network, but also inside attacks. 
DATABASE CONFIGURATION 
----------------------------------- 11 
1 
ALARMS 
DETECTOR - COUNTERMEASURE 
PROBES AUDITS A 
SYSTEM 
Fig. 3.4 A basic model of IDS. Note: The arrow thickness represents the 
amount of information flowing between components. 
A basic model of an IDS is shown in Fig. 3.4 [4]. It includes quite a few 
components. Basically, intrusion detection decisions are made based on collected 
audit data. Audit data come from diverse sources, which could cover all the 
network layers and operating system states. The volume of traffic and required 
storage space for audit data can be huge, especially for long-term auditing. 
Detectors monitor the audit trails and execute one or more detection algorithms to 
find the evidence of suspicious actions. The database is used to store signatures 
(for signature-based detection, termed as known attacks or system vulnerabilities) 
or profiles (for anomaly-based detection, termed as reference models of usual 
behaviour). If any intrusion has been detected, the IDS will take certain response, 
for example, alert the system administrator or disconnect the suspected session. 
The IDS is controlled by the configuration of system settings that would specify 
how and where to collect audit data, how to respond to intrusions, and so on. 
Configuration is crucial because attackers could take advantage of improper 
configuration to bypass the intrusion detection. The system administrator is in 
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charge of setting an effective configuration. 
There are two basic requirements for all IDSs: effectiveness and efficiency. 
Effectiveness means that an IDS must be able to correctly identify malicious 
activities from normal usage. Both false positive (indicating normal activities as 
malicious) and false negative (skipping malicious activities) are unwanted and 
must be kept under certain level. Efficiency means that an IDS must run in a 
cost-efficient way. Overhead introduced by an IDS on CPU usage, storage space 
and network resources confines its usability. The implementation of an IDS 
should not disturb others systems carrying out their normal activities. 
3.2.1 Signature-based and anomaly-based IDS 
According to the detection methods used, IDSs can be divided into 
signature-based detection and anomaly-based detection. Signature-based (also 
called knowledge-based or misuse-based) detection compares audit data with the 
knowledge accumulated about specific attacks and system vulnerabilities. General 
techniques include state modelling, expert systems, string matching and simple 
rule-based checking [31]. For example, a signature rule for a "guessing password 
attack" can be "there are more than 4 failed login attempts within 2 minutes". The 
main advantage of signature-based detection is that it can accurately and 
efficiently detect instances of known attacks. The main disadvantage is that it 
cannot detect unknown intrusions and a regular update is needed. 
Anomaly-based detection builds a reference model of the usual behaviour of 
the system being monitored and looks for deviations from the normal usage [57, 
88,99]. Statistical methods have been used to detect anomalous network activities. 
For example, the normal profile of a user may contain the averaged frequencies of 
some system commands used in his or her login sessions. If for a session being 
monitored, the frequencies are significantly lower or higher than the normal usage, 
an anomaly alarm will be raised. Instead of simply measuring the means or 
variances of variables, SRI's NIDES [99] developed a more sophisticated 
statistical algorithm by using an X2-like test to measure the similarity between 
short-term and long-term profiles. Neural networks are also widely considered as 
an effective approach to classify anomaly patterns. The paper [10] uses BP neural 
networks to detect anomalous usage of programs. The main advantage of anomaly 
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detection is that it does not require prior knowledge of intrusions and can thus 
detect new intrusions. The main disadvantage is that it may have a relatively 
higher false alarm rate. 
Additionally, a number of IDSs adopt a hybrid system design, i. e. combine 
both signature-based and anomaly-based detection modules together. For example, 
in NIDES [99] a statistical model and an expert system were both used to detect 
intrusions. 
3.2.2 Host-based and network-based IDS 
According to the locations of audit sources, IDSs can also be categorized as 
host-based IDSs (HIDSs) and network-based IDSs (NIDSs) [4,31]. HIDSs audit 
data are mainly from local operating systems, e. g. system log files. On the one 
hand, host audit sources are the only way to gather information about the activities 
of users on a given machine; on the other hand, they are also vulnerable to 
alterations in the case of a successful attack. This creates an important real-time 
constraint on HIDSs, which have to process the audit trail and generate alarms 
before an attacker taking over the machine can subvert either the audit trail or the 
intrusion detection system itself. HIDSs put higher requirements on individual 
nodes. The nodes in HIDSs have to dedicate a certain amount of resources to 
intrusion auditing, e. g. maintaining a large number of historical log files. Besides, 
the reliability of HIDSs is, to a great degree, determined by the accuracy of audit 
sources, but some devices may not be able to provide sufficient audit trails due to 
their oversimplified operating systems. 
NIDSs overcome those issues by auditing network packets instead of system 
log files. NIDSs audit network packets between nodes or the Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMP) information. They do not require extra efforts 
from normal network nodes except for those running detection modules. However, 
the efficiency of NIDS is under suspicion [119] and the allocation of detection 
modules also became a controversial issue [13,105,161]. Most existing NIDSs 
are implemented on network devices such as routers and switches. They adopt a 
sniffer-based technique to gather the network traffic they need. Sniffers placed in 
front of a switch or router will see all the IP packets on a subnet. However, 
considering the increasing diversity of network infrastructures, a user's activities 
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within the network may not be noticed by the network devices. For example, 
when a user opens an electric door, he might use his PDA to send a login request 
to the door lock. It is very likely that the request will not be captured by any 
network devices due to its limited propagation range. This could give the inside 
user opportunities to bypass the network intrusion detection. Recent researches 
have already shown that the primary threat comes from individuals inside 
organizations as inside attacks are more damaging than attacks launched outside 
[16,26,150]. 
Hybrid approaches have also been developed using both network-based and 
host-based intrusion detection tools in a multi-host environment, i. e. a network of 
workstations. For example, DIDS [138] detects local attacks as well as monitors 
the network. Both components report to the DIDS director, where the final 
analysis is done. 
3.3 Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated the diversity of possible attacks involved in 
computer systems. There are many countermeasures working at different network 
layers to protect networks against intrusions. As a second line of defence, an IDS 
plays an important role in computer security, especially in the fight against attacks 
launched inside networks. The two principal classifications of IDSs have been 
discussed. Signature-based IDSs focus on known attacks and vulnerabilities, and 
anomaly-based IDSs work alone with a reference model. Host-based IDSs collect 
local data, and network-based IDSs monitor network traffic through audit data. In 
the next chapter, we present a critical survey on current IDSs and discuss their 
specific limitations against the requirements of ubiquitous computing. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT IDSS FOR UBIQUITOUS 
COMPUTING 
Traditional IDSs were developed for wired networks. To our knowledge, 
there is no IDS yet, which has been particularly proposed to meet the special 
requirements of ubiquitous computing. However, with the continuous 
development of IDSs, especially the progresses made on wireless ad hoc networks 
and distributed IDSs, we believe that some existing solutions could be extended 
for intrusion detection in ubiquitous computing. In this chapter, we give a critical 
review of existing solutions that have been utilized in intrusion detection. Their 
benefits and limitations are discussed. 
4.1 Cost-efficient solutions 
As we discussed earlier, many appliances in ubiquitous computing have 
limited resources. For those battery-powered devices, an apparent issue is how to 
implement an IDS efficiently. A natural idea is to disable the IDS when it is not 
needed. This is not as straightforward as it sounds since one of the most desired 
features for an IDS is real-time detection. An improper deactivation of the IDS 
might be exploited by attackers and cause severe consequences. 
Yi-an Huang proposed a cooperative IDS for ad hoc networks [68]. He 
assumes the hosts are organised into clusters. The nodes in the same cluster 
periodically choose a cluster head as an agent to execute intrusion detection tasks. 
Since only the cluster head needs to implement the detection module, this method 
alleviates the overall CPU usage and network overhead compared with running 
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the IDS at each individual node. All the nodes in a cluster have the possibility to 
be chosen as the cluster head, so it is necessary to pre-install the IDS modules on 
them. This method requests the nodes in an ad hoc network are powerful enough 
to carry out the IDS tasks independently. It is difficult to meet this requirement in 
ubiquitous computing due to different resource characteristics. However, the idea 
of a cluster-based IDS did inspire us during the initial design of SUIDS. 
Wenke Lee and his colleagues tried to reduce IDS costs from another aspect 
[46,94]. They divide the costs of an IDS into three parts: operation cost, response 
cost and damage cost. The damage cost is quantified based on an intrusion's type 
and its target. A multiple model cost-sensitive machine learning technique is 
proposed to produce models that are optimized for user-defined cost metrics. In 
other words, the optimized model reduces the detection costs by intelligently 
rearranging detection rules. The fundamental is that an IDS's operation cost is 
proportional to the number of rules that have been examined. A similar technique 
was also used in the paper [108]. It suggests improving the IDS performance by 
ranking and selecting detection features according to their criticality. All these 
works try to reduce the detection costs from the inside mechanism of an IDS. 
However, quantifying the IDS cost is a complicated and costly work. In different 
scenarios the same attack may cause unequal losses. The main problem is the lack 
of a common standard. 
Most network-based IDSs identify intrusions by packet analysis. With the 
continuous growth of network infrastructures, network traffic has exploded during 
the past decade. To achieve real-time intrusion detection and reaction, the 
network-based IDSs need more efficient strategies. The paper [93] copes with the 
IDS overload problem by running performance monitoring on each node. Similar 
to current QoS techniques used in network devices [114], this performance 
monitoring system puts the most crucial event in front of others. Available 
techniques include rule selection and scenario analysis (predicting the 
forthcoming attack). Although in some ways the performance of IDS has been 
improved, it cannot solve the overload problem thoroughly. That is one reason we 
think host-based IDSs are favoured in ubiquitous computing. 
From the respect of intrusion reaction, an adaptive response strategy can 
reduce the overall IDS costs as well. Although directly disconnecting or shutting 
down a system being attacked can immediately prevent a threat from malicious 
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opponents, it could also be seen as a success of a denial-of-service attack. The 
paper [133] proposed an adaptive response mechanism by quantifying the IDS's 
parameters such as the false alarm rate, detection confidence and damage cost. 
The system will choose a suitable response strategy based on the calculations of 
these parameters. Once again, the procedure of quantification is too complicated 
and lacks a common standard. 
4.2 Hierarchically distributed solutions 
The Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) is the first distributed 
IDS [138]. It brought a new dimension to intrusion detection by facilitating the 
correlation and analysis of data from multiple sources. In DIDS the monitoring 
and analysis functions are distributed among several components. These 
components are a central manager, a single host monitor per host, and a single 
LAN monitor for each broadcast LAN segment in the monitored network. The 
host and LAN monitors are primarily responsible for detecting single events and 
known attack signatures which are relevant to the security of an individual system. 
The central manager has access to the distributed audit data gathered by the 
various monitors. It is responsible for analyzing and correlating the events 
reported by the host and LAN monitors. It is worth noticing that DIDS can 
potentially protect the hosts without monitors since the LAN monitor can report 
on the network activities of them. The LAN monitor checks traffics on its LAN 
segment and creates a profile. In particular, it audits host-host connections, 
services used and the volume of traffics. This is an important feature because in 
ubiquitous computing some nodes may not be able to afford a host monitor but 
will still need IDS coverage. 
However, due to the following reasons the DIDS cannot be applied to 
ubiquitous computing directly: 
" In ubiquitous computing the network infrastructures are heterogeneous. It 
simply may not be IP-based. We have to redeploy the LAN monitors to 
cover the entire network. 
" DIDS requires that all hosts run C2 or higher rated computer systems 
[153]. The systems must have certain level of access control ability, so 
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users are individually accountable for their activities through their login 
sessions. In ubiquitous computing devices are heterogeneous and some of 
them may not fulfil this requirement. 
" DIDS still relies on a central manager. It may not scale well in a 
ubiquitous network with tens of thousands active nodes. 
The Graph Based Intrusion Detection System (GrIDS) is concerned with 
detecting intrusions such as worms that involve connections between many nodes 
[145]. It builds activity graphs to represent host activities in a network. The 
system being observed is divided into domains. In the graphs nodes represent 
network domains and edges represent network traffic between them. In GrIDS 
each domain builds its own graph and passes the graph and summary information 
up to its parent domain. This pattern makes the system scale better. Obviously, as 
the information passes up the hierarchy, the graphs become coarser. GrIDS uses a 
rule set to determine how to construct the graphs based on incoming and previous 
information. Rules are also applied to decide whether or not a graph is suspicious. 
The main problem of GrIDS for ubiquitous computing is that GrIDS was 
designed for static wired networks. It is not suitable for topology-varying 
environments. In ubiquitous computing many nodes are featured with mobility. It 
is difficult to construct an activity graph for such a large-scale network with 
dynamic topology. 
EMERALD (Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to Anomalous Live 
Disturbances) is also proposed to monitor distributed networks [115]. As 
concluded in [82], EMERALD uses a three-layered hierarchy to realize intrusion 
detection in a large-scale system. Each of the three layers consists of monitors. 
Each monitor may have its own anomaly and misuse detectors. The layers are 
named as: service (lowest), domain-wide, and enterprise-wide (highest). The 
service layer monitors a single domain. The monitors at the domain-wide layer 
accept input from the service layer and attempt to detect intrusions across multiple 
service domains. Likewise, the enterprise-wide monitors accept input from the 
domain-wide layer and attempt to detect intrusions that cross the entire system. 
Monitors may subscribe to information from other monitors at the same level and 
lower. 
There are some limitations about EMERALD: 
The cooperation between monitors at the same layer is achieved by 
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subscriptions. This mechanism will introduce additional overload into the 
network. In ubiquitous computing system resources are crucial. 
9 The aim of EMERALD is to detect inter-domain attacks. It is not enough 
to have only EMERALD as an IDS in a ubiquitous computing 
environment. It has to collaborate with other host-based IDSs to provide 
integrated protection. 
" The separation of domains is a remaining issue in a topology-varying 
environment like ubiquitous computing. In some cases it is hard to 
maintain the hierarchy of monitors. 
4.3 Cooperative solutions 
The IDSs mentioned above all have a hierarchical architecture. This 
architecture relies on a central controller. In a ubiquitous computing environment 
sometimes it may not have such a central point. This issue has already been 
noticed in wireless ad-hoc networks. 
The paper [160] proposed a cooperative model for an IDS in a mobile ad-hoc 
network. In this model every node participates in intrusion detection and response. 
Each node has an IDS agent that is in charge of local data collection and local 
detection. A local detection engine runs independently. When an anomaly is 
detected in local data or there is inconclusive evidence, neighbouring IDS agents 
will be required to participate in global detection by using a cooperative detection 
engine. A local response module triggers local actions, e. g. alerting the local user, 
while the global module coordinates actions among neighbouring nodes, e. g. 
determining a remedial action. A secure communication module provides a 
high-confidence communication channel among IDS agents. The components are 
structured as shown in Figure 4.1. 
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Fig. 4.1 A conceptual model for an IDS Agent. 
The main contribution of this work is that it presents a distributed and 
cooperative intrusion detection architecture. The design of actual detection 
techniques, their performance as well as verification, however, were not addressed 
in the paper. Similar to paper [41], although their architectures are fully 
distributed, applying them to ubiquitous computing still requires further research. 
It is because in ubiquitous computing not all the nodes are guaranteed the ability 
to implement a local IDS agent independently. This model does not consider how 
to protect those incapable nodes. 
Indra is a distributed scheme based on sharing information between trusted 
peers in a network [75]. It guards the network as a whole against intrusions. Indra 
brings a proactive and P2P approach to intrusion detection. The goal of Indra is to 
distribute intrusion attempt information (gathered by an intended victim) among 
all interested peers in a P2P network. Each interested peer runs a special Indra 
daemon. It watches out for intrusion attempts and also enforces access control 
based on its memory of earlier attempts. The chance that at least one of the peers 
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does notice an attack to which it is not itself vulnerable can be improved in 
relation to the number of peers, the heterogeneity of the peers (operating systems 
and/or applications), and the currency level of the applied security patches. The 
P2P network has to be reliable and trustful. This is achieved by applying a trust 
management scheme like the Web of Trust as known from PGP [144]. 
Indra is independent of a central controller. Because the ubiquitous 
computing is a heterogeneous environment, the idea for at least one machine to 
find an intrusion attempt, to which it is not itself vulnerable, is quite attractive. 
However, Indra has certain level of requirements on individual nodes as well. 
Each node has to implement the Indra daemon independently. The management 
and communication overload introduced by the P2P scheme hinders its 
application. 
4.4 Mobile agent based solutions 
A mobile agent is a software entity, which is capable of continuously and 
autonomously moving throughout networks and intelligently implementing 
certain tasks. The development of distributed IDSs and software agents has led to 
the idea of using mobile agents in intrusion detection. Mobile agents offer several 
advantages when applied to IDSs [77]. These advantages include: 
" Reducing Network Load - Mobile agents can carry about intrusion 
detection algorithms with themselves. This mechanism can avoid 
transferring huge amounts of data (e. g. audit files) to data processing 
points. 
" Overcoming Network Latency - Since mobile agents can operate locally 
on compromised hosts, they can react faster than the detection modules 
coordinated by a central point in a hierarchical IDS. 
Autonomous Execution - Because mobile agents are independent units, 
they can operate offline and autonomously. Even if portions of the IDS get 
destroyed or separated, the mobile agents will remain functional. This 
feature increases the fault tolerance of the overall system. 
Platform Independence - The agent platform allows agents to travel in a 
heterogeneous environment and inserts an OS independent layer between 
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the hosts and the IDS agents. This is important in ubiquitous computing. 
" Dynamic Adaptation - The mobility of agents can be used to reconfigure 
the system at run-time by letting special agents move to a location where 
an attack currently takes place to collect additional data. 
" Static Adaptation (Upgradeability) - It is important for an IDS, especially 
a misuse-based IDS, to update its attack signature database and detection 
algorithms properly. It is simpler to write updated agents and send them 
on duty while the IDS keeps running when new signatures are available. 
" Scalability - Using distributed mobile agents can divide the 
computational load between different machines and reduce the network 
load. This enhances the IDS scalability and additionally supports 
fault-resistant behaviour. 
The biggest concern over mobile agents is the security of themselves. 
Researchers are still working on protecting mobile agents against malicious hosts 
[44,64,130]. However, due to their unique advantages remarked above, we still 
see an increasing trend of applying mobile agents into IDSs. 
Autonomous Agents For Intrusion Detection (AAFID) is featured by 
autonomous agents [140]. An AAFID system can be distributed over any number 
of hosts in a network. Each host contains a transceiver, filter (optional) and any 
number of agents. Agents implement specific functions and monitor interesting 
events happening at the host. They may use filters to obtain data in a 
system-independent manner. The agents cooperate in a client-server fashion by 
sending their findings to the transceiver where it is further processed. A 
transceiver is a per-host entity that oversees the operation of all the agents running 
on the same host. It has the ability to start, stop and send configuration commands 
to the agents. The transceivers report their analysis results to one or more 
monitors. Each monitor oversees the operation of several transceivers. Monitors 
have access to network-wide data, and therefore they are able to perform 
higher-level correlation and detect intrusions that involve several hosts. 
Eventually, a particular monitor is responsible for providing information and 
getting control commands from a user interface. 
Comparing with DIDS, GrIDS, and EMERAND, AAFID is more flexible and 
adaptive due to the usage of autonomous agents. But it still relies on a central 
entity (monitor) where events are collected and related. Moreover, AAFID did not 
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consider how to cope with the heterogeneous issue of ubiquitous computing. 
Sparta is another mobile agent based IDS [89]. In Sparta a single event is 
described by specifying appropriate values for its attributes. A number of events 
can be connected by defining temporal or spatial relationships between them or 
imposing certain constraints on their attributes (creating patterns). Interesting 
events are locally collected and stored. The collection of all local information can 
be considered as a distributed database. A user may issue queries in an Event 
Query Language (EQL) to search for a set of events that fulfil his/her desired 
constraints [29]. The mobile agents in Sparta can correlate distributed events and 
deduce knowledge from different hosts in a fully decentralized manner. It starts its 
task by contacting the directory service to obtain a list of hosts that match the 
constraints given in the FROM clause. These hosts are then visited in arbitrary 
order. Eventually the mobile agents will return results to the user. 
The implementation of Sparta is very complicated. Its special requirements on 
the directory service and event query language constrain its application to a 
large-scale network. In ubiquitous computing nodes are free to join or leave the 
network. A directory service can hardly guarantee network updates in due course. 
Furthermore, functional mobile agents in Sparta put even higher requirements on 
individual nodes. 
Except for the two systems mentioned above, other researches utilize mobile 
agents in a quite similar way. We deem them as a function-based solution because 
in these systems mobile agents are classified based on their particular functions. 
Normally such an IDS includes surveillance agents (data collection agents), 
decision-making agents and response agents. Each type of agent implements 
specific functions. In paper [83] the author distributes these agents into a 
cluster-based ad-hoc network. An elected cluster head is in charge of monitoring 
the network traffic within its cluster and making decisions. In paper [107] the 
surveillance agents roam around to find any suspecting event. If any anomaly is 
detected in the network, the surveillance agents will call for further checks. 
Because there are hundreds of identified attacks and system vulnerabilities, a 
mobile agent cannot be sensitive to all of them. The papers [8,61,87,101,164] 
use lightweight mobile agents to overcome this issue. In their systems the 
detection work is distributed by asking each agent to prevent one particular threat 
only. A central manager dispatches different kinds of agents into the network. If 
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an alarm is raised, the manager will inject more related agents into the network to 
further help. The difficulty is to effectively distribute those agents in relation to 
when, where and what kind of intrusion will take place. 
Basically, function-based solutions also need a central controller. It provides 
the services like agent initialization, agent distribution, and user interfaces. These 
IDSs can effectively distribute the processing workload throughout the network 
being monitored. They have better adaptability and flexibility, though the reliance 
on the central controller may limit their scalability. Besides, like any other 
immature techniques, mobile agents introduce additional weaknesses especially in 
respect of trustworthiness. 
4.5 Summary 
We have summarized the aforementioned IDSs and compared them together 
in Table 4.1. The following points were boiled down to: 
. Most existing IDSs did not consider resource constraints. The reason is 
that they were designed for wired networks or ad hoc networks (laptop or 
PDA based). The requirements for IDSs in these environments are not as 
strict as those in ubiquitous computing environments. The resource 
consumptions on IDSs need to be further reduced. 
" An IDS in ubiquitous computing environments should be characterized by 
a distributed auditing scheme followed by distributed intrusion detection 
analysis. Conventional hierarchical architectures are not suitable due to 
the dynamic features of ubiquitous computing. Cooperative architectures 
have relatively higher resource requirements on individual nodes. A 
mobile agent based IDS is very promising, but a crucial issue needs to be 
considered - enhancing the security of the mobile agents to avoid 
introducing new flaws. 
. Last but not the least, it is important to protect the nodes that lack abilities 
to implement an IDS module independently. Within our knowledge, only 
DIDS and GrIDS provide a solution for those incapable nodes. From this 
aspect, a network-based IDS is advantaged. A LAN or cluster manager is 
needed to take care of the incapable nodes. Remaining issues include what 
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are appropriate audit data sources and how to cope with a heterogeneous 
environment. 
In this chapter we presented the state of the art in intrusion detection related 
to ubiquitous computing. To realize ubiquitous computing, further efforts are still 
needed in the areas of both hardware and software. A carefully designed security 
scheme can ensure that all the work shall be done in the right way. Although the 
research in intrusion detection started decades ago, its application to ubiquitous 
computing is still fresh. As discussed earlier, existing solutions on 
resource-efficiency and system architectures cannot fulfil the special requirements 
of ubiquitous computing. Specifically, an IDS in ubiquitous computing should not 
require to transmit or process a large amount of audit data or attack signatures; a 
centralized detection scheme should be replaced by a distributed or cooperative 
system architecture; host-based and network-based approaches should work 
together to provide all-sided protection. In the next chapter we will introduce the 
framework of our proposed SUIDS based on this analysis. 
Table 4.1 A summary of introduced IDSs. 
Introduced 
IDSs 
Resource 
efficiency 
Independence 
of central point 
Consideration of 
incapable nodes 
System 
scalability 
Overhead 
introduced 
DIDS No No Yes Yes Low 
GrIDS No No Yes Yes Low 
EMERLAND No No No Yes Low 
IDSs for 
Ad Hoc 
No Yes No Yes High 
Indra No Yes No No High 
AAFID No No No Yes Low 
Sparta No No No No High 
Function 
based MA 
Yes No No Yes LOW 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUIDS AND ITS SIMULATION 
Most IDSs strive to be general purpose and able to detect attacks and 
anomalies in any environment. This is clearly a very hard challenge, and as we 
presented earlier, it causes problems in ubiquitous computing. In this chapter, we 
introduce the framework and simulation of our proposed SUIDS, an adaptive and 
resource-efficient intrusion detection system with a novel service-oriented 
auditing mechanism and flexible user-centric design. By working together with 
service-oriented agents, it can reliably and effectively detect malicious activities 
of inside users. SUIDS is suitable for heterogeneous environments such as 
ubiquitous networks. It has the following features: a reliable auditing mechanism, 
a resource-efficient intrusion detection scheme, and a flexible system architecture. 
5.1 Design of SUIDS 
5.1.1 Application scenario 
Ubiquitous computing still is an ongoing research. As a prospective view of 
future direction, further efforts on both hardware and software are needed [102]. 
Although there are only few prototypes implemented in research labs [54,142], 
we believe that a smart space is an appropriate case as our research scenario. Fig. 
5.1 illustrates Mike's smart home in which two PCs on the network backbone are 
connected with a domain management node. Mike's PDA is equipped with 
wireless connection and able to operate some appliances such as an electric door 
lock and a smart refrigerator. He could open the home door by sending a login 
message to the door lock, or check the food information stored in the smart 
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refrigerator through his PDA. A wall screen is used to display any message, 
document, picture or video clips taken by a camcorder. A broadcast service point 
regularly sends him newsletters based on his subscription status. All these devices 
are seamlessly connected together through wired or wireless connections and 
provide services to Mike. 
Smart Camcorder Slave part 
Refrigerator of MA 
1O 1ý 
1\\ 
Wall PDA 
Screen -i ---. __ 1-- 
PC I Master part 
PC2 
of MA " 
Network Backbone 
Q Head node 
Service node 
Wired connection 
'"'""" Wireless connection 
Broadcast 
Point 
Electric 
Door-lock 
Domain 
management 
node 
Q User node 
Fig. 5.1 Example of Mike's smart home. 
In this case several attacks could take place against Mike's smart home: 
" Confidentiality Attack: Unauthorised access to system resources and the 
information stored within these resources. Example: Mike's friend, Paul, 
uses a fraudulent ID to access Mike's folder on one of the PCs to gain 
some confidential information. 
" Integrity Attack: Unauthorized modification to the state of the system and 
to the information stored within the system. Example: Paul alters the data 
about the food stored in the smart refrigerator. The modified information 
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may cause Mike unnecessary waste or threaten his health. 
" Availability Attack: Unauthorized possession of the system resources in 
order to interfere with authorised users' normal access. It is well known as 
a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Example: Paul tries to open Mike's 
home door by continuously sending login requests to the door-lock. Thus 
Mike cannot open it as the door-lock is always in a busy state or simply 
has turned off due to too many failed attempts. 
5.1.2 Nodes classification 
Nodes in Mike's smart home have diverse capabilities as they play different 
roles. For example, PCs are preferred for faster computing ability and higher 
network bandwidth in order to complete complex tasks in due course; camcorder 
and PDA emphasize smaller sizes to be easily carried about. Therefore we cannot 
treat all the nodes in the same way during the design of SUIDS. Before presenting 
the system architecture, some terms and a necessary classification of network 
nodes are explained first: 
" Domain management node: Domain management nodes are in charge of 
the system management. They manage users' profiles and generate 
appropriate mobile agents for each user. Dividing the system into domains 
makes the system more scalable. There is one domain management node 
in each domain. Domain management nodes may cooperate together. For 
example, an individual company may form a single domain; the 
employees of the company register with the domain's management node; 
a visitor to the company needs to register with it first before he/she can 
use the system resources; the visited domain may contact the visitor's 
home domain to require necessary information such as the user's profiles. 
" Cluster: A domain is composed of clusters. Each cluster has a PC-based 
central controller and all clusters are connected together. In a smart space 
a possible way of dividing clusters is based on rooms. This model is 
consistent with the viewpoint that ubiquitous computing is an 
evolutionary result of developing available techniques and integrating 
them together. Nowadays, one hardly finds an office with no PC in our 
department. 
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" Head node: Head nodes form a key part of the whole system. They are 
organised by clusters. There could be more than one head node in a 
cluster. The PCs in Mike's smart home are examples of head nodes. Head 
nodes are allocated on the network backbone with higher connection 
speeds and advanced operating systems. Head nodes take the most 
computing burdens of intrusion detection. 
" Service node: Service nodes such as a smart refrigerator, camcorder and 
electric door lock are used to store information or provide specific 
services only. These nodes have very predictable running processes, open 
ports and traffic patterns. Sometimes service nodes are controlled by or 
provide services through head nodes. For example, a wall screen needs to 
get the content from a PC for the purpose of display. 
" User node: User nodes are defined as those portable devices such as a 
user's PDA or smart phone. They have relatively powerful computing 
ability and advanced operating systems. Although user nodes usually were 
ruled out from intrusion detection, we have a different viewpoint since 
these devices start to offer application tools and are quickly becoming 
necessities in today's business environments [76]. In our design user 
nodes play an important role and they could be used to share the detection 
burden with the head nodes. It makes the system more scalable and 
resource-sensitive. 
5.1.3 System architecture 
SUIDS is a distributed application, dynamically deployed based on the 
classification of network nodes. The system is organized hierarchically with 
several tiers. Different tiers correspond to different network scopes that are 
monitored by intrusion detection modules. 
For the case of the smart home shown in Fig. 5.1, SUIDS is divided into three 
tiers. Tier 3 consists of service nodes and user nodes. Detection modules running 
on tier 3 monitor system processes and network activities of these service nodes 
and user nodes. They generate service-oriented event records for the upper tier 
based on the monitored service usages and system operations. Tier 2 mainly 
consists of head nodes. Detection modules running on tier 2 analyze the event 
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records received from service nodes and user nodes that are within their 
corresponding clusters. They infer the status of the system, make decisions and 
take actions based on the collected event records. Tier 1 is in charge of the domain 
management. It holds users' profiles and generates appropriate mobile agents for 
Domain 
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Fig. 5.2 System hierarchy for Mark's smart home. 
each user. The system hierarchy for the smart home example is shown in Fig. 5.2. 
There are two small clusters on tier 2. The smart refrigerator and wall screen 
belong to PCi's cluster. The electric door-lock and broadcast point belong to 
PC2's cluster. The user's PDA and camcorder are portable devices. They are 
temporarily in cluster 1 and might move to cluster 2 later. 
5.1.4 Service-oriented intrusion detection 
Currently there are only a limited number of services offered publicly by 
computer networks, for example the HTTP, DNS and FTP services [88]. 
Normally these services are provided by specific network servers. However, with 
the trend of computerizing existing devices, the pattern of service providing will 
become highly distributed. More and more services will be available through the 
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networks and provided by specific devices (here referred as service nodes). Just 
like Mike's smart home, he can open his electric door by sending an order to the 
door-lock. In ubiquitous computing, users' activities carrying through computer 
networks will not only be limited to certain services, but extend to daily routines. 
Our intention is to provide a distributed IDS for heterogeneous networked 
appliances that possibly have limited capacities. In current work, the protection of 
services relies on the powerful computing ability and enormous storage space of 
network servers for intrusion detection. For example, HIDSs require a server be 
able to monitor and store a wide range of audits, and NIDSs require the server be 
able to collect substantive network traffic. Unfortunately, these requirements are 
hardly fulfilled by some devices in ubiquitous networks. Although some 
researchers try to use lightweight mobile agents to ease the burden on a target 
system being protected, most of them are designed for homogeneous 
environments [41,61]. Mobile agents in such an environment are normally 
signature-oriented, blindly trying to find specific flaws in any target system. A 
single device may have to execute tens or even more such lightweight agents in 
order to gain an all-sided protection. Obviously it is not an effective solution for 
ubiquitous computing. 
SUIDS overcomes this issue by generating service-oriented mobile agents for 
each kind of devices. Integrating with service specific knowledge, it decreases the 
system complexity and makes it more practical and resource-efficient. In SUIDS, 
the service nodes are required to remember their corresponding head nodes and 
send event records to them during executions. To achieve it the service nodes need 
to register with head nodes first. This is a reasonable requirement for ubiquitous 
networks as the service nodes must let people notice their existences before 
providing services. The head nodes will ask the domain management node to send 
specific mobile agents for the service nodes within their clusters. 
One obstacle confronting us is the high diversity of service nodes in terms of 
different functionalities and capacities on computing ability, storage space, 
communication bandwidth, and energy supply. If we look at today's market, 
different types of product are produced by hundreds of manufactures. In 
ubiquitous computing, these products have to seamlessly work together and 
provide services to users. Currently some research efforts focus on service 
broking in ubiquitous computing [50,54]. The purpose is to establish a 
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mechanism to make the services provided by networked appliances (service nodes) 
effectively available to the users. We assume there is such a service broking 
mechanism semantically available to SUIDS, though the detail of service broking 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus the domain management nodes can 
abstract necessary information about the service nodes, for example their OS and 
YO mode, to generate appropriate service-oriented mobile agents. The mobile 
agents have better understanding of the service nodes on both hardware and 
software levels and are able to react correspondingly to each kind of them. The 
mobile agents should be platform-independent. Sun Java [78] is widely used in 
similar environments as a development tool. 
5.1.5 Concept of a user-centric model 
Based on each user's daily activities, SUIDS generates a service-oriented 
profile for the user. It is used to identify any abnormal usage of the services under 
a certain user ID. Notice again that the definition of `service' in our system is not 
the same as the conventional applications offered by network servers. It could be 
any service provided by networked appliances. 
We use another type of mobile agent to follow users around and connect them 
to the system's Tier 2 and 3. To distinguish these agents from those for service 
nodes, we call them user agents and service agents, respectively. Each user agent 
has two components: detection modules and user profiles. Service agents on Tier 
3 (service nodes) collect information about a user's activities and send event 
records to the user agents. The user agents on Tier 2 (head nodes) analyse the 
records sent by the service agents and take the corresponding actions. In this way, 
the detection module is kept away from the audit module so as to increase the 
robustness of SUIDS and release burdens on the service nodes. Comparing with 
head nodes, service nodes are much constrained by their capacities such as power 
supplies. By allowing a designated user agent to follow a user, the SUIDS design 
can save lots of network resources since the user agent follows the user around 
and always tries to find the closest head node to the user. By giving mobility to 
the detection modules, SUIDS can achieve better performance in respect of 
resource-efficiency. The operation of the user agent and its data flows are shown 
in Fig. 5.3. The details of detection methods will be explained in the next chapter. 
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Fig. 5.3 High-level operation of the user agent. 
In addition, the service nodes, which have received service requests from 
users, will dynamically form a defence wall against malicious inside users. As we 
discussed earlier, traditional NIDSs give an inside user opportunities to bypass the 
network intrusion detection. In SUIDS, service agents send event records to user 
agents according to their system states and real-time operations. This 
event-triggered design will let the user agents notice any user's activities within 
the networks. Therefore, intrusion detection in SUIDS is more reliable and the 
nodes outside the defence wall are beneficially released from burdensome 
intrusion detection surveillances. The service agents only need to monitor and 
record essential activities of users, depending on the system security policy. For 
example, if an authorized user asks for the information about the food stored in a 
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smart refrigerator, it may be allowed and not be recorded, depending on the given 
security policy; but if someone wants to login and change the system settings, it 
will be recorded and sent to the corresponding head node immediately. 
The system structure of the proposed user-centric model is shown in Fig. 5.4. 
Comparing with existing solutions, the user-centric SUIDS has following 
advantages: 
" In a ubiquitous network the number of users is much fewer than the 
number of service nodes. The user-centric model can remarkably decrease 
the system complexity in comparison with implementing the IDS on each 
node. 
" Most services are requested by and then provided to users. The 
user-centric model can effectively collect network activities inside the 
ubiquitous networks. 
" By separating the detection module from the audit module, risks 
stemming from the weak security features of mobile agents are reduced. 
"A mobile user profile and detection agent can save more network 
resources. 
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5.2 Simulation of SUIDS 
In order to test the feasibility and applicability of SUIDS, we created a 
simulation environment by using the Georgia Tech Network Simulator (GTNetS) 
[58]. GTNetS is a fully-featured network simulation environment that allows 
researchers in computer networks to study the behaviour of moderate to large 
scale networks under a variety of conditions. The programming language used is 
C++. 
5.2.1 A simulation scenario 
The first step is to define a proper simulation scenario. For research purposes, 
we first created a small smart home with fourteen nodes. Among these fourteen 
nodes, there are two head nodes, two user nodes, and ten service nodes. Fig. 5.5 
shows the initial state of the simulated environment. The desktop icons represent 
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the head nodes; the PDA icons represent the user nodes; and the rest are service 
nodes. 
I Head Node } User Node   Service Node 
The user nodes in our experiments are mobile. Fig. 5.6 shows another 
snapshot of the simulation during its execution. Comparing with Fig. 5.5, we can 
see that the positions of the user nodes have clearly changed. The mobility pattern 
used here is the Random Waypoint (RWP) model [109], which is a commonly 
used synthetic model for mobility. Briefly, in the RWP model: 
Each node moves along a zigzag line from one waypoint to the next. 
" The waypoints are uniformly distributed over the given area. In our 
simulation it is a 50 x 50 m2 space. 
At the start of each leg a random velocity is drawn from the velocity 
distribution. In our simulation the human velocity is set to be uniformly 
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Fig. 5.5 Initial state of the simulated environment. 
distributed between 0-2 meters/second. 
" Optionally, the nodes may have so-called "thinking times" when they 
reach each waypoint before continuing on the next leg. The duration is 
also an independent and uniformly distributed variable. In our simulation 
it is between 0- 10 seconds. Obviously, it is unlikely that people will 
continually move around within every 10 seconds. This assumption aims 
to reduce the simulation time. 
CS Head Node ý User Node   Service Node 
11 
0 
  
Fig. 5.6 A snapshot of the simulated environment during executions. 
In current experiments we assume that all the nodes in our simulation are 
connected and communicate with each other through wireless connections, i. e. in 
an Ad Hoc pattern. The default routing protocol is DSR [81,126]. 
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5.2.2 Service nodes classification 
Once a network topology is defined, the simulation must then introduce the 
flow of data through the defined network topology. In GTNetS, it is done by 
creating applications at various nodes, which in turn generate data demands on the 
network based on the application behaviour. In our simulation these applications 
are equal to the services provided by the service nodes. It is easy to understand 
that most network traffic is introduced by users' requests for services and the 
corresponding responses. 
Instead of defining and creating service nodes one by one, we categorize them 
into several types based on their functionalities and characteristics. This 
classification could be extended in the future. 
" The first type is the service nodes with only an on-off operation, e. g. a 
room light or an electric door lock. This kind of node receives orders from 
a user and executes the corresponding operations. In SUIDS we take the 
operation time, duration and frequency as auditing data. An authentication 
process might be involved before each session of data transmission. 
" The second type is the service nodes with an on-off operation and an 
adjustable parameter, e. g. an adjustable central heating, a 
temperature-keeping kettle or a smart refrigerator. Authorized users are 
allowed to adjust the parameter as they want. In this case we take the 
operation time/duration and the value of the parameter as auditing data. If 
a device has more than one parameter, we only take the most 
security-related one into account in the current simulation. Our work can 
be extended to consider multitude parameters in the future. 
" The third type of service node has an on-off operation together with a 
display function, e. g. a wall screen or a TV monitor. The definition of 
`display' here has a wider meaning. For example, a printer will also be 
classified into this category since we consider the operation `print' as a 
kind of `display'. This type of node is used to `display' images, 
documents or video clips. They are quite similar to the second type of 
service node discussed above. The difference is that one parameter is not 
enough to determine the effect of the operation. For example, printing 
high quality images requires a very different amount of system resources 
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from printing the same number of pages for a text file. Therefore, we use 
both the amount of received data and the number of displayed/printed 
pages as auditing data. 
" The last type of service node is based on a client-server enquiry pattern. 
This pattern includes various possible operations. For example, a smart 
refrigerator may provide an enquiry service to allow a user to ask for the 
information about the stored food. And a camera may also provide a 
picture downloading service to the user. In this study we only simulate the 
two most common operations: Downloading and Enquiry. For both of 
them we monitor the operation time, duration and the amount of traffic in 
both directions as auditing data. 
Most service nodes have a predictable traffic pattern and running process. 
The traffic patterns depend on both functions of the service nodes and behaviours 
of the users. For example, a broadcast service may either send updates regularly 
or be triggered by a request from a user. There are several types of traffic 
generators supported by GTNetS: 
9 CBR Application: An application that generates constant bit rate data 
between two nodes. 
" On-Off Application: An application that offers an on-off operation. The 
durations of the on and off states are exponentially distributed. 
TCP Server: A simple model of a request/response TCP server. The server 
binds to a specified port, and listens for connection requests from TCP 
peers. The data received from the peers specifies how much data to send 
or receive. 
5.2.3 User scenario 
Normally services are triggered by users. A usage pattern, including the time, 
duration and frequency, depends on its user's behaviour. The user's behaviour is a 
dynamic result and hard to be simulated. We defined two simplified scenarios for 
the simulation of normal usage patterns. 
Random choosing scenario: There are three random variables in this 
scenario: a random node, a random busy duration and a random idle 
duration. In this scenario a user will randomly pick a service node to 
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activate its service (start transmitting data) for a random duration. Then 
the user will turn into idle for another random duration. We assume a user 
will only communicate with one service node at any given time. 
" Nearest choosing scenario: In this scenario a user will choose the nearest 
service node to communicate. Comparing with the random choosing 
scenario, the nearest choosing scenario does not need the variable of a 
random node anymore. Which service node will be activated depends on 
how far it is away from the user. Actually it is related to the user's 
mobility pattern. 
5.2.4 Intrusion auditing 
With the assistance of the GTNetS tracing ability, we can get the system's 
trace file. In this trace file all packets are recorded. In addition, we embedded a 
recording function in each service node. The purpose is to generate event records 
according to node activities. We selected three of the most common activities for 
our research. Actually, no matter what kind of service the service nodes provide, 
we can always abstract three basic operations from a user's point of view: PROBE, 
GET, and SET. PROBE represents the process of communication negotiation and 
the setting up of connections. PROBE could be used as the first step of an attack. 
GET represents the process of receiving data from service nodes. For service 
nodes GET means the operation of `data out'. GET could cause a denial of service 
attack since the unauthorised possession of the system resources might interfere 
with legitimate users' normal access. SET represents the process of sending data 
to or configuring the service nodes. For the service nodes SET means the 
operation of `data in'. SET could change the status of some service nodes and take 
them into unwanted conditions. 
In the collected audit data, the corresponding time (including the occurrence 
time and duration), involved parameters, and amount of data (including both 
directions) of each operation are recorded by SUIDS. The final step is to 
investigate the collected trace files and event records, analyze the service usages 
and create user profiles. This is done by using the Java programming language, to 
enable its migration from the simulation to the real world. The detection methods 
and simulation results are reported in the next few chapters. 
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5.3 Summary 
In this chapter we focused on the new system architecture and detection 
mechanism of SUIDS. The simulation of SUIDS is made by using GTNetS. In 
conclusion, we list the key novelties of SUIDS: 
" Portability and Reliability: The usage of portable user profiles makes 
SUIDS able to detect intrusions without a priori knowledge of security 
flaws in a target system. This mechanism is highly portable and consistent 
with the mobility feature of ubiquitous networks. The service-oriented 
detection method protects service nodes from malicious inside users. 
Service nodes spontaneously form a defence wall against a malicious user. 
Any activities carried by the user through the network will be recorded 
and analyzed by head nodes afterwards. 
" Heterogeneity: There are thousands of diverse devices in ubiquitous 
computing environments. The classification of network nodes could help 
us effectively organise the entire system. Moreover, by cooperating with a 
service broking system, SUIDS will generate service-oriented mobile 
agents for specific devices. The service agents have better understanding 
of the service nodes on both software and hardware levels, and thus 
overcome the blindly roving problem caused by the homogeneous design 
of other mobile agent based IDSs. 
Resource-efficiency: Resources are crucial in ubiquitous networks, 
especially for those resource limited service nodes. In SUIDS, the 
classification of network nodes helps to effectively balance intrusion 
detection and resource consumption. The novel user-centric design can 
reduce the extra resource consumptions of intrusion detection on 
communications. More efforts had made on it and will be explained 
further in chapters eight and nine. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
REAL-TIME INTRUSION DETECTION WITH A 
STRING-BASED APPROACH 
SUIDS is designed for ubiquitous computing environments like a smart 
home/office. It adopts a novel auditing mechanism and flexible system 
architecture to meet the special requirements of ubiquitous networks. In this 
chapter we explain in detail about the detection methods used and experiments 
carried out during the implementation of SUIDS. Specifically, it shows how a 
string-based method is used in a user profile to represent the user's short-term 
behaviour in due course; and how an appropriate string length and threshold value 
are determined in order to balance the system's false alarm rate and detection 
effectiveness. As a result, SUIDS achieves real-time intrusion detection in 
ubiquitous networks with a lightweight and adaptable detection model. 
6.1 Detection methods 
6 1.1 Structure of event record 
As a research scenario to demonstrate the design, we assume Mike lives in a 
smart home. He uses his PDA to open the home door, adjusts the temperature of 
the home central heating, and send documents to a printer in the house. In SUIDS, 
all these tasks carried out by Mike or on behalf of him will be recorded and 
connected to his account. For example, when Mike comes into a room A, two 
event records will be sent to the corresponding head node: 
{Mike, Door Room_A, open, 07: 28: 35am} 
(Mike, Door Room A, close, 07: 28: 42am} 
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The head node may calculate the duration of this operation by using the time item 
in these records. 
If a device has other security-related parameters, they will also be recorded. 
For example, when Mike uses a printer, two event records will be generated: 
(Mike, Printer, print, 16pages, 11: 12: 23am) 
(Mike, Printer, logout, 3.4Mb, 11: 13: 45am) 
Here `16pages' indicates that Mike has printed 16 pages of documents in this 
session and `3.4Mb' indicates the amount of data that has been transferred during 
the same session. They are all security-related parameters. For example, a burst of 
requests on the printing service may indicate a denial-of-service attack or waste of 
the system resources. And it will be reflected by either a large number of print 
pages or a large amount of data transmission (e. g. printing one page of a high 
resolution picture may have the same effect as printing multi-pages of a text file). 
Eventually, these event records will be used to create Mike's profile. 
6.1.2 Mathematical model 
We use the statistical component of SRI's NIDES as our mathematical model 
[99,162]. Instead of simply measuring the means or variances of variables, 
NIDES developed a more sophisticated statistical algorithm by using an X2-like 
test to measure the similarity between short-term and long-term profiles. In 
NIDES, user profiles are represented by a number of probability density functions 
(PDFs). Assume S is the sample space of a random variable and events El, E2, ..., 
Ek are a mutually exclusive partition of S. Let P; denote the expected probability 
of the occurrence of the event E;, P; ' denote the actual probability of the 
occurrence of E; during a given time interval. The similarity between the expected 
and actual distributions is determined by the statistics: 
Q-l 
(P1'-P)2 
(6-1) 
I=1 
P 
If the cumulated value of Q exceeds a pre-determined threshold during a 
given time interval, an alarm will be raised. To utilize this statistical component 
we have to define a new model to specify the service-related factors, which can 
effectively represent a user's both long-term and short-term behaviours. 
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6.1.3 Historical statistics: representation of long-term behaviours 
In SUIDS, a user's long-term behaviour is represented by probability 
distributions. They indicate the possible results and corresponding probabilities of 
a user's each kind of action. For example, statistical results may suggest that the 
typical time for Mike to open his home door during a day is between 8-9am and 
5-6pm. This action rarely happens during other time. Thus we can get the 
following probability distributions for the action of opening the home door: 
{Door, open, 1-2,3%, 8-9,48%, 17-18,45%, 22-23,4%} 
Where `1-2' represents the door opening time, i. e. between 1-2am; and `3%' 
represents the statistical probability for opening the door during this period. 
Similarly, we can also represent Mike's behaviour regarding his usage of a 
printer. Assume the recorded largest number of pages Mike had ever printed in 
one transaction is 200. Thus we can divide it into 10 possible groups: 1-20, 
21-40, ..., 181-200. 
The occurrence probability for each group is: 
PE (6-2) 
Where E is the total number of records, E; is the number of records for the it' 
group. 
Assume the expected probability distributions in turn are 38%, 36%, 20%, 
1%, 0%, 0%, 3%, 0%, 1%, 1%. If Mike prints 30 pages in the current transaction, 
the partial similarity factor Q2 is: 
Qz = 
(P2'-36%)2 (6-3) 
36% 
Where P2' denotes the actual occurrence probability of E2 (i. e. printing 21-40 
pages) during a given time interval. 
Except for the printed page number, other parameters such as the amount of 
data transferred and processing time occupied by each session are also monitored 
and taken into account in a similar way. 
6.1.4 String: representation of short-term behaviours 
The remaining problem now is to get the value of each actual probability Pi'. 
Some IDSs use a time interval to determine a detection window, i. e. each event 
only makes effect during a certain period. Because SUIDS is a distributed and 
58 
mobile system, the time-based detection window will introduce the 
synchronization issue and make the system more complicated. 
Thus in SUIDS we proposed a string-based method to determine the detection 
window. The `string' is used to indicate a user's short-term behaviour. For 
example, if the last 100 printing operations can effectively represent Mike's 
short-term behaviour regarding his usage of the printer, a string with the length of 
100 will be set to follow the printing probability distributions in his profile. Each 
character of the string represents one of his historical printing operations. The 
format of his profile becomes: 
{Printer, print, 1-20,38%; 21-40,36%; ...; 181-200,1%. 19 082031012... 15001) 
10 pairs 100 digits 
The last item here records Mike's last 100 printing operations. We use number 0-9 
to represent the 10 groups, i. e. number 0 indicates printing 1-20 pages, number 1 
indicates printing 21-40 pages and so on. Every time when a new record comes, 
the earliest record will be discarded. The value of P; ' can be calculated 
immediately from this string by applying the following equation: 
P'= `L (6-4) 
where E; ' is the number of occurrence of the it' group in the string, and L is the 
length of the string. 
The length of the string is variable. It depends on the system's requirement 
and characteristics of each event. As will be explained in the next section, longer 
strings may decrease the false positive rate, but at the same time the false negative 
rate will be increased and more system resources will be used. 
6.2 Experiments and results 
As we explained earlier in chapter five, we created a simulation environment 
by using the Georgia Tech Network Simulator (GTNetS) [58]. All the nodes in 
our simulations are connected and communicate with each other through wireless 
connections in an Ad Hoc pattern. The default routing protocol is DSR [81,126]. 
Fig. 5.6 shows the snapshot of the simulated environment. User nodes in our 
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experiments are mobile. The mobility pattern is based on the Random Waypoint 
(RWP) model [109]. Several types of service nodes were also specified according 
to their traffic patterns and parameter characteristics. 
The first experiment we carried out is to examine the false positive rate of 
SUIDS and see how the string length affects it. We set the string length from 10 to 
100, respectively, and divide the audit data into two parts. The first half is used to 
create a user profile and the second half is used to test. Because the audit data is 
generated and collected under a normal circumstance, any alarm raised during this 
test will be considered as a false alarm. To get a low false alarm rate, the value of 
Q needs to be small. To investigate each factor's exact influence on Q, we only 
take the processing time into account at this stage. 
Table 6.1 shows the increment of Q after loading the test data into the system, 
with a different string length. We can see that the increment of Q decreases as the 
string length increases. As expected, it indicates that a longer string is more 
accurate to represent the user's short-term behaviour. However, because the 
longer string also uses more system resources, we chose the length of 80 as our 
investigation sample. Actually other parameters such as a threshold value also 
play important roles in the determination of the false alarm rate. 
Table 6.1 Increment of Q decreases as the string length increases. 
Length Q 
20 89.5758 
40 42.6789 
60 28.7096 
80 19.1924 
100 13.4959 
We use a set of threshold values from 0.5 to 3.0 to calculate the system's false 
alarm rate. Once the cumulated value of Q exceeds a predefined threshold, an 
alarm will be raised and Q will be set back to zero. The false positive rate is 
calculated by: 
R= N° 
N e 
(6-5) 
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where Rfp is the false positive rate, Na is the number of false alarms that have been 
raised, and Ne is the total number of events that have been checked. There are total 
854 event records in the testing data set. The results are listed in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 False positive rate (String length = 80, Ne = 854). 
Threshold Na Rfp 
0.5 32 3.75% 
1.0 18 2.11% 
1.5 12 1.05% 
2.0 9 1.41% 
2.5 7 0.82% 
3.0 6 0.70% 
As we can see, the false positive rate of SUIDS is quite low. A bigger 
threshold value shows a less `sensitiveness' to the deviations from the user's 
long-term behaviour. However, we cannot use Table 6.2 to decide an appropriate 
threshold value yet as it is also related to the next experiment. 
The second experiment is to examine the system's effectiveness on detecting 
anomalies. We generated another set of audit data. This set of data introduces 
anomalies or attacks by extending the processing time beyond the normal extent. 
The effectiveness of the system is represented by a hit rate. If an alarm is raised in 
connection with an event record, this record is regarded as being `hit'. A high hit 
rate on anomalous event records is preferred. The equation to calculate the hit rate 
is: 
N' 
a h=N, (6-6) 
where Na' is the number of genuine alarms and Ne' is the number of malicious 
events. There are total 181 anomalous records in this data set. Table 6.3 shows the 
experiments results. 
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Table 6.3 Hit rate (String length = 80, Ne' =181). 
Threshold Na' Rh 
0.5 172 95.03% 
1.0 165 91.16% 
1.5 159 87.85% 
2.0 157 86.74% 
2.5 151 83.43% 
3.0 149 82.32% 
In most cases, the hit rate must be kept as high as possible since any ignored 
attack may cause serious damages to the entire system. A tolerable false alarm 
rate depends on the system's security requirements/policies. Normally, it is 
acceptable to have a false alarm rate less than 5%. So combining Tables 6.2 and 
6.3, we think in this case when the threshold value is set to 0.5, SUIDS can 
achieve the best performance regarding both measures. 
6.3 Summary 
SUIDS is proposed for ubiquitous computing environments. It takes the 
limited capability and high heterogeneity of service nodes and high mobility of 
user nodes into account. In this chapter, we introduced the detection details of 
SUIDS. It adopts a string-based method to represent a user's short-term behaviour 
in real-time. The experimental results show that with a carefully selected string 
length and threshold value, i. e. length = 80 and threshold = 0.5, SUIDS can 
achieve a hit rate of 95.03% with only a false alarm rate of 3.75%. The problem 
with the string-based method is that it may need more system resources if the 
length of strings is set too long or there are too many different types of events. 
Consequently the size of user profiles might be too large to be transferred 
frequently. In the next chapter, we will introduce a chi-square statistic test to 
further improve the performance of SUIDS. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
IMPROVED CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC TEST 
In chapter six, we presented a string-based approach for SUIDS to detect 
anomalies. In this chapter, we refine the detection method of SUIDS in order to 
improve its performance in terms of both detection effectiveness and efficiency. 
An exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) technique is used to smooth 
out observation values for the variables being tracked. In this way, the observation 
reflects the `most recent past' characteristics of the variables in an online fashion. 
The technique applies a smoothing constant to a user profile to represent the 
user's short-term behaviour in real-time. The deviations between a user's 
short-term and long-term behaviours are measured by using a chi-square statistic 
test. As a result, SUIDS can measure not only the probability distributions of 
variables, but also their occurrence patterns. 
7.1 Detection methods 
In the last chapter we introduced a string-based method to determine a 
detection window. A `string' is used to indicate a user's short-term behaviour in 
an online fashion. For example, if the last 100 printing operations can effectively 
represent Mike's short-term behaviour regarding his usage of the printer, a string 
with the length of 100 will be set to follow the printing probability distributions in 
his profile. Each character of the string represents one of his historical operations. 
There are two problems with this string-based approach. Firstly, it might cost 
more system resources if the length of the string is set too long or there are too 
many different types of events. Consequently, the size of a user's profile might 
become too large to be transferred frequently. Secondly, it does not consider the 
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possible correlations between historical records. The most recent and past records 
are treated equally. Some hidden patterns regarding a user's behaviour might be 
carelessly ignored. 
7 1.1 Chi-square statistic test 
In the papers [158,159], the authors use a multivariate distance test to 
determine anomalies. Let M= {M1, M2i ..., MN} denote a set of N measures from a 
process; MO) =(M, (j), M2(j), ..., MN(j)) denote the jt' observation of these N 
measures. The distance from an observation to the mean estimate of the 
multivariate normal distributions is measured based on a chi-square statistic test: 
_ 
(11'ri(J)-M, )Z 
(7-1) 
M I==1 ; 
where is the expected value of the ith variable. D is small if an observation of 
the variables is close to the expectation. An alarm will be raised if D exceeds a 
pre-determined threshold. 
In its previous applications, the chi-square statistic test is used to measure the 
correlations between the commands at a sole host. It monitors and records the 
invocations of these commands. In contrast with the sole machine environment, 
there will be a large number of possible event types in a ubiquitous network. 
Examining the correlations between all these events will be a 
computation-exhausting and time-consuming task. Moreover, because most of the 
events contain one or more security related parameters, simply measuring the 
occurrences of these events will be insufficient to identify some intrusions. Hence, 
in this chapter we apply this chi-square statistic test within each type of event by 
analyzing their quantified parameters. It focuses on a user's behaviour on each 
specific service. In this way, the chi-square statistic test can be beneficially used 
in a distributed system like a ubiquitous network rather than a single host. 
Additionally, to add a time characteristic into an observation, we use an 
exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) technique [56] to smooth out 
an observation value for the variables being tracked. The observation thus reflects 
the `most recent past' characteristics of the variables. Assume S is the sample 
space of a random variable X, and X1, X2, ..., XN are a mutually exclusive partition 
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of S. Every time when an observation of X arrives, a vector of (X1(j), X2(j), ..., 
XN(j)} will be generated as follows: 
if the f observation of X falls into partition Xi 
X, (j)=ß, x1+(1-A) xX, (j-1) 
otherwise 
X; (j)=ß, x0+(1-, %)xX, (j-1) (7-2) 
where j is the index of the current observation, ? is a decay rate. The most recent 
observation, i. e. the jt' observation, receives a weight of ?; the (j-1)`h observation 
receives a weight of a , (1-?. ); and the (j-k)`h observation receives a weight of %(, _%) 
k. 
In the next subsection we will give an example about how to use this EWMA 
technique and chi-square statistic test to create user profiles and detect anomalies. 
7.1.2 Case study: monitor Mike's usage on a printer 
We can monitor Mike's behaviour regarding his usage of a printer by using 
this chi-square statistic test. Assume that the recorded largest number of pages 
Mike had ever printed in one transaction is 200. Thus we can divide it into 10 
possible groups: 1-20,21-40,..., 181-200, and use numbers 0-9 to represent these 
groups, i. e. number 0 indicates printing 1-20 pages, as described in section 6.1.4. 
We initialize X, (0) to 0 for i=0,1, ..., 9. The decay rate X is usually set to 0.3 
[127]. Fig. 7.1 shows its decay effect. 
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Fig. 7.1 The decay effect with k set to 0.3. 
For each printing operation, we obtain a vector of {X0, X1, ..., 
X9} based on 
equation (7-2). Given the following stream of printing events, we get the 
observation value as recorded in Table 7.1: 
j=0,1,2,3, 
Print 34 pages, Print 172 pages, Print 8 pages, 
Table 7.1 Observation values for vectors of {Xo, Xi, ..., 
X9}. 
xo x XZ X3 X, 
`l5 
x6 X7 x8 x9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0.21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 
3 0.3 0.147 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.21 0 
Note: At j=1, '34 pages' falls into group 1 (21-40 pages); at j=2, '172 
pages ' falls into group 8 (161-180 pages); at j=3, '8 pages 'falls into group 0 
(1-20 pages). 
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Mike's long-term profile of normal activities is represented by the estimated 
vector of (T. -, X, , ..., X9 }. It is obtained from the training data by averaging all 
observed vectors of (Xo, X1, ..., X9). Considering that events in a distributed 
system actually do not arrive at once but sequentially, we use the following 
recursive formula to incrementally update x, after each observation [159]: 
-1)X i-l, l + 
xi', 
(7-3) 
J 
where j is the index of the current observation. Eventually, the format of Mike's 
profile is like: 
{Printer, print, (0,0.055,0.301), (1,0.144,0.254), (2,0.104,0.038), (3,0.054, 
0.001), (4,0.164,0.025), (5,0.076,0.001), (6,0.111,0.094), (7,0.099,0.266), (8, 
0.110,0.019), (9,0.056,0.001), 3.231758} 
As we can see, each group is composed of three variables, e. g. (0,0.055, 
0.301). They represent the group number, expected value and current observed 
value, respectively. The last item in his profile, 3.231758, indicates the threshold 
value for his printing operation. We will explain it in the following part. For each 
printing event in the testing data and the corresponding observed vector of {X0, 
X1, ..., X9}, we compute X2 (i. e. Din equation (7-1)) as follows: 
XZ= 
(X' X')2 
(7-4) 
=o X, 
The computed X2 is small if the observed vector is close to the expected vector. 
Similar to the paper [158], in our study we use XZ +3SX2 as the threshold 
value. We use the training data to estimate the average (X2) and the standard 
deviation (Sx, ) respectively, and then load the testing data into the system. If for 
an event record the calculated value of X2 is higher than the threshold, we signal 
this event as an anomaly. Let N denotes the number of records in the training data. 
The standard deviation SX, is calculated by: 
1N 
SXi 2 
-X22 (7-5) N-Imý1 
It is possible that some audit events do not appear in the training data but 
occur in the testing data. For example, Mike may print 300 pages in his future 
67 
operations. Hence, the expected value for such an event is zero after the training. 
To avoid having a zero at the denominator of equation (7-4), we use the recorded 
smallest value of 0.001 to replace zero. 
Apart from the printed page number, other parameters such as the amount of 
data transferred and processing time occupied by each session are also monitored 
and taken into account in a similar way. 
7.2 Experiments and results 
Again, we use the same simulation environment built with the Georgia Tech 
Network Simulator (GTNetS) [58], as defined in section 5.2.1. Fig. 5.6 shows the 
snapshot of the simulated environment. 
The first experiment is to examine the false positive rate of SUIDS. We 
divide the collected audit data into two parts. The first half is used for training, i. e. 
creating a user's profile. The second half is used for testing. During the test, once 
the calculated value of X2 exceeds the threshold, an alarm will be raised. Because 
the audit data is generated and collected under normal circumstances, any alarm 
raised during this experiment is considered as a false alarm. The false positive rate 
is calculated by: 
Na 
Rfp 
e 
(7-6) 
where R1 is the false positive rate, Na is the number of false alarms that have been 
raised, and N. is the number of events that are generated by the legitimate sessions 
and checked by SUIDS. 
There are 3047 records in the training data and 3028 records in the testing 
data. After the training, we got the value of the average (X2) and standard 
deviation (SX, ) for each type of event. Fig. 7.2 shows the calculated X2 for the 
3028 testing records. We can see that 10 of them have extraordinarily higher 
values than the others. They are the events that only appear in the testing data. In 
the end there are total 99 false alarms raised during the test. So the false positive 
rate of SUIDS is 3.27% (= 99/3028* 100%). 
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The second experiment is to test the system's effectiveness on detecting 
anomalies. The effectiveness of SUIDS is represented by a hit rate. If an alarm is 
raised in connection with an event record, this record is regarded as being 'hit'. A 
high hit rate on anomalous event records is preferred. The equation to calculate 
the hit rate is: 
N' 
Rh = v`, (7-7) 
where Rh represents the hit rate, Na' denotes the number of genuine alarms that 
have been raised, and Ne' denotes the number of events that are generated by 
malicious sessions and examined by SUIDS. 
It is worth noticing that the definitions of Ne and Ne' in equations (7-6) and 
(7-7) are slightly different from other IDSs. Normally people distinguish event 
records into normal and abnormal ones based on their characteristics, but we 
found that on some occasions it is a controversial issue to assert if a record is 
anomalous. For example, a malicious user always needs to do some preparation 
work before launching an attack. Although these preparations are closely related 
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to the attack, its event records could appear normal, as long as they are not against 
any detection rule. To clarify this issue, we categorize event records based on the 
nature of the sessions they belong to. A session starts with a service request from 
a user node, and ends when the service thread is terminated. In this case, all 
records from a legitimate session will be classified into those counted for Ne. 
Actually, because in reality we do not know whether a record is anomalous in 
advance, this generalized classification could be more practical for post-analysis 
such as tracing the behaviour of an attacker. 
We collected another set of data as anomalous data. Two types of anomalies 
or attacks are introduced into this data set. The first type is a denial-of-service 
attack, which is generated by deliberately occupying the CPU time of a service 
node. The second type is a SYN flood attack [143]. In the SYN flood attack the 
attacker sends TCP/IP SYN (synchronize/initialization) packets, with erroneous 
return IP address information, to the target. Each SYN packet is a request to open 
a TCP connection. The victim responds with a SYN/ACK (synchronize/ 
acknowledge) packet and waits for a response. Soon it will get slowed down as 
more traffic floods in. In both cases the attacker randomly picks up a service node 
from the simulated environment as a victim. There are total 2596 records in the 
anomalous data set. 
Fig. 7.3 shows the values of X2 for the entire anomalous data set, and Fig. 7.4 
picks part of the results in order to give a clear view. There are 1199 alarms raised 
during this experiment. The hit rate is quite low, just 46.19% (_ 
1199/2596* 100%). As we explained earlier, it is caused by the fact that not all the 
records in a malicious session act against the rules being checked by SUIDS. A 
specific attack will only show anomalies in certain aspects, e. g. an anomalous 
traffic pattern or processing time. Actually, if we measure the system's hit rate by 
excluding the accessory records, we will get a so-called `key anomaly' hit rate. 
The key anomalies are identified according to each attack's main influence on the 
system being protected. For example, in our experiments the DoS attack directly 
affects the CPU processing time and the SYN flood attack introduces unusual 
traffic patterns. We addressed 982 key anomalous records from the anomalous 
data set, and 924 of them triggered an alarm. So the key anomaly hit rate of 
SUIDS is 94.09% (= 924/982*100%). 
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To further prove the effectiveness of SUIDS, we also measured the system's 
hit rate by sessions other than records. Similar to the definition of the hit rate by 
records, if there is an alarm triggered in connection with an intrusion session, we 
signal this session as being `hit'. The result is calculated by dividing the number 
of signalled malicious sessions by the total number of them. As long as no 
malicious session has been ignored by SUIDS, we can regard the system as being 
secured. This measurement will not affect the real time feature of SUIDS as the 
detection mechanism still works based on the stream of event records. 2596 
anomalous records are generated by 789 intrusion sessions. After the experiment, 
all these 789 sessions have been signalled. The system's hit rate by sessions 
achieved 100% (= 789/789* 100%). 
Instead of using the pure normal or pure anomalous data set, in the last 
experiment we tested SUIDS with a mixed data set by combining normal 
activities and anomalies. The audit data we used here are the same as those used 
in experiments 1 and 2. We chop the anomalous data into several portions and 
insert them into normal data stochastically. The false alarm rates and hit rates (by 
both records and sessions) are calculated in the same way. Fig. 7.5 shows the 
calculated values of X? for the mixed data and Table 7.2 shows the experimental 
results. We can see from Table 7.2 that the false alarm rate here is little higher 
than in experiment 1. It indicates that introducing anomalies into normal data do 
affect the final result of Rfp. However, the malicious session hit rate still keeps 
100%. 
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Table 7.2 False alarm rates and hit rates (by both records and sessions) for a 
combined data set. 
False Alarm Number (Na) 120 
Normal Record Number (Ne) 3028 
False Alarm Rate (Rfp) 3.96% 
Genuine Alarm Number (Na') 1171 
Anomalous Record Number (Ne') 2596 
Hit Rate by Records (Rh) 45.11% 
Signalled Key Anomalous Record 
919 
Number 
982 
Key Anomalous Record Number 
93.58% 
Key Anomaly Hit Rate 
Signalled Malicious Session Number 789 
Malicious Session Number 789 
Hit Rate by Session 100% 
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In most cases, we want to keep a high hit rate on anomalous records/sessions 
since any ignored attack may cause severe damages to the entire system. The 
system's tolerance on the false alarm rate depends on individual requirements. 
Because the false alarm rate of SUIDS is very low (< 3.96%), we can conclude 
that SUIDS can achieve a good performance by applying this altered chi-square 
statistic test. 
Comparing with the string-based approach proposed in chapter six, the 
detection effectiveness of the chi-square statistic test shows little improvement. 
The chi-square statistic test has a better false alarm rate, while the string-based 
approach has a slightly better hit rate. Both of them are lightweight and able to 
detect anomalies in real-time. However, because the user profile used for the 
string-based approach is bigger than that for the chi-square statistic test, the 
former requires more system resources. Furthermore, since the string-based 
approach is based on a cumulated result, it needs an extra process to identify a 
malicious event record. Thus we think the chi-square statistic test is a better 
solution in general. 
7.3 Summary 
In this chapter, we presented an improved detection method for SUIDS. It 
adopts a chi-square statistic test to calculate the deviations between a user's 
short-term behaviour and his long-term profile. The experiment results 
encouragingly show that SUIDS can achieve a high hit rate on anomalous 
records/sessions with a maximum false alarm rate of only 3.96%. Based on this 
effective detection method, in the next chapter, we will investigate the 
possibilities to make SUIDS more resource-efficient. A resource-efficient 
detection scheme will help reducing the usage of CPU and storage space. More 
importantly, for ubiquitous networks which may contain many battery powered 
devices, reduced energy consumptions will extend the lifetime of the entire 
network. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
ACHIEVING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN SUIDS 
In the last two chapters we examined two different detection methods for 
SUIDS. The inherent features of ubiquitous computing request SUIDS to give 
special concern to the issue of resource-efficiency. In this chapter, we present a 
comprehensive analysis of energy consumed in SUIDS and propose a profile 
splitting technique in order to reduce the energy consumption. Specifically, it 
shows how a head node can be utilized to save the computing-related energy; how 
a user profile can be managed in a distributed pattern to reduce the 
communication-related cost; and how a hybrid metric is used to balance both of 
them in order to extend the network lifetime. 
8.1 Energy-efficiency in SUIDS 
System resources are crucial in ubiquitous networks. Ideally, during its 
implementation, SUIDS needs to balance many factors such as CPU processing 
speed, storage space, trustworthiness and etc. In the past decades, the CPU 
processing ability and storage space of computer systems keep fast growing, by 
obeying Moore's Law [106]. Battery capacity becomes a bottleneck for most 
battery-powered devices. We think in the foreseeable future, the energy issue will 
remain as a crucial hurdle on the road towards ubiquitous computing. Hence, in 
this chapter we particularly focus on saving energy. We analyze the energy 
consumed by SUIDS and present a new approach to reduce it. Other factors will 
be considered in the next chapter. 
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8.1.1 Energy consumptions in SUIDS 
The energy consumed by SUIDS can be classified into two categories: 
communication-related energy and computing-related energy. 
Communication-related energy refers to the energy used by the radio 
transceiver of a node to communicate with others. The contents of the 
communication include transmitted/received event records and user profiles. An 
approximation of energy consumption when transmitting or receiving r bits 
between two nodes nl and n2 with a distance of d(ni, n2) is given in [111] as: 
E, = (a +a2d(n,, n2)")r (8-1) 
E,., = a12r (8-2) 
where Ea denotes the transmitting energy and E, denotes the receiving energy. 
all, a2 and a12 are constants, and their typical values are all = 45nJ/bit, a12 = 
135nJ/bit, a2 = IOpJ/bit'm2 (for n= 2) and O. 00IpJ/bit/m4 (for n= 4). n is the 
attenuation factor and in this study we use n=2. 
The computing-related energy refers to the energy used to implement the 
intrusion detection modules. It is mainly dedicated to monitor network status and 
user activities, execute intrusion detection algorithms, maintain and update user 
profiles. The calculation of the computing-related energy is a very complex task. 
A more detailed definition and simulation model are needed. In this thesis, we 
assume this part of the consumption is proportional to the number of event records. 
That means the more users' activities are observed, the more computing-related 
energy will be consumed. For each record, processing it is a fixed charge (5mJ), 
regardless where detection modules are. 
8.1.2 Save computing energy by using head nodes 
As we explained in chapter five, the network nodes in our system are 
categorized into head nodes, service nodes and user nodes. Head nodes, for 
example PCs, normally have no constraints on energy when they serve as fixed 
workstations. In our original design, a user profile in SUIDS follows the user 
around and stays at the nearest head node to the user. Head nodes are in charge of 
receiving event records from service nodes and detecting anomalies. In this way, 
most of the computing-related energy is consumed at head nodes and can be 
omitted since the head nodes have unlimited power supplies. 
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However, just like today's ad-hoc networks, the great feature of `anytime and 
anywhere' inevitably constrains the availability of head nodes in ubiquitous 
networks. Sometimes we may not be able to find a suitable head node to host a 
user profile. And even if a head node is available, more energy could still be 
consumed on communications if it is too far away from service nodes. In order to 
extend the lifetime of a ubiquitous computing network and cope with the situation 
where no head node is available, in the next subsection we will present a 
distributed profile splitting technique to replace the centralized model defined in 
chapter five. 
8.1.3 Save communication energy by splitting user profiles 
To save the energy and time spent on communications, service nodes need to 
participate in intrusion detection in a more proactive way. In this chapter we try to 
achieve energy efficiency by arranging the detection modules and user profiles of 
SUIDS in a distributed pattern. Obviously, if event records are processed locally 
instead of sending them to head nodes, energy consumed on data transmission 
will be reduced. 
A user's profile in SUIDS is constructed by a list of entries. Each entry 
records a user's behaviour regarding his usage of a particular service. The 
structure of an entry is like: 
{Service-ID, Action-Type, (Parameter Sample Spaces, Estimated Value, 
Observed Value), Threshold) 
We are inspired to split the user profile into smaller parts based on the 
Service-ID and distribute them to the corresponding service nodes. Because the 
entries in a user profile are independent of each other (according to the detection 
method of SUIDS), splitting the user profile will not affect the result of intrusion 
detection. When a user requests a service, the related service node will get the 
corresponding entries from the user profile. The service node will calculate the 
value of X? (the measurement of similarities between the expected and observed 
values linked to the node) locally and send the updated entries back to the head 
node when the user moves to other domains. In this way, only a small part of the 
user profile needs to be transmitted between the service node and its head node. 
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8.1.4 Choose proxy nodes based on a hybrid metric 
Processing event records locally means that the detection algorithm of SUIDS will 
be executed at service nodes. The prerequisite for this method is that the service 
nodes are able to afford this extra load. Unfortunately, in ubiquitous networks it is 
not always the case. A service node might be constrained by its limited battery 
capacity. The overuse of the service node may cause battery exhaustion and 
shorten the service lifetime. Hence, another process is needed to choose the most 
suitable place to allocate the split user profile and execute the intrusion detection 
algorithm. We will use the term `proxy node' to denote a dedicated place/node for 
this purpose. 
Possible choices of proxy nodes for a service node include the service node 
itself and other nodes around it within one hop. Although no solution has been 
proposed yet to address the same issue in the area of intrusion detection, we 
realized that, to some extent, our work can benefit from existing research in the 
area of energy-efficient routing in mobile ad-hoc networks [95,136,151]. In this 
chapter we use the following metrics to choose a proxy node: 
1. Minimum transmission power Et,. This metric tries to find the most 
efficient proxy node in terms of saving communication energy. Because 
for the same amount of data, the energy consumed on receiving (En) is 
unchanged, we only have to compare different amounts of transmission 
energy (Eu) related to possible proxy nodes. Equation (8-1) shows that 
E, consumed between a service node and a proxy node depends on d (d 
is the distance between the service node and proxy node). As a feature of 
ubiquitous computing, the physical positions of service and proxy nodes 
can be used as available information. Obviously, for a service node, this 
metric will always lead to the proxy node that is closest to but different 
from the service node (with the minimum d). 
2. Maximum residual energy B. Although the minimum transmission power 
E, may reduce the total energy consumption, it does not reflect directly 
on the lifetime of each node. If a service node chooses a node with less 
residual energy, the selected node will die of battery exhaustion sooner. 
Therefore, the remaining battery capacity of each node is a more accurate 
metric to describe their lifetimes. This metric prefers the proxy node with 
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the maximum residual energy at time t (BI). The target of this metric is to 
evenly distribute energy consumptions among network nodes and extend 
the network lifetime. 
3. Minimum energy consumption rate (Bo-Bt)/t. Residual energy Bt 
represents a node's current condition at time t. It cannot reflect the node's 
past and future usage trend. Because the intrusion detection module of 
SUIDS introduces extra burdens on both communication and computing, 
an energy consumption rate is also an important metric to be considered. 
Let Bo denote the initial battery capacity of a proxy node, and Bt denote 
its residual energy at time t. Assuming the energy consumption rate is a 
constant value, (Bo-Bt)/t represents how busy/active this node is in the 
network. This metric can be regarded as a complement to the second 
metric. 
The above three metrics are not consistent with each other. For example, in 
Fig. 8.1 service node 1 will work out different proxy nodes when applying these 
three metrics respectively. Metric 1 will choose node 2 as the proxy node of node 
1 since it consumes the least transmission power. Metric 2 will choose node 3 
because it has the most residual energy. And metric 3 will choose node 4 since it 
consumes energy at the lowest rate. It is worth to notice that metrics 2 and 3 do 
not necessarily mean a longer network lifetime. In some cases it might even get 
the opposite result if they pick up a proxy node that consumes too much 
transmission power. 
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Fig. 8.1 Three metrics will work out different proxy nodes. 
In order to balance these three metrics, in this chapter we use a new 
conditional hybrid metric. Basically, from all the candidate nodes, the one with 
the maximum value of 
M 
B,. - ß1 (8-3) h 
(B° 
B` 
+ ß2)x E, 
t 
will be chosen as the proxy node. Mh is referred to as the conditional hybrid 
metric. Parameters f1 and P2 are the conditions. 6 works as a threshold to rule out 
a set of nodes with less residual energies. P2 sets a minimum expectation of the 
energy consumption rate. By adjusting the values of ßl and ß2i we will be able to 
prevent some extreme cases. For example, if a node keeps idle for a long time and 
has very little energy left, without fl and /32 (set to 0), it might be undesirably 
selected as a proxy node. In this study we set Q1= 20mJ and ß2 = 0.05mJ/s. 
8.2 Experiments and performance analysis 
8.2.1 Modified simulation environment 
Because GTNetS does not provide the functionality for measuring energy 
consumption, we chose another simulator - Georgia Tech Sensor Network 
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Simulator (GTSNetS) [111] - to prove the effectiveness of our method. GTSNetS 
is a fully-featured sensor network simulation tool based on the GTNetS. The main 
difference is that it provides each sensor node with a simulated battery in order to 
measure its energy consumption. Because GTSNetS was dedicated to sensor 
networks, we have to modify the source of the simulator in order to make it fit for 
our experiments. The major modifications we made include: 
" Inherit and transform basic sensor network applications to CBR and TCP 
applications. The CBR application is used to generate constant bit rate 
data between two nodes. The TCP application creates a simple model of a 
request/response based TCP session. A TCP server is bound to a specified 
port, and listens for connection requests from TCP peers. The data 
received from the peers specifies how much data to send or receive. 
" Disable the sensing function of sensor nodes and transform the simulated 
environment of a sensor network into that of a simple wireless ad hoc 
network. Along with the alterations to applications and network nodes, the 
routing protocol used has also been changed from Directed Diffusion [73] 
to DSR [81]. 
" Generate our own trace files by using a timer variable to check node states 
every 1.5 seconds. If a node's residual energy is less than 1mJ, the node 
will be considered as dead due to its battery exhaustion. To simplify the 
issue, we assume that if the number of dead nodes exceeds half of the 
total node number, the network will be considered as dead too. 
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Fig. 8.2 Modified simulation environment with GTSNetS. 
The simulated network has total 51 nodes in a 120x120m2 area. Initially, there 
is one head node. ten user nodes and forty service nodes. All the nodes in our 
simulations are connected and communicate with each other through wireless 
connections, i. e. in an Ad Hoc pattern. The default routing protocol is DSR. Fig. 
8.2 shows a snapshot of the simulated environment. We assume the signal 
transmission medium is homogeneous, i. e. fixed ai 1, a- and ail with n=2 in 
equations (8-1) and (8-2), and all the nodes have the same radio range (30m). 
There are some factors that will affect the performance of SUIDS in terms of 
energy-efficiency. In the next few subsections, we analyze each of them and 
demonstrate their influences on the network lifetime. 
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8.2.2 Effect of the hybrid metric 
The first experiment is to examine the effect of the hybrid metric defined 
earlier. We created three scenarios. In the first scenario, all event records will be 
processed locally at the service nodes. In this way, the communication-related 
energy is much reduced. In the second scenario, the service nodes will always 
choose the head node as a proxy node. All the event records will be analyzed at 
the head node. Thus the computing-related energy can be reduced. In the last 
scenario, once a service node has been activated, all nodes within its radio range, 
including itself, will be examined against the hybrid metric. The node with the 
highest value of the metric will be chosen as its proxy node. The event records of 
the service node will be sent to the proxy node and processed there. The TTL 
(time to live) field of the request message sent by service node set to 1 (hop) in 
order to reduce the amount of communications. Only a small amount of data (the 
value of hybrid metric) needs to be sent back to the service node during the proxy 
selection phase. 
In all these three scenarios, the communication-related energy is calculated 
based on equations (8-1) and (8-2). The computing-related energy is shared by the 
service and proxy nodes. We assume the energy consumed at a service node is 
proportional to the length of an event record it generated, and that at its proxy 
node is a fixed cost for the record reception and processing (5mJ). The simulation 
will end after the network has died (i. e., over half of the service nodes are battery 
exhausted). The purpose for this is to examine how the introduction of the hybrid 
metric will affect the network lifetime. 
We tested each scenario with different user nodes and took mean values as 
the final results. Fig. 8.3 shows their differences. The horizontal axis denotes the 
number of dead nodes and the vertical axis denotes their death time. At the node 
number equal to 20, the network is dead. Not surprisingly, with our hybrid metric, 
the system has the best performance compared with simply using a service node 
or head node as a proxy for event record processing. The impact of the hybrid 
metric gradually improves as the simulation proceeds. The average node lifetime 
is increased from 4488.525s (scenario one) and 4563.89s (scenario two) to 
5845.595s (increased 30.23% and 28.08%, respectively). The network lifetime is 
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extended on average from 6314.6s (scenario one) and 7042s (scenario two) to 
8736.1s (increased 38.35% and 24.06%, respectively). 
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Fig. 8.3 Impact of the proposed hybrid metric. 
8.2.3 Head nodes 'density and distribution 
In the first experiment, we assume that there is only one head node available 
in the simulated environment. Certainly, if more head nodes are deployed in the 
network, the result could be different. In the second experiment we examine how 
the existence and deployment of head nodes will affect our system. 
We increased the number of head nodes from one to five and reran the 
simulations, respectively. To keep the total node number unchanged, we reduced 
the number of user nodes correspondingly. In the case of five head nodes, only six 
user nodes are left. In order to ensure a fair comparison, all the results are 
obtained by using the same set of user nodes. The head nodes are randomly 
located and one of them will be chosen as a proxy node. Because they all have 
unlimited power supplies, the hybrid metric cannot be used here. In this 
experiment we use the distance from a service node to a head node as a metric to 
measure its suitability as a proxy node. Normally, the closer a head node to an 
activated service node, the less energy consumed on the communication between 
- Hybrid letric 
- Service Node 
-- Head Node 
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them. Hence, a service node will always choose the closest head node as its proxy 
node. Experiment results are shown in Fig. 8.4. Basically, since the additional 
head nodes are deployed, the network lifetime is generally extended. The 
averaged node lifetimes are 4368.958s, 4618.675s, 4782.65s, 4744.051s, and 
5387.984s for the number of head nodes from one to five, respectively. However, 
even with the five head nodes (almost 10% of the total node number), the 
performance of using the head nodes is still no better than using our hybrid metric 
which has the averaged node lifetime of 5449.575s (re-calculated by using the 
same set of user nodes as well). 
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Fig. 8.4 Use of head nodes from one to five. 
Apart from the number of head nodes, their locations also play an important 
role. If a head node is easy to reach from a service node, the energy consumed on 
their communication could be reduced. In the last test, we choose the case of four 
head nodes and deploy them uniformly instead of stochastically. The network is 
equally divided into four squares and the head nodes are deployed at the center of 
the squares. The experiment results are shown in Fig. 8.5. Although the network 
lifetime is dramatically increased in the case of uniform distribution, in reality the 
deployment pattern of head nodes is different from case to case. As we mentioned 
earlier, because the availability of head nodes is not guaranteed in ubiquitous 
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networks, we think our hybrid metric still has a greater and more generalized 
usefulness. 
Note that in Fig. 8.5 the random distribution overperforms the hybrid metric 
around 10 dead nodes. It could happen at the early stage of an experiment if there 
are relatively more head nodes. However, the case with the application of the 
hybrid metric still has a longer average node lifetime for a long-term observation. 
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Fig. 8.5 Four head nodes with different distribution patterns. 
8.2.4 User nodes ' mobility 
User nodes in our experiments are mobile. The mobility pattern used here is 
the Random Waypoint (RWP) model [109]. The RWP model is widely used in the 
simulations of Ad Hoc networks. There are two factors in the RWP model: a 
user's velocity and thinking time. Basically, in the RWP model, each node moves 
along a zigzag line from one waypoint to the next. The waypoints are uniformly 
distributed over a given area. At the start of each leg a random velocity is drawn 
from the velocity distribution (in a basic case the velocity is constant I). The 
nodes may have so-called 'thinking times' when they reach each waypoint before 
continuing on the next leg. We cannot control a user's mobility, but the 
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correlations between the users' mobility patterns and the network lifetime may 
help us to adjust our strategies. 
We first examine the effect of a user's velocity. Let the thinking time be fixed 
to 600 seconds. Four velocities have been tested: Im/s (Walk), 5m/s (Bicycle), 
lOm/s (Motorcycle), and 15m/s (Car). The network lifetimes under the different 
velocities are shown in Fig. 8.6. We can see that at a low speed (1-5m/s), the 
network lifetime is shorter than that at a higher speed (10 m/s). It can be explained 
that with a fixed thinking time, a higher speed scenario covers a wider area during 
the same period. It tends to give the service nodes more choices on a proxy node 
and helps the system to distribute its residual energy evenly. However, if the 
speed continues growing (15 m/s), the extra energy consumed on the dynamic 
routing will partly leverage the benefit brought by the wider coverage. The 
network lifetime will be shortened. 
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Fig. 8.6 Effects of users' velocities. 
Similarly, in the next experiment we tested different thinking times from 300s 
to 1500s. The velocity is fixed to the most common scenario lm/s (Walk). The 
experiment results can be found in Fig. 8.7. Basically, a shorter thinking time has 
better performance than a longer thinking time. It can be explained that under the 
I m/s 
5 m/s 
10 m/s 
15 m/s 
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same speed, a shorter thinking time can cover a wider area during the same 
period. 
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Fig. 8.7 Effect of users' thinking times. 
It is worth noticing that in both of figures 8.6 and 8.7, the network lifetime 
lines are flatter than those in the 'still' case (without mobility). It further proved 
that though user nodes' mobility may require more energy on routing, it can also 
help to distribute the energy consumptions evenly among the nodes and extend the 
network lifetime eventually. 
8.3 Summary 
In this chapter, we analyzed the energy consumptions in SUIDS for a 
ubiquitous computing network and categorized them into two parts: 
computing-related and communication-related. The computing-related part can be 
reduced by taking advantage of head nodes' unlimited computation supplies; and 
the communication-related part can be reduced by splitting user profiles and 
implementing the detection modules of SUIDS locally. To balance these two, we 
proposed a conditional hybrid metric. By taking various energy-related factors 
into account, the hybrid metric helps SUIDS achieve better performance in terms 
l 
-300s 
-9005 
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- non-mobility 
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of energy-efficiency. As a result, the network lifetime is beneficially extended. It 
has to be pointed out that our method is designed for those battery powered 
devices. Some service nodes such as a smart refrigerator may also have an 
unlimited energy supply. In this aspect, their capacities are equal to those of head 
nodes. A combined consideration about the density, distribution and mobility of 
head nodes may help to deploy the network more effectively in the future. In the 
next chapter, more factors such as a node's processor speed and available storage 
space will be considered. Especially, we take the trustworthiness of nodes into 
account during the selection of a proxy node. In this way, SUIDS is enhanced 
with stronger security assurance. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
BALANCING INTRUSION DETECTION RESOURCES IN 
UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING NETWORKS 
Resource-efficiency is regarded as a key objective for all applications in 
ubiquitous computing. In the last chapter, we used an energy-related hybrid metric 
to reduce the energy consumptions of SUIDS. It balanced the transmission power, 
residual energy, and energy consumption rate of a node during the selection of a 
proxy node. Based on this work, in this chapter we present a comprehensive 
analysis of the resource constraints in SUIDS and propose a new method in order 
to take other factors such as computing ability, storage space and trust levels into 
account. Specifically, it shows how a node's computing availability is measured 
in relation to its energy usage; how a node's trust level is estimated based on 
multi-factors; and how a hybrid metric is used to balance these concerns together. 
As a result, SUIDS achieves better performance in terms of resource efficiency 
together with enhanced security assurance. 
9.1 Selecting a proxy node based on additional factors 
Overcoming the barriers of limited resources in ubiquitous computing is 
always one of our main objectives. In this section, we present a new approach to 
improve the performance of SUIDS regarding its usage on system resources. We 
use the same profile splitting technique mentioned in chapter eight and an 
enhanced hybrid metric to select a proxy node. The proxy node is used to perform 
delegated burdensome intrusion detection tasks. During the selection of the proxy 
node, there are four key resources to be considered: energy, storage space, 
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processor speed (busy/idle ratio), and trust. Among them, the energy, storage 
space and processor speed are quantified metrics. It is possible to compare them 
directly by knowing their numerical values. In contrast, to measure the 
trustworthiness of a node, an extra process is needed to evaluate its level first. 
However, it is important to take the trust into account as the delegation of 
detection tasks should not introduce new threats or vulnerabilities into the system. 
In this section, we propose a new approach to measure these resources together. 
This method exploits the hidden correlations among the resources. 
9.1.1 Remaining energy and storage space 
A node's remaining energy and storage space are variables. Their values 
change all the time, depending on the node's current condition as well as the 
surrounding environment. Sufficient remaining energy and storage space are 
prerequisites for a node to be chosen as a proxy node. In contrast with consumable 
energy, occupied storage space can be released once its use is completed. Hence 
remaining energy is a more crucial factor during the selection of a proxy node. 
To simplify the issue, in this study we assume that all the nodes are powered 
by batteries. It is more like a mobile Ad Hoc network. As we explained in chapter 
eight, although in reality some devices, such as head nodes, may have unlimited 
energy supplies, simply relying on them may cause quick battery exhaustion for 
other nodes. Because remaining energy is just one aspect of the issue, to use the 
energy smartly and reduce its total consumption, other energy related factors also 
need to be considered. Here we use the same three factors mentioned in chapter 
eight: minimum transmission power Ea, maximum residual energy Bt, and 
minimum energy consumption rate (Bo-Bt)/t. The final metric regarding a node's 
energy is: 
E 
B- Br-ßl 
(9-1) 
(otI +Q2)xE., 
9.1.2 Available computing ability 
The processor speed of a node/device is a constant. It denotes the node's 
computing capability. The processor speeds of different nodes vary from several 
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MHz to several GHz. Normally small devices such as sensors have limited 
computing abilities as their sizes are confined. However, the availability of a 
node's actual computing ability is a variable. Its processor speed needs to be 
considered together with its busy/idle ratio. If the node is always in a busy status, 
its actual computing ability dedicated to IDS will be limited. During the selection 
of a proxy node, we prefer a node with both a fast processor speed and low 
busy/idle ratio. 
To reduce the intrusion detection work on each node, in this study we find a 
new way to measure the busy/idle ratio of a node. This ratio, to some extent, is 
reflected by the node's energy consumption rate. If the node is always busy, its 
energy consumption rate will be fast, and vice versa. Thus the energy 
consumption rate can denote the node's condition in the network. To simplify the 
issue, we set only two statuses here: busy and idle. Each node has its own energy 
consumption rates for the busy and idle statuses. The idle consumption rate should 
be more stable than the busy one. Because most service nodes provide specific 
services to users, they have very determined traffic/operation patterns. Thus in 
this study we can assume the energy consumption rates for both statuses are 
constant. Suppose that the initial energy is Bo, the current energy at time t is Br, tb 
is the node's total busy time for duration t, t, is the total idle time for the same 
duration, Rb is the energy consumption rate for the busy status, and R, is the 
consumption rate for the idle status. Based on these factors, the following 
equations can be deduced: 
Rb x tb + R, x t, = Bo - B, (9-2) 
t+ +t, =t 
Thus the node's busy/idle ratio C can be represented as: 
Bo -B, 
-R 
C __b 
rB-B (9-3) 
it R t, or bt 
9.1.3 Trust 
Trust, as we mean it in this thesis, is about the confidence a service node has 
to delegate its intrusion detection tasks to a specific proxy node. It is important 
that a proxy node is trustworthy due to the security nature of intrusion detection. 
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An improper delegation may put the entire system in danger as a compromised 
proxy node might leave a backdoor to intruders. However, just like in real society, 
trust is a very subjective metric. A node's trust level may not be the same when 
measuring it from different angles. In order to be able to compare different nodes' 
trust levels, the first step is to establish a quantitative trust model. 
There are many research results on establishing trust in computer networks 
[15,80,134]. The information sources used to build trust normally are reputation 
(evidence from observations of previous interactions), delegation or 
recommendation from a third party. Trust has its own lifecycle. It depends on the 
procedures of how trust is maintained. A typical lifecycle includes collecting 
information, evaluating trust, making decision, monitoring, and updating. Trust 
evaluation and decision-making include risk analysis. There is always a trade-off 
between risks and benefits. To make the final decision, a pre-defined security 
policy is essential. For example, it might set a threshold to decide at which level 
of trust a node can be selected as a proxy node. In the end, the trust must be 
revocable if a node's trust level is changed or erroneously estimated. It needs to 
be updated in time. 
Because ubiquitous computing is a highly distributed environment, it will be 
a problem to estimate the trust level for a newly joined node. It is hard to decide 
where to get recommendations for a totally unknown node. Furthermore, flooding 
is not an appropriate way to collect recommendations in ubiquitous networks as it 
may consume more energy. 
The paper [74] proposed an intrusion detection method based on the usage of 
batteries. The principle is that if a node's energy is consumed unusually, it is very 
likely that the node is under attack. It gave us the idea that the correlations 
between trust and energy could be measured. In addition, we believe that a node's 
trust level is also related to its "safe time" (duration without known abnormal 
activities) in the network. A node with a longer safe time could have a higher trust 
level. Thus the final estimation of trust is also a coexistence result of multi-factors. 
We use Tto denote a node's trust level. It can be represented as: 
A(i') 
T= (9-4) 
A( 
Bn - Bi2 ) 
(t2 -t, )x(Rb xS+R, x(1-S)) 
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where fQ is the function about the safe time and f2Q is the function about the 
short-term energy consumption rate. In f Q, t, denotes the node's safe time and to 
is an adjustable threshold. In f2Q, Bt, and Bt2 denote the remaining energies at 
times 11 and 12. Rb and R; are the aforementioned energy consumption rates for the 
busy and idle statuses, respectively. S represents the node's status between times 
t1 and t2 with S=1 if the node was busy and S=0 otherwise. If the node's 
short-term energy consumption rate (Btl-Bt2)/(t2 -tl) is over the conventional value 
Rb or R;, the node's trust level will decline. Based on the definitions of f, Q and f2Q 
listed below, T is confined between 0 and 10 and will be updated every time when 
the node's status changes. 
f, _x 
ifx510 
) W (ý 
10 otherwise 
(9-5 
x ifxzl 
zx ) () 1 otherwise 
(9-6 
Because not all attacks can be traced by monitoring the usage of energy, this 
method is not one hundred percent accurate in reflecting a node's trust level. 
Other factors such as the node's historical security records and functionalities may 
give different views on its trustworthiness. More trust related factors will be 
considered in our future work. 
9.2 The protocol 
Eventually, to balance these three metrics discussed in section 9.1, we adopt a 
conditional hybrid metric. Basically, from all the candidates meeting certain 
prerequisite requirements of a proxy node, the one with the maximum value of 
M_ExT 
C 
(9-7) 
will be chosen. Here, Mdenotes the hybrid metric, E represents the energy related 
metric, C is the node's busy/idle ratio, and T is the trust level. 
There are two main steps in the selection of a proxy node. The first step is to 
choose a set of nodes which are capable of taking over the intrusion detection 
tasks. To become a candidate, a node must have enough processor speed, 
remaining energy and storage space. The second step is to choose the most 
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suitable node from the remaining candidates. The decision is made based on the 
hybrid metric M. 
User node 
Service node 
Neighbors of 
service node 
3 
4Service node 
Head node 
5 
s 
Selected Service node proxy node 
7 
Head node 
Fig. 9.1 Process for the selection of a proxy node. 
The entire process for the selection of a proxy node is depicted in Fig. 9.1, 
and its steps are explained below: 
1. A user requests services from a service node. 
2. The service node sends a broadcast message to its neighbours. The TTL 
(time to live) field of the message is set to I (hop) in order to reduce the 
amount of communication. It contains pre-set minimum requirements on 
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the three conditional metrics (processor speed, remaining energy and 
storage space). A threshold value for the next step's hybrid metric is also 
included to further reduce the communication cost. 
3. Every neighbouring node fulfilling the minimum requirements defined in 
the message received calculates its hybrid metric M, which reflects a 
combined estimate of the deciding metrics (energy, busy/idle ratio and 
trust level). If a node's hybrid metric exceeds the threshold set in the 
message, it sends the result of M to the service node. 
4. The service node appoints its proxy node as the one with the highest 
hybrid metric value among those received, and informs its head node of 
the decision. 
5. After passing an authentication and verification process with the head 
node, the proxy node retrieves the user's partial profile and the 
corresponding detection modules from the head node. 
6. The service node provides services, while the proxy node updates the 
user profile based on the event records provided by the service node and 
monitors anomalies. 
7. Before the user leaves the current domain, the updated user profile will 
be sent back to the head node by the proxy node. 
It is worth noticing that in step 5, a verification process is necessary. It is used 
to prevent a compromised node from winning the position of the proxy node by 
giving a false hybrid metric value. The winner node has to provide certain details 
to the head node for verification. Based on equations (9-1), (9-3) and (9-4), a 
malicious node could modify its remaining energy (Bt) to get a higher hybrid 
metric value. The modification of other parameters such as the conventional 
energy consumption rates (Rb and R; ) or safe time (ts) could be easily identified by 
the head node to expose the node's malice. As a countermeasure against the 
illegitimate modification of Bt, we may use a mobile agent to collect the value of 
Bt directly through the node's UO interface. To ensure that the mobile agent is not 
manipulated by the malicious host node, techniques such as obfuscated code [64] 
and an expiration timer [44] could be used together. The obfuscated code makes 
the mobile agent code hard to understand in short time so as to prevent its 
meaningful alteration. The expiration timer requests that a mobile agent must be 
returned back to its associated head node within certain time interval. If a node 
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does not return the mobile agent in time, the head node will reject any request for 
its appointment as a proxy node, and notifies the requesting service node of going 
back to step 4 for the node with the second highest hybrid metric value. Further 
actions may also be taken against the suspected node. In this way, even if a node 
is compromised by an intruder, it cannot gain the access to the intrusion detection 
modules easily. The implementation of the mobile agent is beyond the scope of 
this thesis and will be addressed in our future work. 
9.3 Experiments and performance analysis 
Similar to chapter eight, we use the same simulation environment created by 
the Georgia Tech Sensor Network Simulator (GTSNetS) [111]. As stated in 
chapter eight, the simulated network has total 51 nodes in a 120xl2Om2 area. 
There are one head node, ten user nodes and forty service nodes. All the nodes in 
our simulations are connected and communicate with each other through wireless 
connections, i. e. in an Ad Hoc pattern. The default routing protocol is DSR [81]. 
We assume that the signal transmission medium is homogeneous, i. e. fixed al i, a2 
and a12 with n=2 in equations (8-1) and (8-2), and all the nodes have the same 
radio range (30m). 
9.3.1 Effect of the hybrid metric on network lifetime 
The first experiment is to examine the effect of the hybrid metric defined in 
equation (9-7). We created three scenarios. The first scenario demonstrates our 
previous design, i. e. all event records are sent to and processed at the head node. 
The distances between the service nodes and the head node are calculated based 
on their randomly deployed positions. In the second scenario, the service nodes 
process the event records locally without any help from proxy nodes. Thus the 
communication-related energy consumption can be reduced. In the last scenario, 
once a service node has been activated, all the nodes within its radio range, 
including itself, will be examined against the hybrid metric. The node with the 
highest hybrid metric value will be chosen as its proxy node. The event records 
will be sent to the proxy node and processed there. 
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In all these three scenarios, the communication-related energy is calculated 
based on equations (8-1) and (8-2). The energy consumed on implementing 
intrusion detection tasks is shared between the service nodes and their proxies. 
We assume that the energy consumed at a service node is proportional to the 
length of an event record it generates, and the energy consumed by its proxy node 
is a fixed cost (5m. ) for the record reception and processing. To get the hybrid 
metric, we need to know the nodes' conventional energy consumption rates (Rb 
and R; ) in prior. They have been calculated through a training process. We pre-ran 
the simulation several times with different active user nodes. A node's energy 
consumption rate at the busy status (Rb) is calculated by dividing the energy 
consumed during its active sessions by the total busy time. And similarly, Ri is the 
result of dividing the energy loss during other times by the total idle time. In the 
end we use the means as the conventional rates. The simulation stops after the 
network is dead (i. e., half of the service nodes are battery exhausted). 
We tested each scenario with different user nodes and took the mean values 
as the final results. Fig. 9.2 shows their differences. As with the previous 
experiments, the horizontal axis in the figure denotes the number of dead nodes, 
and the vertical axis denotes their death time. At the node number equals to 20, 
the network is dead. Not surprisingly, with our hybrid metric, the system has the 
best performance comparing with simply using a head node or service node itself 
to process the event records. The impact of the hybrid metric gradually improves 
as the simulation proceeds. The average node lifetime is increased from 
4284.445s and 4650.8s to 5116.775s (increased 19.42% and 10.02%, respectively). 
The network lifetime is extended on average from 5862.9s and 6048.4s to 7165.3s 
(increased 22.21% and 18.47%, respectively). 
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Fig. 9.2 Impact of the proposed hybrid metric. 
9.3.2 Enhanced security policy under attacks 
In the second experiment we monitor the reaction of the hybrid metric to 
attacks and see how the system's security can be enhanced. We simulated two 
types of anomalies or attacks in this experiment. The first type is a 
denial-of-service attack. which is generated by deliberately occupying the CPU 
time of a service node. The second type is a SYN flood attack. In both cases the 
attacker randomly picks a victim from the first half of the service nodes. After 
each attacking session, the safe time (t, ) of the victim node will be reset to zero. 
Ideally, the attacked node should have a lower trust level and less chance of being 
selected as a proxy node in short time. In this way, the system is enforced with 
stronger security assurance. 
Fig. 9.3 and 9.4 show the different proxy node selection distributions before 
and under attacks. The horizontal axis denotes the node number and the vertical 
axis denotes how many times a node has been selected as a proxy node during the 
simulation. Among these nodes, node I is the head node, nodes 2 to 11 are the 
user nodes, and the rest are service nodes. As we mentioned earlier, the first half 
99 
of the service nodes (numbers 12-31) are the victims of the attacks. We can see 
that before the attacks, the selection distributions are similar for the different 
groups of nodes. Afterwards, the chance for the victim group to be chosen as 
proxy nodes has fallen down significantly and the others have increased their 
chances accordingly. Specifically, the average selection time for the victim group 
of nodes is down from 5.05 to 2.5 and the average lost selection percentage is 
46.3%. 
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Fig. 9.3 Proxy selection distributions before attacks. 
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Fig. 9.4 Proxy selection distributions under attacks. 
9.4 Summary 
SUIDS is an anomaly-based intrusion detection system proposed for 
ubiquitous computing environments. It meets the special requirements of 
ubiquitous networks by taking resource constraints into account. In this chapter, 
we analyzed the requirements on resources in SUIDS and proposed a profile 
splitting technique to achieve resource efficiency. Instead of sending event records 
to a fixed node for processing, a proxy node is selected based on the availability 
of its resources. Three deciding resource factors have been considered: energy, 
computing ability and trust. In order to balance these three factors, we proposed a 
novel conditional hybrid metric. Our experiment results show that by applying the 
hybrid metric, SUIDS achieves better performance in terms of resource-efficiency, 
and also its security assurance is beneficially enhanced. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
SUIDS EVALUATION 
In this chapter, we review the requirements of intrusion detection systems in 
ubiquitous computing and evaluate the performance of SUIDS against them. A 
successful intrusion detection system in ubiquitous computing must have the 
following five features: real-time detection, scalability and adaptability, full 
coverage, resource efficiency, and detection effectiveness. Comparing with 
existing solutions, SUIDS addressed all these issues from the start of its design. 
Specifically, it achieves real-time detection by giving mobility to its detection 
modules. The classification of network nodes and usage of lightweight agents 
make SUIDS scalable and adaptable; SUIDS considers capacity constrained nodes 
by adopting proxies; a novel hybrid metric balances the system resources; and in 
the meantime, SUIDS achieves a high detection rate while keeping its false alarm 
rate low. 
10.1 Requirements on IDSs in ubiquitous computing 
Before listing the requirements on an IDS, we first look at what need to be 
protected in ubiquitous networks. Conventionally, IDSs are used to protect 
computers and computer networks against any malicious activities that could 
compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of the network or 
information sources. According to the definition of ubiquitous computing, 
computer embedded devices will eventually spread throughout physical 
environments. For example, our TV, refrigerator, and even door lock might be 
equipped with computer processors and connected together. The question is 
whether an IDS has to protect all the nodes within a network, or we can just leave 
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some of them alone. Actually the answer depends on the network/system's 
security policy. The same device might need protection in certain scenarios but the 
other way round in other situations. There is always a trade-off between the level 
of security and the usage of resources needed for the security protection. 
Imagine there is a smart refrigerator, which is able to notify a user about what 
kind of food and how much is left inside and what their `use by' dates are. The 
user might be allowed to set the temperature he/she wants the refrigerator to keep 
and decide the period of refilling the refrigerator with fresh food, to make sure 
that the food inside the refrigerator is always adequate and healthy. All these 
enquiries and settings could be completed through wireless connections by using 
the user's PDA. Some people might feel that there is nothing to do with security 
and intrusion detection. Then think about what will happen if someone modifies 
the data about the temperature the refrigerator should keep and thus makes the 
food become inedible, or orders the refrigerator keeping food which is already 
beyond the `use by' date. Surprisingly we can conclude that in ubiquitous 
computing a malicious user may threaten not only our information resources, but 
even our finance and health by simply controlling a smart refrigerator. 
What makes the security situation in ubiquitous computing sound worse? If 
we look back to the developing history of computers and intrusion detection 
systems, we might find the answer. Actually the scope of intrusion detection was 
always growing with the popularization of computers. In the early period the only 
benefit a hacker could obtain from attacking was just making free phone calls. But 
today, they can certainly benefit much more since computers are applied to 
various areas. It is predictable that in ubiquitous networks hackers can do even 
more as long as computer embedded devices are manipulatable. It is ironic that we 
introduce computers into our lives to make things easier, but at the same time give 
hackers opportunities to take advantage of it. 
As computers become ubiquitous, intrusion detection will be closely 
connected with our daily lives. For example, an IDS may need to monitor who is 
using a smart refrigerator, for how long and how often, and who is trying to open 
electric doors. The border between intrusion detection and user surveillance will 
become obscure. It is difficult to distinguish them as totally separated. The issue 
of user surveillance is related to privacy protection. It cannot be solved by only 
technical means. A proper security policy and privacy policy are both needed. 
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Such policy issues are beyond the scope of our research. 
The above discussion clearly indicates that the evolving infrastructure of 
networks to support ubiquitous computing requires the development of a new 
generation of resource-efficient IDSs to provide appropriate protections for 
ubiquitous computing environments. Such an IDS must minimise the use of 
devices or network nodes with limited resources (e. g. energy and communication 
resources) for intrusion detection while being able to achieve high detecting 
efficiency (e. g. a high hit rate and a low false alarm rate). The new IDS needs an 
appropriate system architecture and strategy to make it flexible and scalable. 
There are two key requirements for all IDSs: effectiveness and efficiency. The 
effectiveness refers to that the IDSs must be able to distinguish malicious actions 
from normal actions correctly. Both false positive (label normal activities as 
malicious) and false negative (overlook malicious activities) decisions are 
undesirable and must be kept under certain level. The efficiency means that an 
IDS must run in a cost-effective way. Excessive overhead introduced by the IDS 
on CPU usage, network resources and storage space confines the wide 
deployment of the IDS. The implementation of the IDS should not disturb existing 
systems doing their normal activities. 
Keeping these two basic requirements in mind, we now expand in detail what 
is exactly required for IDSs, especially considering the impact of the 
characteristics of ubiquitous computing on intrusion detection. 
9 Real-time detection: An IDS must run continuously, or at least 
periodically, to detect intrusions and make the corresponding responses. A 
delayed monitoring may cause crucial losses and give intruders chances to 
hide or remove their trails. As we explained earlier, in ubiquitous 
computing, the consequence of a successful attack could harm physical 
environments, so real-time detection becomes especially important. 
Scalability and Adaptability: An IDS should be scalable. The IDS in 
ubiquitous computing must be able to cope with hundreds, or even 
thousands, of network nodes. An IDS must be adaptable as well. System 
and user behaviours are changing over time. The topologies of networks 
are also varying. In ubiquitous computing, the situation is even more 
complicated as some hosts are capable of mobility. The IDS must be able 
to adapt to these changes. 
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" Full coverage: In ubiquitous computing, an IDS needs to consider those 
nodes that are incapable of implementing the IDS by themselves. 
Effectively deploying the IDS in an environment with such a diverse 
range of devices/nodes is a big challenge. An IDS should be organized in 
a distributed manner. Balancing the computing load and diagnostic burden 
of intrusion detection among network nodes can increase the 
network/system's fault-tolerance, scalability and security protection 
coverage. 
" Resource-efficiency: An IDS should require as little system resource 
usage as possible to alleviate extra burdens on CPU usage, network 
overhead, storage space and battery consumption. In ubiquitous 
computing, many devices may have very small physical sizes to achieve 
their unaware/invisible deployment. Although manufactures keep working 
on enhancing the capacity of their products, many appliances/devices will 
still face limitations on system resources, especially for those 
battery-powered. 
" Detection effectiveness: An IDS must be able to detect malicious 
activities effectively. It must keep both false positive and false negative 
alarm rates under acceptable levels. 
" Low administration burden: Because ubiquitous computing is related to 
people's daily lives, an IDS must keep the administration burden low. 
Normal users cannot be expected to have many security expertises. 
10.2 Evaluation of SUIDS 
10.2.1 System architecture 
Among the five requirements stated earlier, real-time detection, scalability 
and adaptability, and full coverage are related to system architectures. We have 
compared SUIDS with other IDSs mentioned in chapter four with regard to these 
three requirements, and list the comparison results in Table 10.1. For conventional 
hierarchically organized IDSs such as GrIDS and EMERLAND, they were 
proposed for static wired networks and do not fit for topology-varying network 
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environments such as those for ubiquitous computing. Newly emerged IDSs 
which were proposed for mobile ad hoc networks overcame this problem by using 
a cooperative architecture or software agents. However, they did not consider 
those nodes that lack abilities to implement an IDS module independently, 
because current ad hoc networks mainly utilize relatively powerful devices such a 
laptop or PDA. SUIDS is featured by a distributed auditing scheme followed by a 
lightweight intrusion detection analysis. It can adapt intrusion detection tasks to fit 
the operational characteristics of service and user nodes in a network, process 
event records in real-time, and use proxy nodes to balance the network resources 
for the intrusion detection coverage of resource poor small devices/nodes. Thus 
SUIDS is the only intrusion detection system that fulfils all these three 
requirements. 
Table 10.1 Comparing SUIDS with other IDSs in respect of system architectures. 
Introduced Real-time Scalability and Full coverage IDSs detection adaptability 
Yes. The layered Yes. Use proxy 
Yes. User profiles structure, network nodes to balance 
and detection node classification, network resources. 
modules are mobile and Resource 
SUIDS and lightweight. service-oriented constrained nodes 
Anomalies are user-centric design can delegate 
detected in an help effectively intrusion detection 
online fashion. organise the entire tasks to proxy 
system. nodes. 
Delayed as event 
require that all No reports need to be Only work in , hosts be or DIDS sent and processed IP-based higher rated at the central environments. computers [153]. manager. 
Need to wait a monitor Yes detection window No, proposed for , connections and GrIDS before the conventional static not need all nodes' s' aggregation of wired networks. 
participation. network activities. 
Yes, each monitor No, its subscription No consideration, 
EMERLAND may own anomaly mechanism proposed 
for 
and misuse introduces high powerful PC-based 
detectors. network overload. networks. 
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Yes, each IDS 
No consideration, 
IDSs for 
agent has a local 
Yes, totally every node needs 
Ad Hoc detection engine. 
distributed. to run an IDS agent 
independently. 
May be delayed, No, introduce high 
Indra depending on the trust management No consideration. 
size of a network. overload. 
Yes, network 
No consideration, 
latency reduced as Yes, but still rely each 
host contains 
AAFID its IDS agents on a central entity. a 
transceiver, filter 
operate locally. and any number of agents. 
Depend on network 
No, its directory 
service is not 
No consideration, 
Sparta sizes and mobile suitable for a 
its complex mobile 
agent roaming large-scale agent is too heavy 
patterns. network. 
for small nodes. 
Depend on network 
No consideration, 
Function based sizes and mobile 
Yes, fully but the requirement 
MA agent roaming 
distributed system for running an IDS 
patterns. architecture. agent 
is much 
lowered. 
10.2.2 Resource efficiency 
Resources are crucial in ubiquitous computing. Any applications designed for 
ubiquitous computing should set resource-efficiency as one of the main objectives. 
However, most existing IDSs did not consider the resource constraints in their 
design. The reason is that they were proposed for either wired networks or ad hoc 
networks (laptop or PDA based). The requirements on resources in these 
environments are not as strict as those in ubiquitous computing. Current resource 
efficient techniques which were proposed as complements of existing IDSs do not 
fit for ubiquitous computing. Table 10.2 summarises their drawbacks. The 
resource efficiency issue must be carefully considered before the implementation 
of an IDS in ubiquitous computing environments. 
SUIDS uses a profile splitting technique to achieve resource efficiency. 
Instead of sending event records to a fixed node for processing, a proxy node is 
selected dynamically based on the availability of network resources. Three 
deciding factors have been considered for the proxy node selection: energy, 
computing ability and trust. In order to balance these three factors, we proposed a 
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novel conditional hybrid metric. As demonstrated in chapter nine, our experiment 
results showed that by utilizing the hybrid metric, SUIDS achieves better 
performance in terms of resource-efficiency. The average node lifetime in our 
experiments was increased by at least 10% and the network lifetime was extended 
on average by at least 18%. Besides, because SUIDS took the nodes' trust level 
into account before delegating intrusion detection tasks, its security assurance is 
beneficially enhanced. The methodology used in SUIDS could benefit the further 
development of IDSs for ubiquitous computing networks in the future. 
Table 10.2 Drawbacks of current resource efficient solutions for IDSs. 
Resource efficient solutions Drawbacks 
Choose a cluster head for Require all nodes pre-install IDS 
implementing an intrusion detection modules and be able to carry out 
module at any given time. intrusion detection tasks independently. 
Quantify damage costs based on an The quantification of attack costs is 
intrusion's type and its target. An complicated and costly. It lacks a 
optimized model reduces detection common standard, as in different 
costs by intelligently rearranging scenarios the same attack may cause 
detection rules. unequal losses. 
Address NIDSs overload problems 
Cannot solve the overload problems 
by running the most crucial event in 
thoroughly without any help from 
front of others for performance HIDSs. 
monitoring. 
Apply an adaptive response 
mechanism by balancing parameters Need a quantification process similar to 
such as a false alarm rate, detection the second method above. 
confidence and damage cost. 
10.2.3 Detection effectiveness 
In this thesis we presented two detection techniques, a string-based approach 
and a chi-square statistic test, in chapters 6 and 7, respectively. We now compare 
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their performances based on the experiment results discussed in these two 
chapters. Table 10.3 summarises the comparison outcomes. For detection 
effectiveness, the experiment results are close. The string-based approach has a 
slightly better hit rate, while the chi-square statistic test has a lower false alarm 
rate. Both of them are lightweight and can detect anomalies in real-time. A user 
profile used for the string-based approach (with a string length of 80) is bigger 
than that for the chi-square statistic test. Considering that we only set ten service 
nodes in the experiments, the difference between them will definitely grow in a 
larger network. Besides, because the string-based approach is based on a 
cumulated result, it needs an extra process to identify a malicious event record. 
Thus we think the chi-square statistic test is a better solution in general. 
Table 10.3 Comparison of two detection methods. 
String-based Chi-square 
approach statistic test 
False Alarm 
3.75% 3.27% 
Rate (R fp) 
Hit Rate by 
95.03% 94.09% 
Records (Rh) 
Hit Rate by 
100% 100% 
Session 
Real-time 
Yes Yes 
detection 
User profile size 6.22 5.25 
(KB) 
In conclusion, SUIDS adopts a layered and distributed system architecture, 
which is seamlessly embedded into the ubiquitous computing environments. By 
categorizing the system nodes into three major groups, SUIDS is more scalable 
and adaptable in order to fit for various network scenarios. SUIDS has a novel 
user-centric design and service-oriented detection method. By giving the mobility 
to detection modules, SUIDS is able to react to malicious activities in real-time. It 
detects anomalies at the service level rather than relying on a one-sided network 
109 
layer. SUIDS also equips a new resource-sensitive scheme, including protocols 
and strategies. By allowing the delegation of intrusion detection tasks to proxy 
nodes, it provides satisfactory intrusion detection service coverage to those nodes 
that are incapable of running IDS independently. A novel hybrid metric based 
algorithm is used in SUIDS in order to balance the system resources such as CPU 
usage, network overhead, storage space, and energy consumption. This hybrid 
metric can measure these factors together by exploiting their hidden correlations. 
A node's trustworthiness is also considered in this hybrid metric to enhance the 
system's security policy. The effectiveness of SUIDS is reflected by its high hit 
rates on anomalies and low false alarm rates. Its efficiency is shown on the 
deducted energy consumptions. All these novelties and characteristics make 
SUIDS well fit for ubiquitous computing environments. 
10.3 Summary 
System evaluation is an important consideration in any system development. 
In previous chapters, we presented the system architecture design, detection 
methods, and resource-efficient solutions of SUIDS. This chapter evaluated the 
entire system in relation to the requirements stated in section 10.1. The evaluation 
demonstrated the novelty of SUIDS in its architecture design. To the best of our 
knowledge, SUIDS is the first intrusion detection system that took the special 
requirements of ubiquitous computing into account during its design. It adopted 
proxy nodes in intrusion detection and used a novel hybrid metric to balance 
multiple system resources such as energy, computing ability, and trust information. 
The detection algorithms of SUIDS were tested with a number of parameters such 
as a hit rate, false alarm rate, and user profile size. As the test results demonstrated, 
SUIDS provides a robust and resource-efficient protection for ubiquitous 
computing networks. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter revisits the themes recurrent in this thesis and details future work. 
The notion of ubiquitous computing was introduced as a prospective view about 
the future usage of computers. Smaller and cheaper computer chips will enable us 
to embed computing ability into any appliances. Existing IDSs have several 
weaknesses that hinder their direct application to ubiquitous networks. These 
shortcomings are caused by their lack of considerations about the heterogeneity, 
flexibility and resource constraints of ubiquitous networks. As demonstrated 
earlier, to overcome these problems, we proposed a novel service-oriented and 
user-centric intrusion detection system - SUIDS. SUIDS is an adaptive and 
resource-efficient intrusion detection system with a novel service-oriented 
auditing mechanism and flexible user-centric design. By working together with 
service-oriented agents, SUIDS can reliably and effectively detect malicious 
activities of inside users. SUIDS comprises the following main components: a 
reliable auditing mechanism, a resource-efficient intrusion detection scheme, and 
a flexible system architecture. Our future work will focus on the further 
examination of SUIDS and the refinement of its models. 
11.1 Conclusions 
This thesis first introduced the history of computer networks. For many years, 
computers were supposed to stand alone, run programs and provide computing 
resources for local usage only. This situation changed with the advent of 
ARPANet in the late 1960's. A set of computers were connected together in order 
to allow remote access to computer resources. Since then, millions of computers 
111 
joined the network forming the biggest computer society - Internet. By enabling 
us to shop, work and study remotely, the Internet changes our daily lives in many 
ways. 
Soon, with the continuous growth and development of computer and network 
technologies, we will enter the next stage of information era - ubiquitous 
computing. The concept of ubiquitous computing was introduced as a prospective 
view about the future usage of computers. Smaller and cheaper computer chips 
will enable us to embed computing ability into any appliances, e. g. a cup, lighter, 
and even a piece of paper. People's daily activities will be closely connected with 
computers and beneficially become ever convenient. For example, in ubiquitous 
networks, one can open a door by simply sending an order to the electric door 
lock from his/her PDA, or read news on a computer embedded "e-paper" with the 
content updated through wireless connections. 
However, the great features of ubiquitous computing inevitably expose its 
inherent vulnerabilities. The convenience brought by ubiquitous computing could 
also be taken advantage of by intruders. It makes things too easy for malicious 
people to build a system to spy on others. For example, an intruder may 
compromise the integrity and confidentiality of an information system by using a 
stolen ID to modify or access valuable information, or compromise the 
availability of an information system by possessing the system resources in order 
to interfere with authorised users' normal access. Like any other computer 
systems, one of the main prerequisites for the wide adoption of a ubiquitous 
network is security. The network has to be properly secured so that it can be relied 
upon. 
IDSs are widely used to protect computer networks. In computer security, 
intrusions are defined as any malicious activities that could compromise the 
integrity, confidentiality, or availability of networks and information sources. If 
an intrusion is detected quickly enough, the intruder can be identified and ejected 
from the system before any damage is done or any data are compromised. 
Moreover, an effective IDS can even serve as a deterrent, acting to prevent 
intrusions. As a second line of defence, IDSs play an important role in computer 
security, especially in the fight against attacks launched inside networks. 
Two principal classifications of IDSs have been explained in this thesis. 
According to the detection methods used, IDSs can be divided into 
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signature-based detection and anomaly-based detection. The signature-based 
detection compares audit data with the knowledge accumulated about specific 
known attacks and system vulnerabilities. The anomaly-based detection builds a 
reference model of the usual behaviour of the system being monitored and looks 
for deviations from the normal usage. According to the locations of audit sources, 
IDSs can also be categorized as host-based IDSs and network-based IDSs. 
Host-based IDSs audit data mainly from local operating systems, e. g. system log 
files, and network-based IDSs audit network packets between nodes or the Simple 
Network Management Protocol information. 
Although the research in intrusion detection started decades ago, its 
application to ubiquitous computing is new. This thesis provided a critical survey 
on existing solutions. As concluded, they do not fulfil the special requirements of 
ubiquitous computing in respect of resource-efficiency and system architecture. 
Specifically, an IDS in ubiquitous computing should not require to transmit or 
process a large amount of audit data or attack signatures; a centralized detection 
scheme should be replaced by a distributed or cooperative system architecture; 
host-based and network-based approaches should work together to provide 
all-sided protection. Within our knowledge, there is no IDS yet, which has been 
particularly proposed to meet these special requirements of ubiquitous computing. 
As a solution to address this issue, we proposed an adaptive and 
resource-efficient IDS with a novel service-oriented auditing mechanism and 
flexible user-centric design - SUIDS. SUIDS handles the heterogeneity issue of 
ubiquitous computing networks by classifying network nodes into three major 
categories (head nodes, service nodes, and user nodes) and integrating intrusion 
detection with service specific knowledge. SUIDS is a distributed and 
dynamically deployed system based on this classification. 
Unlike existing network-based IDSs, SUIDS integrates service specific 
knowledge with intrusion detection and thus focuses on the service level instead 
of burdensome packet analysis. Agents on service nodes monitor system 
information across the system layers, e. g. from the network layer such as an open 
port to the application layer such as a device operation. The information 
eventually converges to the service level. In this way, the SUIDS detection 
modules on head nodes can reliably and effectively detect malicious activities of 
inside users and only need to analyze event records instead of a bundle of packets. 
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Two anomaly-based detection methods have been tested with SUIDS. The 
first one is a string-based approach. Some IDSs use a time interval to determine a 
detection window, i. e., each event only makes effect during a certain period. 
Because SUIDS is a distributed and mobile system, the use of a time-based 
detection window will introduce synchronisation issues and make the system 
more complicated. Hence in the string-based approach, a `string' is used to 
indicate a user's short-term behaviour in an online fashion. For example, if the 
last 100 printing operations can effectively represent a user's short-term behaviour 
regarding his usage of the printer, a string with the length of 100 will be set to 
follow the printing probability distributions in the user profile. Each character of 
the string represents one of his/her historical operations. Every time when a new 
record comes, the earliest record will be discarded. The length of the string is a 
variable, depending on the system requirements. Generally, a longer string could 
have a lower false positive rate but with the possibility of increasing the false 
negative rate at the same time and consuming more system resources. 
The second detection method is based on a chi-square statistic test. Instead of 
using a string, an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) technique is 
used to smooth out observation values for the variables being tracked. It applies a 
smoothing constant in a user profile to represent the user's short-term behaviour 
in real-time. In this way, the most recent and past records have different weight 
indexes. The observation reflects the `most recent past' characteristics of the 
variables. The deviations between a user's short-term and long-term behaviours 
are measured by using a chi-square statistic test. Comparing with the string-based 
approach, this method can measure not only the probability distributions of the 
variables, but also their occurrence patterns and hidden correlations. As a result, 
SUIDS achieves real-time intrusion detection in ubiquitous networks with a 
lightweight and adaptable detection model. 
According to the definition of ubiquitous computing, many embedded 
computer chips must be physically small in order to achieve unaware deployment. 
Inevitably, they will have limited system resources such as energy supplies and 
storage spaces. Hence SUIDS has to give special concerns over the issue of 
resource-efficiency. To further improve the performance of SUIDS, we presented 
a comprehensive analysis of energy consumed in SUIDS. The energy 
consumptions in SUIDS are categorized into two parts: computing-related and 
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communication-related. The computing-related part can be reduced by taking 
advantage of head nodes' unlimited power supplies; and the 
communication-related part can be reduced by having user profiles distributed and 
implementing the SUIDS detection modules locally. To balance these two parts, 
this thesis proposed a profile splitting technique and a new hybrid metric. Instead 
of sending event records to a fixed node for processing, a proxy node is selected 
based on the calculation of the hybrid metric. The hybrid metric considered three 
energy-related factors on a node: its transmission power, residual energy, and 
energy consumption rate. Our experiments indicated that this method successfully 
distributed the energy consumptions of intrusion detection among network nodes 
and extended the network lifetime. 
Based on the above results, we extended our work in order to take other 
system resources into account to enhance the resource efficiency of SUIDS. In the 
latest scheme, four key resources have been considered during the selection of a 
proxy node: its energy, storage space, processor speed (busy/idle ratio), and trust. 
Among them, the energy, storage space and processor speed are quantified 
metrics. It is possible to compare them directly by knowing their numerical values. 
In contrast, an extra process is used to evaluate the trust level of the node. This 
process calculates the node's trust level based on its energy consumption pattern 
and its safe time in the system. In order to balance these four resources together, 
we proposed a new conditional hybrid metric. This metric effectively exploited 
the hidden correlations among the resources. 
System evaluation is an important consideration in any system development. 
In the previous chapter, we reviewed the requirements on IDSs in ubiquitous 
computing and evaluated the performance of SUIDS against them. A successful 
IDS in ubiquitous computing must have the following five features: real-time 
detection, scalability and adaptability, full coverage, resource efficiency, and 
detection effectiveness. Comparing with existing solutions, SUIDS addressed all 
these issues from the start of its design. Specifically, it achieves real-time 
detection by giving mobility to its detection modules. The classification of 
network nodes and usage of lightweight detection agents make it scalable and 
adaptable. SUIDS offers the intrusion detection coverage of capacity constrained 
nodes by adopting proxies. The novel hybrid metric of SUIDS balances multiple 
system resources to achieve optimal efficiency. Moreover, SUIDS can achieve 
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high detection effectiveness while keeping its false alarm rate low. 
In conclusion, SUIDS is the first intrusion detection system proposed for 
ubiquitous computing environments. It keeps the special requirements of 
ubiquitous computing in mind throughout its design and implementation. SUIDS 
adopts a layered and distributed system architecture, a novel user-centric design 
and service-oriented detection method, a new resource-sensitive scheme, 
including protocols and strategies, and a novel hybrid metric based algorithm. 
These novel methods and techniques used in SUIDS set a new direction for future 
research and development. As the experiment results demonstrated, SUIDS is able 
to provide a robust and resource-efficient protection for ubiquitous computing 
networks. It ensures the feasibility of intrusion detection in ubiquitous computing 
in the first place. This work has been recognised by many international academic 
organizations. In total, eight papers have been published and one more paper is 
under review. 
11.2 Future work 
This thesis has posited the weaknesses of current intrusion detection solutions, 
and the requirements for a new generation of intrusion detection that protects 
ubiquitous computing networks in a resource-efficient way. As presented in this 
thesis, SUIDS provides a resource-efficient, scalable, and effective approach. 
Future work includes several main directions: 
" Refinement of the SUIDS model and detection techniques for improved 
defence against attacks. For example, exploring more complex algorithms 
such as neural networks may further reduce the false alarm rate of SUIDS 
and increase its detection effectiveness. 
. Improvement of resource measurements for higher accuracy. For example, 
the computing-related energy is referred to the energy used to implement 
the SUIDS intrusion detection modules. It is mainly dedicated to monitor 
network statuses and user activities, execute the intrusion detection 
algorithms, maintain and update user profiles. This thesis used a simple 
model to calculate this part of energy consumption, assuming it is 
proportional to the number of event records. A more detailed definition 
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and simulation model may increase the accuracy of the energy 
consumption measurement. 
" Extension of the trust measurement model. Currently the trust 
measurement model in SUIDS considers only two factors: energy 
consumption pattern and safety time. It works as a draft model rather than 
the final solution. Trust management itself is an area where many 
attentions have been attracted to. We pointed out one possible solution 
and a refined model could be expected to appear in future research. 
" Creation of a prototype of SUIDS in a laboratory for further examination. 
This thesis has demonstrated the effectiveness and efficiency of SUIDS in 
a simulated environment by using GTSNetS. Implementing a small 
ubiquitous computing network such as a smart home will help us to 
explore the applicability of SUIDS and get more convincing results. For 
example, we can investigate a user's behaviour and monitor the resource 
consumption of SUIDS in runtime. 
" Cooperation with other information security countermeasures and 
non-security factors such as law enforcement and privacy protection 
strategy. An intrusion detection system alone cannot solve all the security 
issues. It has to work closely with other defence mechanisms such as 
cryptographic support, security policy enforcement, and access control. In 
different application scenarios, system conditions and requirements are 
not the same. SUIDS must take other available security countermeasures 
into account in its future utilizations. 
11.3 Summary 
Nowadays our economy relies heavily on networked computer information 
systems for commerce, communications, energy distribution and transportation, as 
well as a host of other critical activities. One of the key security issues requiring 
urgent attentions is about how to protect system resources against malicious 
activities. A recent FBI survey suggests that 44% organizations had experienced 
intrusions from within their organization. The average cost of a successful attack 
by a malicious insider is much greater than the cost of an external attack. It 
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emphasizes the needs for one type of security tool - Intrusion Detection Systems. 
The SUIDS project has highlighted the problems of current intrusion detection 
solutions in ubiquitous computing environments and provided a resource-efficient 
solution as an important first step toward meeting the special requirements of 
ubiquitous computing networks. 
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APPENDIX A 
SIMULATION CODE 
This Appendix provides the code used for network simulation. The simulated 
environment is described in chapter nine. It is written in C++ programming 
language under GTSNetS. 
smartspace normal. cc 
! 'Written by Bo Zhou, Liverpool JMU, 2006 
Simulation of a smart space with one head node, ten user nodes and forty 
service nodes. Energy consumptions are recorded. 
#include "simulator. h" 
#include "node. h" 
#include "wlan. h" 
#include "ratetimeparse. h" 
#include "application-cbr-sn. h" 
#include "udp. h" 
#include "routing-dsr. h" 
#include "routing-nvr. h" 
#include "routing-aodv. h" 
#include "wireless-grid-rectangular. h" 
#include "trace. h" 
#include "application-sntest. h" 
#include "mobility-random-waypoint. h" 
#include "servicenode-CBR. h" 
#include <sstream> 
#include <fstream> 
#include "trace-sn. h" 
#include "battery. h" 
#include "sensors. h" 
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#include "sensor. h" 
#include "node-sn. h" 
#include "interface-wireless. h" 
#include "ratetimeparse. h" 
#define ANIMATION_ON 
#define XWIDTH 150 
#define YWIDTH 150 
#define NO NODE 51 
#define NO_HNODE 1 
#define NO UNODE 10 
#define NO SNODE 40 
#define NO SNODECBR 20 
#define NO_SNODECBR_P 20 
#define RADIORANGE 30 
#define SIM TIME 20000 
#define UNODETIME 3000 
#define INIT_ENERGY 2000 //Initial energy of 2 Joules (2000 mJ) 
#define ROUTING_DNVR 1 
#define ROUTING_DSR 2 
#define ROUTING_AODV 3 
using namespace std; 
// Simple timer class for random choose scenario 
class RandomChoose : public Timer { 
public: 
virtual void Timeout(TimerEvent*); // Called when timer expires 
RandomChoose(Node**, ServiceNodeCBR*, ServiceNodeCBR*, Node*, 
double*, double*, Time_t*, Time_t*, Energy t*); 
int ActiveNode(); 
void ProcessRecord(string, Node*, Node*, Portld t); 
Node* getMidNode(Node*); 
Portld_t getMidPort(Node*); 
string status; 
Node** AIINode; 
double* si; llenergy consumption rate at idle status 
double* sb; //energy consumption rate at busy status 
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Time_t* st; //safetime since last known abnormal activities 
Time_t* pt; //previous time since last status changed 
Energy_t* pe; //previous energy left since last status changed 
private: 
ServiceNodeCBR* CBRNode; 
ServiceNodeCBR* CBRNode_P; 
Node* UserNode; 
int rNumber, 
Node* midNode; 
Portld_t midPort; 
Uniform urvNodeNumber, urvBusyTime, urvidleTime, attackTime, CBRRate; 
Uniform urvCBRP[NO_SNODECBR P]; 
//parameter range of CBR nodes 
bool nwkdied, unodeEnergyRecorded; 
ofstream eventRecords; //recorder for entire system 
}; 
RandomChoose:: RandomChoose(Node** n, ServiceNodeCBR* cbrnode, 
ServiceNodeCBR* cbrnodep, Node* usernode, double* Si, 
double* s2, Time_t* t1, Time_t* t2, Energy_t* e) 
{ 
urvNodeNumber-Uniform(0, NO_SNODE); 
urvBusyTime=Uniform(3,10); //How long the user will use the service node. 
attackTime=Uniform(20,30); //During of launched attack 
urvldleTime=Uniform(5,10); //idle time between services. similar to busytime 
CBRRate=Uniform(1,10); //CBR rate is randomly generated too. 
urvCBRP[0]=Uniform(18,25); 
urvCBRP[1]=Uniform(30,50); 
urvCBRP[2]=Uniform(65,95); 
AIINode=n; 
UserNode=usernode; 
CBRNode=cbmode; 
CBRNode_P=cbmodej; 
UserNode->SetTrace(Trace:: DEFAU LT); 
sb=sl; 
si=s2; 
st=tl; 
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pt=t2; 
pe=e; 
nwkdied=false; //network is not died yet 
unodeEnergyRecorded=false; //user node's energy consumption rate is 
//calculated during the process, only once. 
//open events file 
eventRecords. open("events. t(r', ios:: app); 
if (! eventRecords){ 
cerr«"File could not be opened"«endl; 
exit(1); 
} 
} 
int RandomChoose:: ActiveNodeO{ 
int nNum; 
int m=0; 
while (m < 2*NO_SNODE){ 
nNum=(int)floor(urvNodeNumber. Value()); //make it 0-5 
if(! static cast<NodeSN*>(AllNode 
[nNum+1+NO_HNODE+NO_UNODE])->IsDead()) break; 
else m++; 
} 
if (m==2*NO_SNODE) nNum=NO_SNODE+1; 
return nNum; 
} 
Node* RandomChoose:: getMidNode(Node* n){ 
Node" node=n; 
Meters 
-t 
dist; 
int nodeNum=O; 
double B=O; //energy 
double T=O; //trust level 
double R=0; //busylidle ratio 
double tempMetric=0; 
double maxMetric=0; 
Energy j initEnergy=INIT_ENERGY; //currently we use the same configure 
Energy_t curEnergy; 
Timet now = Simulator.: NowO; 
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for (int i=1; i <= NO NODE; i++) ( 
dist=node->Distance(AIINode[i]); 
if ((dist<RADIO RANGE)) 
curEnergy=static cast<NodeSN"> 
(AIINode[i))->getSNBatteryp->GetRemainingEnergyp; 
if (i<=(NO HNODE+NO_UNODE)) initEnergy=INIT ENERGY"2; 
//head node and user node have double battery capacity 
else initEnergy=lNIT ENERGY; 
cout<<"node ID: "<<AIINode[i]->IdO«" "«i«"remainEnergy: " 
<<curEnergy<<" pt: N«pt[i-l]«" pe: "«pe[i-l]«" now: " 
<<now«endl; 
double errate=(initEnergy-curEnergy)/now; 
B=curEnergylecrate; // currently do not need to consider d2 and t 
//since the radio rang didn't really change 
B=B/1000; //to confine the range of B to double figures 
//note: prevent choosing node which has remaining energy less than 0 
//but bigger tempMetric(caused by square). 
R=(ecrate-si[i-1 ]l(sb[i-1 ]-ecrate); 
if ((ecrate<=si[i-1])li(R<0.1)) R=0.1; //avoid too small and minus value 
else if ((ecrate>=sb[i-1])IR(R>10)) R=10; //avoid too big and minus value 
double x=ceil((now-st[i-1 ])/1000); 
if (x>10) x=10; 
double y=((pe[i-1 ]-curEnergy)/(now-pt[i-1 ]))/si[i-1 ]; 
if (y<1) y=1; 
T=x/y; 
tempMetric=(B1 R; 
cout<<" ecrate: "«ecrate«" idle: "«si[i-1]«" busy: "«sb[i-1] 
«" x: "«x«" y: "«y«endl; 
cout «" B: "<<B<<" R : "<<R<<" T: "«T 
«" tempMetnc: "«tempMetric«endl; 
if ((curEnergy>1)&&(tempMetric>maxMetric)){ 
//1 used to ensure the node is not died 
maxMetric=tem pM etric; 
nodeNum=i; 
} 
//energy cost on distribution of the hybrid metric 
e= (static cast<NodeSN">(AIINode[i])->getPerBitEnergy())*5; 
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static cast<NodeSN*>(AIINode[i])->updateComputingEnergy(e); 
} 
} 
cout«"chosen node ID: "«AIINode[nodeNum]->Id() 
«" number i: "«nodeNum«endl; 
if (nodeNum==O){ /lall neighbour nodes are died, e. g. network died 
if(nwkdied==false){ 
Timet now=Simulator:: NowO; 
ofstream deathRecords; 
deathRecords. open("death. txt", ios:: app); //open mode is append. 
if (! deathRecords){ 
teer«"File could not be opened"«endl; 
exit(1); 
} 
deathRecords«now«" network is died"«endl; 
nwkdied=true; //network is already died 
} 
return node; 
} 
else return AllNode[nodeNum]; 
} 
Portld_t RandomChoose:: getMidPort(Node* n){ 
Node" node=n; 
Portld_t p=1000+node->Id(); 
return p; 
} 
void RandomChoose:: ProcessRecord (string s, Node* sn, Node* mn, Portld_t mp){ 
string status=s; 
Node" snode=sn; 
Node* mnode=mn; 
//mnode=AHHNode[1]; //use head node as proxy node 
//mnode=snode; //use service node itself as proxy node 
Portld_t mport=mp; 
mport=1000+mnode->Id(); 
Size 
_t 
ssize=status. length(}; 
IPAddr t mdst=mnode->GetlPAddr(); 
Energy_t e; 
cout<<status«" size of s is: "«ssize«endl; 
140 
cout<<" middle node is: "<<mnode->Ido; 
cout<<" midle port is: "<<mport«endl; 
L4Protocol* 14Proto=static cast<NodeSN*>(snode)-> 
GetApplicationSNQ->GetL4(); 
I4Proto->SendTo(ssize'2, mnode->GetIPAddro, mport); 
if (! static cast<NodeSN*>(snode)->IsDeadO) { 
e= (static cast<NodeSN">(spode)->getPerBitEnergy()*ssize; 
e=e'500; //process ids event needs extra processing power. 
static cast<NodeSN*>(snode)->updateComputingEnergy(e); 
} 
if (! staticcast<NodeSN*>(mnode)->IsDead()) { 
e=5; //process ids event needs extra processing power. 
static cast<NodeSN'>(mnode)->updateComputingEnergy(e); 
} 
} 
void RandomChoose:: Timeout(TimerEvent* ev){ 
Timet now = Simulator.: Nowo ; 
if ((now>UNODETIME)&&(! unodeEnergyRecorded)){ 
unodeEnergyRecorded=true; 
eventRecords«"-----------------------============"«endl; ----------------------------------- 
for(inti=0; i<NO_UNODE; i++){ 
eventRecords«"node "«AIINode[2+i]->Id()«" 
«static cast<NodeSN*> (AIINode[2+i]) 
->getSNBattery()->GetRemainingEnergy(«endl; 
} 
} 
double busyTime; 
busyTime=urvBusyTime. Value(); 
double idleTime=urvldleTime. Valueo ; 
if (now<(SIMTIME-100)){ 
rN umber=ActiveNode(); 
cout <<"Progress"<< now « endl; 
cout<<"Randomly selected node is: node " 
«1+rNumber+NO_HNODE+NO UNODE«endl; 
cout<<"Random busy period is: "«busyTime«" seconds"«endl; 
cout«"Random idle period is: "«idleTime«" seconds"«endl; 
if (rNumber<NO_SNODECBR){ 
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CBRNode[rNumber]. GetAppO->SetRemoteNode(UserNode); 
int ratelndex=(int)CBRRate. Value(); 
CBRNode[rNumber]. GetApp()->cbrRate= 
(Rate_t)Rate("4.096Kb") * ratelndex/5.0; 
status=CBRNode[rNumber]. SetStatus("on", now); 
midPort=getMidPort(midNode); 
ProcessRecord(status, CBRNode[rNumber]. GetNode(), midNode, 
midPort); 
CBRNode[rNumber]. GetAppO->StartAppO; 
CBRNode[rNumber]. GetAppo ->Stop(busyTime); 
status=CBRNode[rNumber]. SetStatus("off', now+busyTime); 
ProcessRecord(status, CBRNode[rNumber]. GetNode(), midNode, 
midPort); 
pt[rNumber+NO HNODE+NO UNODE]=now+busyTime; 
pe[rNumber+NO_HNODE+NO UNODE]=static cast<NodeSN"> 
(AIINode[1+rNumber+NO_HNODE+NO_UNODE])-> 
getSNBatteryO->GetRemainingEnergy(; 
else if (rNumber<NO SNODECBR+NO_SNODECBR_P){ 
rNumber=rNumber-NO_SNODECBR; 
double ranPara=urvCBRP[(rNumber%3)]. ValueO; 
CBRNode_P[rNumber]. GetAppO->SetRemoteNode(UserNode); 
int ratelndex=(int)CBRRate. Value(); 
CBRNode P[rNumber]. GetApp(->cbrRate= 
(Rate_t)Rate("4.096Kb") * ratelndex/5.0; 
status=CBRNode P[rNumber]. SetStatus("on", now); 
midNode=getMidNode(CBRNode_P[rNumber]. GetNode()); 
midPort=getMidPort(midNode); 
ProcessRecord(status, CBRNode_P[rNumber]. GetNodep, midNode, 
midPort); 
status=CBRNode P[rNumber]. SetStatus("set", now, ranPara); 
ProcessRecord(status, CBRNode_P[rNumber]. GetNodep, midNode, 
midPort); 
CBRNode P[rNumber]. GetApp()->StartApp(); 
CBRNode P[rNumber]. GetAppO->Stop(busyTime); 
status=CB RNode_P[rNumber]. SetStatus("off', now+busyTime); 
ProcessRecord(status, CBRNode P[rNumber]. GetNode(, midNode, 
midPort); 
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pt[rNumber+NO_HNODE+NO_UNODE+NO_SNODECBR]= 
now+busyTime; 
pe[rNumber+NO_HNODE+NO_UNODE+NO_SNODECBR]= 
static cast<NodeSN">(AIINode[1+rNumber+NO_HNODE 
+NO_UNODE+NO SNODECBR])->getSNBatteryo ->GetRemainingEnergy(); 
)else(//all nodes are died 
Timet now=Simulator:: Now(); 
ofstream deathRecords; 
deathRecords. open("death. txt", ios:: app); 
//open mode is append. 
if (! deathRecords){ 
cen«NFile could not be opened"«endl; 
exit(1); 
} 
deathRecords«now«" all nodes are died"«endl; 
idleTime=SIMTIME-now-100; 
//make it ends now. no more random choose procedure 
}//end of else 
Schedule(ev, busyTime+idleTime); 
} else {// start record all actions to trace file. 
for (int i=0; i< NO_SNODECBR; i++) { 
eventRecords«CBRNode(i]. GetRecords(); 
} 
for (int i=0; i< NO_SNODECBR_P; i++) { 
eventRecords<<CBRNode_P[i]. GetRecords(); 
} 
eventRecords. closeO; 
} 
class RecordDeath : public Timer { 
public: 
virtual void Timeout(TimerEvent*); //Called when timer expires 
Record Death(N ode**); 
private: 
Node" AIINode; 
bool ndied[NO_NODE+1]; 
Timet deathTime[NO NODE+1]; 
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Timet totamime; 
Timet meanTime; 
ofstream deathRecords; //recorder for entire system 
int diedNum; 
}; 
RecordDeath:: RecordDeath(Node*' allnode){ 
AIINode=allnode; 
//open events file 
deathRecords. open("death. b(t", ios:: app); //open mode is append. 
if (! deathRecords){ 
cerr«"File could not be opened"«endl; 
exit(1); 
} 
deathRecords«"___________________________________"«endi; 
for (int i=0; i <= NO_NODE; i++) ndied[i]=false; 
diedNum=O; 
totalTime=O; 
meanTime=O; 
} 
void RecordDeath:: Timeout(TimerEvent* ev) { 
Timet now = Simulator.: Now(); 
if (now<(SIMTIME-50)) { 
for (int i=0; i< NQ-NODE; i++){ 
if ((! ndied[1+i]) && (static_cast<NodeSN*> (AIINode[1+i])->IsDeadO)){ 
deathRecords«now«" node "<<AIINode[ 1+i]->IdO«" is died"«endl; 
ndied[1+i]=true; 
deathTime[1+i]=now; 
diedNum++; 
} 
} 
if(diedNum<(NO_NODE/2)) Schedule(ev, 1.5); 
else ( 
deathRecords«now«" The network(half Nodes) is died "«endl; 
for (int i=0; i< NO_NODE; i++){ 
if(ndied[1+i]) totalTime=totalTime+deathTime[1+i]; 
} 
deathRecords«"Total life time is: "«totalTime«endl; 
deathRecords«"Died node number is: "«diedNum«endl; 
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meanTime=totalTime/diedNum; 
deathRecords«"Everage life time is: "«meanTime«endl; 
//standard=maybe calculate standard deviation later 
Schedule(ev, SIMTIME-now-40); 
} 
}else deathRecords. close(); 
} 
int main(int argc, char** argv) 
{ 
/' parameters setting 
1. ad hoc routing protocol type 
2. seed 
int routingProto = ROUTING_DSR; 
Seed 
_t seed = 
1; 
if (argc > 1) { 
if (! strcmp("dnvr", argv[1])) routingProto = ROUTING_DNVR; 
else if (! strcmp("aodv", argv[1])) routingProto = ROUTING_AODV; 
} 
if (argc > 2) seed = atoi(argv[2]); 
Random:: GlobalSeed(seed, seed, seed, seed, seed, seed); 
Simulator s; 
s. HasM ob il ity(tru e); 
H trace file 
Trace* gs = Trace:: Instance(); 
gs->Open("smartspace_normal. txt"); 
TraceSN* is = TraceSN:: Instance(); 
is->OpenC'smartspace_normal_sn. txt"); 
ts->OnSN(); 
gs->IPDotted(true); 
//TC P:: Log Flag sText(true); 
// Log flags in text mode, e. g. show 'SYN' insteadof'0x02' 
//TCP:: TC PHeader->DetailOff(TCP:: FI D); 
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II Increase detail of L3 trace messages 
IPV4:: Instancep->DetailOn(IPV4:: TOTALLENGTH); 
//packet total Iength, inc. data 
IPV4:: Instanced->DetailOff(IPV4:: TTL); //disable time to live column 
IPV4:: Instance()->DetailOff(IPV4:: VERS ION); //disable version column IP4 or 6 
IPV4:: InstanceO->DetailOff(IPV4:: UID); //packet unique ID. default ON 
IPV4:: InstanceO->DetailOff(IPV4:: PROT000L); //disable protocol number 
//IPV4:: Instance()->DetailOn(IPV4:: FRAGMENTOFFSET); Default off 
IPV4:: Instanceo->SetTrace(Trace:: DEFAULT); 
// routing protocol 
if (routingProto == ROUTING DSR) 
Routing:: SetRouting(new RoutingDSR); // set DSR to default routing 
else if (routingProto == ROUTING_DNVR) { 
Routing:: SetRouting(new RoutingNVR); // set NVR to default routing 
Energy_t initEnergy =INIT ENERGY; 
Timet reclnterval = 500; 
WirelessLink wlink((NO_NODE), IPAddr("192.168.0.0"), MASK ALL, 
reclnterval, initEnergy, MODEL1); 
Uniform urvx(O, (XWIDTH-RADIO_RANGE)), 
urvy(O, (YWIDTH-RADIO RANGE)); 
llCreate Grid to allow random waypoint mobility, 
//+-1 to make sure the mobile node virtually will not move out of grid 
Uniform borderx(O, XWIDTH-RADIO RANGE-1), 
bordery(O, YWIDTH-RADIO RANGE-1); 
WirelessGridRectangular g(Location (1,1), Constant(NO_NODE), borderx, 
bordery, IPADDR_NONE, false); 
Node* n[NO_NODE+1]; 
Portld_t rPort[NO NODE+1]; 
Portld_t IPort[NO NODE+1]; 
InterfaceWirelessSN" iface[NO_NODE+1]; 
for (int i=0; i <=NO_NODE; i++) { 
n[i] = wlink. GetNode(i); 
n[i]->SetRadioRange(RADIO_RANGE); 
n[i]->SetLocation(urvx. ValueO, urvy. ValueO); 
146 
rPort[i]=1000+i; 
(Port[i]=1000+i; 
if (i==0){ 
/linitialize node n0. It is a sink node automatically generated by wlink. 
n[i]->SetRadioRange(O); 
n[i]->SetLocation(XWIDTH, YWIDTH); 
n[i]->SetTrace(Trace:: DISABLED); 
static_cast<NodeSink*> (n[i])->TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: SINKNODE_ID); 
static cast<NodeSink"> (n[i])-> 
TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: NOD E_SENSING_EN ERGY); 
static cast<NodeSink"> (n[i])-> 
TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: NODE_RELAY[ NG_ENERGY); 
static cast<NodeSink"> (n[i])-> 
TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: NODE_COMPUTING_ENERGY); 
static cast<NodeSink*> (n[i])-> 
TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: NODERELAY OVERHEAD_ENERGY); 
static cast<NodeSink*> (n[i])-> 
TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: NODE_COMP OVERHEAD_ENERGY); 
static cast<NodeSink*> (n[i])-> 
TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: NETW TOTAL_ENERGY); 
static cast<NodeSink*> (n[i])-> 
TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: NETW SENSING_ENERGY); 
static_cast<NodeSink*> (n[i])-> 
TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: NETW RELAYING_ENERGY); 
static cast<NodeSink"> (n[i])-> 
TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: NETW_COMPUTING_EN ERGY); 
static cast<NodeSink"> (n[i])-> 
TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: NETW RELAY OVERHEAD_ENERGY); 
static cast<NodeSink'> (n[i])-> 
TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: NETWCOMP OVERHEAD_ENERGY); 
static cast<NodeSink*> (n[i])-> 
TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: NETWLIFETIME); 
static cast<NodeSink*> (n[i])->TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: SENSED 
_DATA); 
static cast<NodeSink*> (n[i])->TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: NODE X); 
static cast<NodeSink*> (n[i])->TraceSNOff(NodeSink:: NODE_Y); 
static cast<NodeSink*> (n[i])->TraceSNOn(NodeSink:: TIME); 
static cast<NodeSink*> (n[i])->TraceSNOn(NodeSink:: SENSNODE_ID); 
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else{ 
//static cast<NodeSN*> (n[i])->SetApplicationSN (app[i]); 
static cast<NodeSN*> (n[i])->getSNBattery()->SetMinEnergy(1); 
static cast<NodeSN*> (n[i])->setSize(32); 
static cast<NodeSN*> (n[i])->setPerBitEnergy(O. 0002); 
//parameter to define how much energy are used for each packet 
//processed. kind of at application layer. The physical layer cost is 
//defined by interface initialization. 
static cast<NodeSN*> (n[i])->setComputePower(0.00001); 
iface[i] = static cast<lnterfaceWirelessSN*>(static cast<NodeSN*> 
(n[i])->GetSNIface()); 
iface[i]->setTxPower(0.000001); 
iface[i]->energyModel = MODELL; 
iface[i]->SetPerBitTxEnergy(O. 000045); 
iface[i]->SetPerBitM2TxEnergy(0.00001); 
Min micro Joules : 10 pJ/bit/m2 for attenuation factor of 2 
iface[i]->SetAttenuationFactor(2); 
iface[i]->SetPerBitRxEnergy(0.000135); 
CBRApplicationSN" app[NO_HNODE+NO UNODE+1]; 
//Initiate array of Head Nodes 
for (int 1=0; i< NO_HNODE; i++) { 
n[1+i]->Color(Qt:: blue); 
app[1+i]=new CBRApplicationSN(n[O], rPort[1+i], IPort[1+i], 0,512, UDPO); 
static cast<NodeSN"> (n[1+i])->SetApplicationSN (app[1+i]); 
static cast<NodeSN*>(n[1+i])->getSNBatteryO-> 
SetRemainingEnergy(INIT ENERGY*2); 
//Initiate array of User Nodes 
for(inti=0; i<NO UNODE; i++) 
n[1+NQ_HNODE+i]->Color(Qt:: red); 
n(1+NO_HNODE+i]->Shape(Node:: CIRCLE); 
n[1+NO_HNODE+i]->AddMobility(RandomWaypoint(g, Uniform(1200,1500), 
Uniform(0,1))); //first is the thinking time, second is the velocity 
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app[1+NO_HNODE+i]=new CBRApplicationSN(n[O], rPort[1+NO_HNODE+i], 
IPort[1+N0 HNODE+i], 0,512, UDPO); 
static cast<NodeSN'> (n[1+NO_HNODE+i])-> 
SetApplicationSN (app[1+NO_HNODE+i]); 
static cast<NodeSN*>(n[1+NO_HNODE+i])->getSNBattery()-> 
SetRemainingEnergy(INIT ENERGY"2); 
//Initiate array of CBR service node without parameter only on off 
Ratet cbrratefl = {(Rate_t)Rate("4.096Kb") * 0, 
(Rate_t)Rate("4.096Kb") * 0, (Rate_t)Rate("4.096Kb") * 0); 
Size 
_t 
cbrpsizefl={512,512,512}; 
ServiceNodeCBR cbmode[NO SNODECBR]; 
for (int i=0; i< NO_SNODECBR; i++) { 
cbmode[i]=ServiceNodeCB R(n[O], 
wlink. GetNode(1+N0 HNODE+NO UNODE+i), 
rPort[1+NO HNODE+NO_UNODE+i], 
IPort[1+NO_HNODE+NO_UNODE+i], cbrrate[(i%3)], cbrpsize[(i%3)]); 
//Initiate array of CBR service node with one parameter on off and set 
Ratet cbrrate_pf _ {(Rate t)Rate("4.096Kb") * 0, 
(Rate t)Rate("4.096Kb") * 0, (Rate t)Rate("4.096Kb") * 0); 
Size j cbrpsizejE={512,512,512}; 
double cbrý-para[]={20,40,80}; //default parameter value 
ServiceNodeCBR cbrnode p[NO SNODECBR_P]; 
for (int i=0; i< NO_SNODECBR_P; i++) { 
cbmode_p[i]=ServiceNodeCBR(n[0], 
wlink. GetNode(1+NO_HNODE+NO_UNODE+NO_SNODECBR+i), 
rPort[1+N0 HNODE+NO_UNODE+NO_SNODECBR+i], 
IPort[1+NO HNODE+NO_UNODE+NO SNODECBR+i], 
cbrrate_p[(i%3)], cbrpsize_p[(i%3)], cbrý_para[(i%3)]); 
llread energy consumption rate from ecr. txt 
ifstream ecr( "ecr. t(t", ios:: in); 
if (lecr){ 
cerr«"File could not be opened"«endl; 
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exit(1); 
} 
double Si[NO_NODE]; 
double Sb[NO NODE]; 
int nnum=0; 
double temps; 
while (! ecr. eofp){ 
char temp[256]; 
ecr. getline(temp, 256); 
if (temp[o]=='E'){ 
char * pch; 
pch=strrchr(temp, '); //get the pointer on last appreance of space. 
//It will get the last token in the line. 
if (temp[3]== i') Si[nnum] = atof ( pch ); 
//convert string to double. consumption rate during idle 
else { 
Sb(nnum] = atof ( pch ); I/consumption rate at busy 
if (Sb[nnum]<Si[nnum]){ 
temps=Sb[nnum]; 
Sb[nnum]=Si[nnum]; 
Si[nnum]=temps; 
} 
nnum++; 
} 
} 
} 
//an array used to record node's safe time 
Timet safeTime[NO_NODE]; 
for (int i=0; i< (NO NODE); i++) safeTime[i]=0; 
//an array used to record nodes' previous status change time 
Timet pTime[NO NODE]; 
for (int i=0; i< (NO_NODE); i++) pTime[i]=0; 
/Jan array used to record nodes' previous energy at last status change time 
Energy_t pEnergy[NO_NODE]; 
for (int i=0; i< (NO_NODE); i++){ 
if (i<(NO HNODE+NO_UNODE)) pEnergy[i]=INIT_ENERGY*2; 
else pEnergy[i]=INIT ENERGY; 
} 
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//Start call user scenario 
gs->On(4); l/allowed trace on layer 4 
gs->On(3); l/allowed trace on layer 4 
gs->TimePrecision(3); //set bit number after dote 
int activeu= 1; 
static cast<NodeSN*>(n[1+NO_HNODE+activeu])->getSNBattery(-> 
SetRemainingEnergy(IN IT ENERGY*2); 
RandomChoose t(n, cbmode, cbmode_p, n[activeu+l+NO_HNODE], Sb, Si, 
safeTime, pTime, pEnergy); 
t. Schedule(new TimerEvent, 1.5); 
Record Death t1(n); 
ti. Schedule(new TimerEvent, 1.0); 
//s. Progress(1.0); 
s. StopAt(SIM TIME); 
//s. AnimationUpdatelnterval(Time("l ms")); 
//s. StartAnimation(0, true); 
s. Runo; 
gs->CloseO; 
cout <<"Simulation complete" « endl; 
for (int i=0; i< NO_NODE; i++) 
cout<<" node "<<n[1+i]->IdO«" "« static_cast<NodeSN*> 
(n[1+i])->getSNBatteryO->GetRemaining EnergyQ«endl; 
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APPENDIX B 
DETECTION ALGORITHM 
This Appendix provides the code used for intrusion derection. The detection 
algorithm is the chi-suqare statistic test described in chapter seven. It is written in 
Java programming language. 
DetectionAlgorithm. java 
r Written by Bo Zhou, Liverpool JMU, 2006 
Detect anomalies by reading event records and calculating the anomalous index 
x2. 
I 
import java. io. *; 
import java. math. *; 
import java. util. "; 
public class DetectionAlgorithm { 
public static void main( String args[J ) 
{ 
File pDistribution = new File( "distribution. txt" ); 
File mRecords= new File ("records. txr'); 
//format of event record should be 
//service id, user id, action, time, duration, parameter, packet in, packet out 
int NO_SNODE=10; 
int S TIME=1200; 
int STEPS=10; 
int NONNUM=5; 
//difference between node number and last digital of IP addr 
double DECAY=0.3; //decay rate 
java. textDecimalFormat df2 =new java. text. DecimalFormat("#. 00"); 
java. text. DecimalFormat df4 = 
new java. text. Decimal Format("#. 0000"); 
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if ( pDistribution. existsO&& mRecords. exists() ) 
System. out. print( 
pDistribution. getName() +" exists\n" + 
( pDistribution. isFile() ? "is a file\n" : 
"is not a file\n" )+ 
( pDistribution. isDirectory() ? "is a directory\n" : 
"is not a directory\n") + 
( pDistribution. isAbsolute() ? "is absolute path\n" : 
"is not absolute path\n") + 
"Last modified: "+ pDistribution. IastModified() + 
"\nLength: "+ pDistribution. Iength() + 
"\nPath: "+ pDistribution. getPath() + 
"\nAbsolute path: "+ pDistribution. getAbsolutePath() + 
"\nParent: "+ pDistnbution. getParent() +"\n\n"); 
if ( pDistribution. isFileO && mRecords. isFile()) { 
try { 
RandomAccessFile pdistribution = 
new RandomAccessFile( pDistribution, "rw" ); 
RandomAccessFile mrecords= 
new RandomAccessFile(mRecords, Y'); 
String record e, recorder/individual event records 
Strings detail e, detail p; 
StringE detail IP; 
Tonga node_p=new long[NO_SNODE]; 
doublep X2=new double[3000]; 
//record all X2 to calculate mean and Sx2. i. e. threshold 
int nodeNum=O; //number of current activated service node 
int recordNum=O; //number of records has been processed 
int alarmNum=O; l/recoed how many alarms have been raised 
int rareNum=O; //record number of rare events 
int falseNum=O; //record alarms raised without connection with 
I/ rare events. i. e. number of false alarms. 
//record starting position of each node's related records 
// in distribution. txt file 
while( (recorder = pdistribution. read Line())! =null){ 
if (recordp. startsWith("node")){ 
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node p[nodeNum]=pdistribution. getFilePointer(); 
nodeNum++; 
} 
} 
//process each record 
while(( record -e = mrecords. readLine() 
) 1= null ){ 
detail 
-e = record e. split('Ms"); 
//split recrod by spaces 
if (detail e[2]. equalslgnoreCase("on")){ 
double slime=Double. parseDouble(detail_e[3]); 
detail_IP = detail_e[O]. split("W'); 
int node num=lnteger. parselnt(detail IP[3]); 
nodeNum=node num-NONNUM; 
pdistribution. seek(node_p[nodeNum]); 
long tempStart=pdistribution. getFilePointero ; 
//start position of off session 
record. rpdistribution. read Lineo ; 
detail_p=record_p. split('1\s"); //split pdf by spaces 
double stimeminrDouble. parseDouble(detail_p[O]); 
double slime ele=Double. parse Double(detail_p[l 
int elenum=(int)Math. round 
((stime-stime_min)/stime_ele); 
String eleNum=lnteger. toString(elenum); 
double ave=0.0; 
double currentQ=0.0; 
boolean match=false; 
boolean rare=false; 
for (int i=2; i<detailp. length; i=i+3) 
ave=Double. parseDoub! e(detail p[i+1]); 
if (details[i]. equa! slgnoreCase(e! eNum)){ 
detail_p[i+2]=Double. toString 
(Doub! e. parseDoub! e(detail_p[i+2])"(1-DECAY)+DECAY); 
if (ave==O) { 
ave=0.001; 
System. out. print("Rare event! "); 
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rareNum++; 
rare=true; 
} 
match=true; 
}else detaiI p[i+2j=Double. toString 
(Double. parseDouble(detail p[i+2])*(1-DECAY)); 
if (ave! =0){ 
currentQ=currentQ+Math. pow 
((Double. parseDouble(detail_p[i+2])-ave), 2)/ave; 
} 
} 
if (match==false){ //the eleNum apprears for the first time 
ave=0.001; 
System. out. print("Rare event! "); 
rareNum++; 
rare=true; 
currentQ=currentQ+Math. pow((DECAY-ave), 2)/ave; 
} 
String tempString=detailp[0]+" "+detail p[1]+" "; 
pd istribution. seek(tempStart+tem pString. Iength()); 
for (int i=2; i<detail p. Iength; i=i+3){ 
pdistribution. writeBytes(detail_p[i]+" "+detail p[i+1]+ 
" "+df2. format(Doub! e. parseDoub! e(detail. p[i+2]))+" 
} 
recordNum++; 
if ((currentQ>2.34)){//calculate from first time run this data set 
System. out. print("Alarm! "+"X2="+df4. format(currentQ)+ 
" Record num="+recordNum+"\n"); 
alarmNum++; 
if(rare==false) falseNum++; //this is a false alarm 
} 
} 
else if (detail e[2]. equalslgnoreCase("off')){ 
double stime=Double. parseDouble(detail_e[3]); 
double ptime=Double. parseDouble(detail_e[4]); 
int ipacket=lnteger. parselnt(detail e[5]); 
int opacket=lnteger. parselnt(detail e[6]); 
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detail_IP = detail_e[O]. split("\\. "); 
int node_num=lnteger. parselnt(detail_IP[3]); 
nodeNum=node_num-NONNUM; 
pdistribution. seek(node_p[nodeNum]); 
record_p=pdistribution. read Line(); 
long tempStart=pdistribution. getFilePointer(); 
//start position of off session 
record_p=pdistribution. read Line(); 
//read twice to get PDs about'off related info 
detail=record_p. split("\\s"); //split pdf by spaces 
double ptime_min=Double. parseDouble(detail_p[O]); 
double ptime ele=Double. parseDouble(detail_p[1]); 
int elenum=(int)Math. round ((ptime-ptime_min)/ptime_ele); 
String eleNum=lnteger. toString(elenum); 
double ave=0.0; 
double currentQ=0.0; 
boolean match=false; 
boolean rare=false; 
for (int i=2; i<detail_p. length; i=i+3){ 
ave=Double. parseDouble(detailp[i+1 ]); 
if (details[i]. equalslgnoreCase(eleNum)){ 
detailp[i+2]=Doub! e. toString 
(Double. parseDouble(detail_p[i+2])*(1-DECAY)+DECAY); 
if (ave==O) { 
ave=0.001; 
System. out. print("Rare event! "); 
rareNum++; 
rare=true; 
} 
match=true; 
} else detail_p[i+2]=Double. toString 
(Double. parseDouble(detail p[i+2])*(1-DECAY)); 
if (ave! =O){ 
currentQ=currentQ+Math. pow( 
(Double. parseDouble(detailp[i+2])-ave), 2)/ave; 
} 
} 
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if(match==false)//the eleNum apprears for the first time { 
ave=0.001; 
System. out. print("Rare event! "); 
rareNum++; 
rare=true; 
currentQ=currentQ+Math. pow((DECAY-ave), 2)/ave; 
} 
String tempString=detailp[O]+" "+detailj[1]+" "; 
pdistribution. seek(tempStart+tempString. lengthO); 
for (int i=2; i<detail p. length; i=i+3){ 
pdistribution. writeBytes(detail_p[i]+" "+detaiij[i+l]+ 
" "+df2. format(Double. parseDouble(detail p[i+2]))+" "); 
} 
recordNum++; 
if ((currentQ>2.34)){// calculate from first time run this data set 
System. out. print("Alarm! "+"X2="+df4. format(currentQ)+ 
" Record num="+recordNum+"\n"); 
alarmNum++; 
if(rare==false) falseNum++; //this is a false alarm 
} 
//calculate input packets 
pdistribution. seek(node p[nodeNum]); 
record=pdistribution. read LineO; 
record=pdistribution. read Lineo ; 
tempStart=pdistribution. getFilePointer(); 
record. =pdistnbution. read Lineo ; 
//read twice to get PDs about'off related info 
detail=recordp. split("\\. s"); //split pdf by spaces 
double ipacket min=Double. parseDouble(detailp[O]); 
double ipacket ele=Double. parseDouble(detail_p[1]); 
elenum=(int)Math. round ((ipacket-ipacket min)rpacket ele); 
eleNum=lnteger. toString(elenum); 
ave=0.0; 
currentQ=0.0; 
match=false; 
rare=false; 
for (int i=2; i<detailp. length; i=i+3){ 
ave=Double. parseDouble(detailp[i+1 ]); 
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if (details[i]. equalslgnoreCase(eleNum)){ 
detailp[i+2]=Double. toString( 
Double. parseDouble(detail_p[i+2])"(1-DECAY)+DECAY); 
if (ave==O) { 
ave=0.001; 
System. out. print("Rare event! 
rareNum++; 
rare=true; 
} 
match=true; 
)else detail_p[i+2]=Double. toString( 
Double. parseDouble(detail_p[i+2])"(1-DECAY)); 
if (ave! =0){ 
cu rrentQ=currentQ+Math. pow 
((Double. parseDouble(detailj[i+2])-ave), 2)/ave; 
} 
} 
if(match==false){//the eleNum apprears for the first time 
ave=0.001; 
System. out. print("Rare event! "); 
rareNum++; 
rare=true; 
currentQ=currentQ+Math. pow((DECAY-ave), 2)lave; 
} 
tempString=detail_p[O]+" "+detail p[l]+" 
pdistribution. seek(tempStart+tem pString. lengtho); 
for (int i=2; i<detailp. length; i=i+3) { 
pdistribution. writeBytes(detail. p[i]+" "+detailp[i+1]+ 
"+df2. format(Double. parseDouble(detailp[i+2]))+" 
} 
recordNum++; 
if ((currentQ>2.34)){// calculate from first time run this data set 
System. out. print("Alarm! "+"X2='+df4. format(currentQ)+ 
" Record num="+recordNum+"\n"); 
alarmNum++; 
if(rare==false) falseNum++; //this is a false alarm 
} 
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//calculate output packets 
pdistribution. seek(node p[nodeNum]); 
recorder=pd istribution. read Line(); 
record=pdistribution. read LineO; 
record=pdistribution. read Lineo ; 
tempStart=pdistribution. getFilePointer(); 
record=pdistribution. read LineO; 
//read more lines to get PDs about'off related info 
detail p=record_p. split('\1s"); //split pdf by spaces 
double opacket min=Double. parseDouble(detailp[O]); 
double opacket ele=Double. parse Double(detail_p[1]); 
elenum=(int)Math. round((opacket-opacket min)/opacket ele); 
eleNum=lnteger. toString(elenum); 
ave=0.0; 
currentQ=0.0; 
match=false; 
rare=false; 
for (int i=2; i<detailp. Iength; i=i+3){ 
ave=Double. parseDouble(detailp[i+1 ]); 
if (detailp[i]. equalslgnoreCase(eleNum)) { 
detail_p[i+2]=Double. toString 
(Double. parseDouble(detail_p[i+2])"(1-DECAY)+DECAY); 
if (ave==O) { 
ave=0.001; 
System. out. print("Rare event! "); 
rareNum++; 
rare=true; 
} 
match=true; 
)else detail p[i+2]=Double. toString( 
Double. parseDouble(detail p[i+2])*(1-DECAY)); 
if (ave! =O){ 
currentQ=currentQ+Math. pow 
((Double. parseDouble(detail p[i+2])-ave), 2)/ave; 
} 
} 
if(match==false){ //the eleNum apprears for the first time 
ave=0.001; 
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System. out. print("Rare event! 
rareNum++; 
rare=true; 
currentQ=currentQ+Math. pow((DECAY-ave), 2)/ave; 
} 
tempString=detailp[O]+" "+detail p[l]+" "; 
pdistribution. seek(tempStart+tempString. IengthO); 
for (int i=2; i<detail p. length; i=i+3){ 
pdistribution. writeBytes(detail p[i]+" "+detail_p[i+1]+ 
" "+df2. format(Double. parseDouble(detailp[i+2]))+" 'I); 
} 
recordNum++; 
if ((currentQ>2.34)){// calculate from first time run this data set 
System. out. print("Alarm! "+"X2="+df4. format(currentQ)+ 
" Record num="+recordNum+"\n"); 
alarmNum++; 
if(rare==false) falseNum++; //this is a false alarm 
} 
} else if (detail e[2]. equalslgnoreCase("set")){ 
double stime=Double. parseDouble(detail e[3]); 
double para=Double. parseDouble(detail e[4]); 
detail_IP = detail e[O]. split("\L. "); 
int node_num=lnteger. parselnt(detail IP[3]); 
nodeNum=node_num-NONNUM; 
pdistribution. seek(node_p[nodeN um]); 
record. =pdistribution. read Line(); 
record=pdistribution. read Line(); 
record_p=pd i stributi on. read Li neQ; 
record=pdistribution. read Line(); 
long tempStart=pdistribution. getFilePointer(; 
record_p=pdistribution. read Line(); 
detail=record_p. split("\\s"); //split pdf by spaces 
double para_min=Double. parseDouble(detail p[O]); 
double para_ele=Double. parseDouble(detail p[1]); 
int elenum=(int)Math. round ((para-para_min)/para_ele); 
String eleNum=lnteger. toString(elenum); 
double ave=0.0; 
double currentQ=0.0; 
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boolean match=false; 
boolean rare=false; 
for (int i=2; i<detail p. length; i=i+3){ 
ave=Double. parseDouble(detailp[i+1 ]); 
if (details[i]. equa! slgnoreCase(eleNum)){ 
detailp[i+2]=Double. toString( 
Double. parseDouble(detailp[i+2])*(1-DECAY)+DECAY); 
if (ave==0) { 
ave=0.001; 
System. out. print("Rare event! "); 
rareNum++; 
rare=true; 
} 
match=true; 
)else detailp[i+2]=Double. toString 
(Double. parseDouble(detail_p[i+2])*(1-DECAY)); 
if (ave! =0){ 
currentQ=currentQ+Math. pow 
((Double. parse Double(detail p[i+2])-ave), 2)/ave; 
} 
} 
if(match==false){//the e! eNum apprears for the first time 
ave=0.001; 
System. out. print("Rare event! "); 
rareNum++; 
rare=true; 
currentQ=currentQ+Math. pow((DECAY-ave), 2)/ave; 
} 
String tempString=detailp[O]+" "+detail_p[l]+"'; 
pdistribution. seek(tempStart+tempString. Iengtho ); 
for (int i=2; i<detail p. iength; i=i+3){ 
pdistribution. writeBytes(detail_p[i]+" "+detail p[i+1]+ 
""+df2. format(Doub! e. parse Doub! e(detailj, [i+2]))+" "); 
} 
recordNum++; 
if ((currentQ>2.34)){ //calculate from first time run this data set 
System. out. print("Alarm! "+"X2="+df4. format(currentQ)+ 
" Record num="+recordNum+"\n"); 
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alarmNum++; 
if(rare==false) falseNum++; //this is a false alarm 
} 
} 
}//end of while 
pdistribution. closeo; 
/! save Q value in a file for later analysis 
File Q_all = new File( "Q. txt" ); 
RandomAccessFile q_all =new RandomAccessFile(Qall, "rw" ); 
q_all. seek(q_all. lengthO); 
//calculate false alarm rate 
double far, hr, //far=false alarm rate //hr-hit rate 
if (recordNum==rareNum) far=(falseNum+0.0)/1.0; 
//to avoid dividing 0 at denominator; 
else far-(false Num+0.0)/(recordNum-rareNum+0.0); 
if (rareNum==O) hr=(alarmNum-falseNum+0.0)/1.0; 
//to avoid dividing 0 at denominator; 
else hr-(alarmNum-falseNum+0.0)/(rareNum+0.0); 
System. out. printC1nToatlAlarmNum="+alarmN um+ 
" FalseAlarmNum="+falseNum+" Record N um="+(record N um)+ 
" RareEventNum="+rareNum+" FalseAlarmRate="+df4. format(far)+ 
" HitRate="+df4. format(hr)); 
q_all. writeBytes("1nToatlAlarm N um="+alarm N um+ 
" FalseAlarmNum="+falseNum+" Record N um="+(record N um)+ 
" RareEventNum="+rareNum+" FalseAlarmRate="+df4. format(far)+ 
" HitRate= +df4. format(hr)); 
//calculate mean and Sx2 
double totalX2=0; 
double SX2=0; 
double meanX2, Threshould; 
int halfNum=recordNum/2; 
for (int i=0; i<(halfNum); i++){ 
totalX2+=X2[i]; 
} 
meanX2=totalX2/halfN um; 
for (int i=0; i<halfNum; i++){ 
SX2+=Math. pow((meanX2-X2[i]), 2); 
} 
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SX2=Math. sgrt(SX2/halfNum); 
Threshould=meanX2+3`SX2; 
System. out. print("\nmeanX2="+meanX2+" SX2="+SX2+ 
catch( IOException e2 ){ 
System. outprintC'FILE ERROR"+"fin"); 
}else if ( pDistribution. isDirectoryo ){ 
String directory[] = pDistribution. Iisto ; 
System. out. print( "\n\nDirectory contents: \n"); 
for ( int i=0; i< directory. length; i++ ) 
System. out. print( directory[ iJ+ "\n" 
else { 
System. out. print( " Does Not Exist\n"+" FILE ERROR\n"); 
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